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Marriage of Necessity:  
Same-Sex Marriage and  
Religious Liberty Protections* 
Robin Fretwell Wilson† 
Abstract 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor, the number of states 
recognizing same-sex marriage has exploded. Even though the 
Supreme Court “stopped short of deciding whether the Constitution 
guaranteed a right to same-sex marriage,” the Court’s basic 
 
*  Between the date of the Law Review Symposium on October 22, 2013, 
and final publication, a flurry of activity around same-sex marriage has 
occurred; state elections have also changed which party controls the 
legislature and occupies the governor’s office in at least one state. See 
infra notes 225 and 232 (discussing Virginia). This Article takes into 
account changes to same-sex marriage laws as of January 14, 2014, but 
it uses a snapshot of the political terrain as of the symposium date, 
October 22, 2013. 
† Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Director, Family Law 
and Policy Program, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful 
to Helen Alvarez, Joyce Chen, Rep. Gordon Denlinger, Josh Fairfield, 
Richard Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Howard Katz, Andy Koppelman, 
Douglas Laycock, Tim MacDonnell, Steve McAllister, Tamara Piety, 
Steven Smith, Mark Tushnet, and Todd Zywicki for their thoughtful 
comments, as well as the insights of the panelists and audience at the 
Case Western Law Review Symposium and presentations at the 
Institute for American Constitutional Heritage at the University of 
Oklahoma, UC Davis Law School, George Mason University School of 
Law, Kansas University School of Law, Penn State University School of 
Law, the International Academy for the Study of the Jurisprudence of 
the Family, and the Law & Religion Roundtable at Washington 
University School of Law. I would also like to thank the students in the 
Seminar for Gay Rights and the Courts at Yale University’s Trumbull 
College for our dinner conversation about religious liberty and same-sex 
marriage. I am part of a group that urges robust religious liberty 
protections in any same-sex marriage legislation. This group, which 
takes no position for or against same-sex marriage as a group in its 
filings, includes: Thomas C. Berg (St. Thomas (Minn.)), Carl H. Esbeck 
(Missouri), Richard W. Garnett (Notre Dame), Edward McGlynn 
Gaffney (Valparaiso), and myself. This group works in tandem with a 
second group of law professors, all of whom support same-sex marriage 
and religious liberty protections; that group includes Douglas Laycock 
(Virginia), Bruce S. Ledewitz (Duquesne), Christopher C. Lund (Wayne 
State) and Michael Perry (Emory), as well as Professor Berg. I am 
indebted to Cameron Flynn for his diligent research, without which the 
empirical analysis presented here would not have been possible. 
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vindication of same-sex couples’ right to equal treatment has spurred 
newly enacted legislation as well as judicial decisions recognizing 
same-sex marriage. The net effect has been to erase a boundary that 
had largely confined same-sex marriage to the Northeast.  
In jurisdictions that voluntarily enacted same-sex marriage, 
religious liberty protections for religious objectors who adhere to a 
heterosexual view of marriage—exempting them from requirements to 
facilitate marriages inconsistent with their religious beliefs, by 
providing a reception hall, for example—proved vital to the 
legislation’s success. In many Enacting Jurisdictions, more robust 
protections resulted in successful legislation where a bill with thinner 
or nonexistent protections had failed just years before. 
Even though same-sex marriage recognition in the Enacting 
Jurisdictions has thus far been yoked to religious liberty protections—
delivering important gains to supporters and opponents alike—
prominent voices on each side now caution against compromise. 
Buoyed by their recent judicial victories, some supporters have 
hardened against compromise. With the recent spate of favorable 
judicial decisions, compromise may simply appear increasingly 
unnecessary.  
Opponents are hardening in their stance, too. Far from folding in 
the face of the momentum carrying same-sex marriage across the 
country, some thought-leaders urge opponents to double down on 
their opposition. These opponents see only one way forward: fighting 
to the bitter end.  
This Essay contends that we stand at a critical moment in the 
same-sex marriage movement. A clear-eyed examination of the 
marriage movement’s success—and the challenges facing it going 
forward—reveals that both sides will benefit from remaining at the 
bargaining table, although the gains to each will be different.  
For same-sex couples, voluntary recognition of same-sex marriage 
by legislation delivers the benefits and security of marriage today. 
True, many believe that the juggernaut of lower court decisions 
requiring same-sex marriage will lead in the near term to a favorable 
Supreme Court decision. Although that result is increasingly likely, it 
is nonetheless not assured. Moreover, the unanimity of decisions 
striking marriage bans may, ironically, delay an ultimate resolution 
by the Supreme Court, which often declines review until a meaningful 
circuit split arises. For marriage equality opponents, the voluntary 
embrace of same-sex marriage permits legislators to consider 
competing considerations, including concrete ways to permit those 
who adhere to a traditional view of marriage to continue to do so 
without facing civil lawsuits or government penalty. 
Part I shows that same-sex marriage has spread across America 
through three different avenues: judicial decisions, state laws enacting 
same-sex marriage, and ballot initiatives—with judicial decisions 
being fraught with risk for religious dissenters while legislative or 
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popular enactments offer important, if flawed, protections to religious 
organizations and individuals.  
Parts II and III document that a “perfect storm” of characteristics 
favoring marriage equality in jurisdictions that voluntarily embraced 
same-sex marriage, together with extensive bargaining around 
religious liberty, nudged same-sex marriage legislation over the finish 
line. Even with these favorable conditions, marriage equality bills just 
barely squeaked over the line to enactment, helped by religious liberty 
exemptions. 
That advantageous political terrain is now nearly exhausted, as 
Part IV documents. Going forward, one would reasonably expect 
more robust religious liberty protections to play a central part in any 
legislative compromises over same-sex marriage, at least for the  
near term.  
Part V evaluates the impulse of some opponents of same-sex 
marriage to dig in, resisting same-sex marriage at all costs. In part, 
opponents rely on constitutional bans against same-sex marriage. 
Constitutional bans may well not survive judicial challenge. However, 
even without court action striking a ban, constitutional amendments 
banning same-sex marriage do not provide the bulwark against 
change that some assume since many can be repealed almost as easily 
as enacting ordinary legislation.  
Part VI concludes that, in the tougher political terrain that 
looms, those who care about marriage equality can continue to sew up 
legislative victories—but the price tag in the short term will be to 
agree to robust religious liberty protections for dissenters. Those who 
wish to protect religious objectors from the unintended consequences 
of same-sex marriage should act with all deliberate speed to lock in 
robust religious liberty protections, because the window for securing 
them is almost certainly closing. 
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Introduction 
In the space of nine short months—from oral arguments before 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry1 and United States 
v. Windsor2 to a pair of federal district court decisions invalidating 
state constitutional bans on same-sex marriage in direct reliance on 
 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (reinstating the federal district court 
decision invalidating Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit had affirmed the lower court’s decision in Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), but the Supreme Court found 
that the parties lacked standing to appeal. 133 S. Ct. at 2668. 
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires 
the federal government to recognize same-sex marriages that are valid 
under state law). The Court heard oral argument in the cases on March 26 
and 27, 2013. Argument Audio, Supreme Court of the 
United States (March 26 & 27, 2013), http://www.supremecourt.gov/or
al_arguments/argument_audio.aspx (listing the date of oral arguments). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1165 
Windsor3—the number of states recognizing same-sex marriage has 
exploded. If one includes the now-stayed decisions in Oklahoma4 and 
Utah,5 as of January 14, 2014, 19 states and the District of Columbia 
permit same-sex marriage, a leap from ten states mere months before.6 
Newly enacted legislation in five states7 and judicial decisions in four 
others,8 together with Hollingsworth’s restoration of same-sex marriage 
 
3. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 
WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (striking Oklahoma’s 
constitutional same-sex marriage ban on equal protection grounds, using 
rational basis review); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 
6697874, at *30 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013) (striking Utah’s constitutional 
same-sex marriage ban on due process and equal protection grounds), 
stay granted, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).  
4. In Bishop, the district court judge stayed the decision until “final 
disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.” 
Bishop, 2014 WL 116013, at *33.  
5. In Herbert, the district court judge did not stay the decision while on 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Herbert, 
2013 WL 6697874. On January 6, 2014, the Supreme Court stayed 
the decision “pending final disposition of the appeal by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” Herbert v. Kitchen, 
134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014). In the weeks between the decision and the 
Supreme Court’s stay, nearly 1,300 same-sex couples married. While 
the federal government has said it will acknowledge the marriages as 
valid, Utah is “largely refusing to do so.” Charlie Savage and Jack 
Healy, U.S. to Recognize 1,300 Marriages Disputed by Utah, N.Y. 
TIMES Jan. 11, 2014, at A1. 
6. Eleven jurisdictions permit same-sex marriage by legislation alone: 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
See infra Table A1. One state, Connecticut, passed legislation 
recognizing same-sex marriages on the heels of a judicial decision 
requiring recognition. See infra Table A1. One state, Maine, adopted 
same-sex marriage by a ballot initiative. See infra Table A1. Finally, 
seven states recognize same-sex marriage as a result of a judicial 
decision alone: California, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah. See infra Table A1. 
 As of this writing, the decisions in Utah and Oklahoma are stayed. See 
supra notes 4–5. 
7. Since March 2013, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Rhode 
Island have all legislatively enacted same-sex marriage. See H.B. 75, 
147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013) (codified as Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 
101 (2013)); S.B.1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (codified as 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §572-1 (West 2013)); S.B. 0010, 98th Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill. 2013) (to be codified at 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/201 (2014)); H.F. 
1054, 88th Sess. (Minn. 2013) (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. §517.01 
(West 2013)); H.B. 5015B, 2013 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2013) (codified as R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 (2013)). See also Table A1 infra. 
8. See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 
2014 WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014); Kitchen, 2013 WL 
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in California,9 erased a boundary that had largely confined same-sex 
marriage to the Northeast.10  
Even though the Supreme Court “stopped short of deciding 
whether the Constitution guaranteed a right to same-sex marriage,”11 
the Court’s basic vindication of same-sex couples’ right to equal 
treatment12 hastened a spate of judicial decisions requiring state 
recognition of same-sex marriage.13 Just as significant, the Court’s 
“historic decisions”14 fueled state legislation as well. In Hawaii, Senator 
Brickwood Galuteria introduced SB1 to enact same-sex marriage 
during a special legislative session. The bill’s text explained that 
“[t]he legislature acknowledges the recent decision of the United  
6697874 at *30; Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) (authorizing 
same-sex marriage in New Mexico); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 
A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (striking down New Jersey’s 
civil union statute as violative of the New Jersey Constitution and 
requiring the state to permit same-sex couples to marry). Prior to 
Griego, New Mexico law neither explicitly banned nor authorized same-
sex marriages. Griego, 316 P.3d at 871. 
9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
10. Of the early exceptions to the geographic cluster (Iowa, D.C. and 
Maryland), Iowa recognized same-sex marriage by judicial decision while 
D.C. and Maryland did so by statute. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862, 906 (Iowa 2009); see also Bill 18-0482 (D.C. 2009) (codified as D.C. 
Code § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2012)); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. 
(Md. 2012) (codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§2-201 
(LexisNexis 2012)). Maryland voters subsequently approved Maryland’s 
same-sex marriage law by popular referendum by a vote of 52% to 48%. 
See infra note 114. 
11. Adam Liptak, Utah Ruling Means No Respite for the Supreme Court on 
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2013, at A1. 
12. The federal district court decision invalidating Oklahoma’s 
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage references Windsor 65 times. 
See Bishop, 2014 WL 116013, at *17 (“This Court interprets Windsor as 
an equal protection case holding that [the invalidated federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”)] drew an unconstitutional line between 
lawfully married opposite-sex couples and lawfully married same-sex 
couples). The decision invalidating Utah’s constitutional ban on same-
sex marriage references Windsor 34 times. See Kitchen, 2013 WL 
6697874, at *7 (“The court agrees with Justice Scalia’s interpretation of 
Windsor and finds that the important federalism concerns at issue here 
are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies 
the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protection under the 
law.”). 
13. See supra note 8. 
14. Marriage at the Supreme Court in 2013, Freedom to Marry (June 
26, 2013), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/supreme-
court (“The Supreme Court’s historic decisions will dramatically 
improve the lives of same-sex couples across the country, allowing many 
couples the ability to protect each other and their families.”). 
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States Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor”15 and seeks to 
“ensure that same-sex couples are able to take full advantage of 
federal rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities granted to 
married opposite-sex couples by allowing same-sex couples to marry 
under the laws of this State.”16 In Illinois, where proponents 
introduced the ultimately successful same-sex marriage bill before the 
Supreme Court’s later decisions, Windsor lent further support.17 
Even before this Court-powered juggernaut toward marriage 
equality, state recognition of same-sex marriage over the last decade18 
evolved from a labored, slow moving phenomenon to a steady, 
seemingly inexorable one.19 As Figure 1 illustrates,20 the movement 
 
15 S.B.1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (codified as Haw. Rev. 
Stat. §572-1 (West 2013)). 
16. Id. Governor Abercrombie also referenced Windsor when he floated his 
own bill text to recognize same-sex marriage. See Press Release, Gov. 
Neil Abercrombie, Proclamation and Marriage Equity Bill (Sept. 9, 
2013) (“[T]he Governor believes that, in keeping with the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013), the State of Hawaii should extend to same-sex couples the 
right to marry and receive all the same rights, benefits, protections, and 
responsibilities of marriage as opposite-sex couples receive under the 
laws of this State.”). 
17. See David Masci, Supreme Court’s DOMA decision driving same-sex 
marriage efforts in states, PEW RES. CENTER (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/21/supreme-courts-
doma-decision-driving-same-sex-marriage-efforts-in-states/ (discussing 
Illinois’s prior attempts to legislate same-sex marriage). 
18. Recognition of same-sex marriage rights started in 2003 with Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) and gained speed 
after 2008, which was marked by a judicial decision in California, In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), as well as a judicial 
decision and subsequent legislation in Connecticut. See Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); S.B. 899, 2009 
Legis., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-20 
(2009)). 
19. See Liptak, supra note 11 (“Since then, the pace of change has been 
very rapid. . . . [I]n March, same-sex marriage was permitted in nine 
states and the District of Columbia. If the Utah decision stands, the 
number of states allowing such marriages will have doubled, to 18.”). 
20. Figure 1 reflects the date that a judicial decision was handed down or 
legislation was signed into law (or for some states, both). These dates do 
not always match the first date on which same-sex couples could marry. 
Some states, like Illinois, postponed by months the date when state 
officials were authorized to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
See S.B. 0010, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (to be codified at 750 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 5/201 (2014)). 
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gathered momentum when state legislatures began acting 
independently, as Vermont did, to “ensure that equality was there.”21  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Same-Sex Marriage Timeline 
In jurisdictions that enacted same-sex marriage (“Enacting 
Jurisdictions”),22 religious liberty protections for religious objectors 
who adhere to a heterosexual view of marriage—exempting them from 
requirements to facilitate marriages inconsistent with their religious 
beliefs, like providing a reception hall—proved vital to the 
legislation’s success. After New York’s watershed same-sex marriage 
law, the New York Times observed that the religious liberty 
protection: 
proved to be the most microscopically examined and debated—
and the most pivotal—in the battle over same-sex marriage. 
Language that Republican senators inserted into the bill 
legalizing same-sex marriage provided more expansive 
 
21. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Heidi Schuermann, Member 
of the Vt. House of Representatives (June 28, 2012). See Anthony Kreis 
& Robin Fretwell Wilson, Embracing Compromise: Marriage Equality and 
Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 Geo. J. Gender & L. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
22. The Enacting Jurisdictions either recognized same-sex marriage by 
legislation alone or with legislation codifying a judicial decision requiring 
same-sex marriage. The Enacting Jurisdictions include Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
For the enacting legislation, see infra Table A1. 
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protections for religious organizations and helped pull the 
legislation over the finish line . . . .23 
For some legislators, religious liberty protections shifted the question 
from whether to embrace marriage equality to how to balance 
marriage equality and religious liberty. For example, New Hampshire 
State Representative Rick Watrous explained:  
[Religious liberty protections] were very important. As you can 
see by the closeness of the vote, I think it was the crucial 
difference that made success. . . . These types of very personal 
and religious freedoms are very important to New Hampshire.24 
In many Enacting Jurisdictions, more robust protections resulted in 
successful legislation where a bill with thinner or nonexistent ones had 
failed just years before.25 
In fact, every single bill over a decade that has offered hollow 
religious liberty “protections” limited only to the clergy, who simply 
do not require protection,26 has failed to garner sufficient support to 
become law.27 This remains true after the Supreme Court’s decisions.28  
One would expect legislation with enlarged protections to succeed 
because legislators inherently balance competing interests in a 
 
23. Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2011, at A20. 
24. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Rick Watrous, N.H. State 
Representative (June 29, 2012). See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21. 
25. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21 (drawing on interviews with state 
legislators intimately involved in legislative battles to show that 
expanded and honed religious liberty protections allowed for same-sex 
marriage in states like Maryland and New York, where earlier bills had 
failed). 
26. The clergy do not need statutory protections because of the First 
Amendment. See John Corvino, The Slippery Slope of Religious 
Exemptions (Nov. 22, 2009), http://johncorvino.com/2009/11/the-
slippery-slope-of-religious-exemptions/ (“[T]he gay-rights debate 
concerning religious accommodation is not about worship. No serious 
person argues that the government should force religions to perform gay 
weddings (or ordinations or baptisms or other religious functions) 
against their will. That would violate the First Amendment, and beyond 
that, it would be foolish and wrong.”). 
27. See infra Part I. 
28. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21. The religious liberty protections may 
be thinning, however. See infra notes 35–36 (discussing efforts by same-
sex marriage advocates in Hawaii to provide a stripped-down exemption 
for religious organizations that was ultimately enlarged by the 
legislature). For a comparison of the religious liberty protections enacted 
in Hawaii with those put in place by earlier Enacting Jurisdictions, see 
Table A3. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1170 
pluralistic, democratic society.29 The many clashes over same-sex 
marriage have highlighted, for some legislators, the need to insulate 
religious organizations from unintended consequences.30 In the words 
of Washington State Senator Mary Margaret Haugen:  
Once I made the decision [to support same-sex marriage], I felt 
very strongly that those provisions [protecting religious liberty] 
needed to be there. We have many wonderful organizations. We 
need to respect each other’s space. We need to treat and respect 
others like we want to treat ourselves.31  
Even though same-sex marriage recognition in the Enacting 
Jurisdictions has thus far been yoked to religious liberty protections—
delivering important gains to supporters and opponents alike—
prominent voices on each side now caution against compromise.  
Buoyed by their recent victories, some supporters have hardened 
against compromise. Some supporters have long said that religious 
liberty protections are “politically unwise.”32 Now, with a spate of 
judicial decisions, compromise may appear increasingly unnecessary, 
 
29. The first openly gay legislator to vote against same-sex marriage, 
Hawaii Representative Jo Jordan, was guided by one question: “[A]re we 
creating a measure that meets the needs of all?” Diane Lee, Exclusive: 
Why Rep. Jo Jordan Voted Against Marriage Equality, Honolulu 
Magazine (Nov. 2013), http://www.honolulumagazine.com/Honolulu-
Magazine/November-2013/Exclusive-Why-Rep-Jo-Jordan-voted-against-
Marriage-Equality/. Representative Jordan explained that she was 
“really . . . not happy with the exemptions. Too narrow. I’m not here to 
protect the big churches or the little churches, I’m saying we can’t erode 
what’s currently out there. We don’t want to scratch at the religious 
protections at all.” Id. 
30. See infra Part I for a discussion of the loss of government contracts by 
religious organizations. See infra note 128 for discussion of a small 
business facing penalty for a refusal to celebrate same-sex marriage. See 
infra Part I for a discussion of how justices of the peace, judges, and 
government clerks may face firing or other penalty for not providing 
services for a same-sex marriage even if other willing individuals are 
immediately available to provide the needed service. Although 
somewhat dated, see Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, 
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2008) [hereinafter Emerging Conflicts] for a 
discussion of conflicts between religious liberty and same-sex marriage. 
31. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21; Telephone Interview by Anthony 
Kreis with Mary Margaret Haugen, Wash. State Senator (July 16, 2012). 
32. Jana Singer, Balancing Away Marriage Equality, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 29, 
2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/balancing-away-
marriage-equality/ (arguing for same-sex marriage legislation stripped of 
any protections for religious organizations or individuals).  
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too. For example, after Garden State Equality v. Dow,33 Senate 
Democrats in New Jersey initially supported and then declined to 
back state legislation that would have codified same-sex marriage, 
explaining that the influential same-sex marriage advocate Lambda 
Legal didn’t “want any kind of religious exemption.”34  
In Hawaii, where same-sex marriage resulted from legislation 
rather than judicial decision, some advocates downplayed religious 
liberty concerns. They argued strenuously that: 
[t]he proposed marriage equality law ensures that no clergy can 
be required to perform any marriage to which they object. This 
protects religious freedom. And the law goes further, by 
clarifying that churches or other religious organizations need not 
allow anyone to use their facilities for weddings, so long as those 
facilities aren’t rented for weddings to the general public for a 
profit.35  
Believing that a broader exemption was needed, the Hawaii legislature 
approved slightly more robust protection for religious nonprofit 
organizations.36  
Opponents are hardening in their stance, too. Far from folding in 
the face of the momentum carrying same-sex marriage across the 
country, some thought-leaders urge opponents to double down on 
their opposition. They say that the “the preservation of meaningful 
religious liberty . . . is inseparable from the preservation 
of . . . [heterosexual] marriage. They stand or fall together.”37 In the 
Enacting Jurisdictions, they contend that bargaining has “gotten 
exactly nowhere.”38 That is, efforts to shield religious objectors “have 
 
33. 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013). 
34. Ken Klukowski, NJ Stalls Same-Sex Marriage Bill To Kill Religious 
Protections, Breitbart (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com 
/Big-Government/2013/12/18/War-on-Christians-in-New-Jersey 
(“Democratic Senate Majority Leader Loretta Weinberg pulled the bill 
that she was supporting because of objections from gay-rights 
organizations such as Lambda Legal. The reason? Weinberg explained, 
‘They don’t want any kind of religious exemption, so out of respect for 
that, I will [pull the bill] (emphasis added).’”); see also infra note 63. 
35. Hawaii Facts on Marriage: Telling the Truth About 
Marriage Equality in Hawaii, http://www.factsonmarriage.com/ 
(last accessed Feb. 22, 2014). 
36. See infra Table A3. 
37. Matthew J. Franck, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, 
Fundamentally at Odds, Public Discourse (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/06/10393/. 
38. Id. (“When the above-mentioned religious liberty scholars have pleaded 
for accommodation of such persons and groups, they have gotten exactly 
nowhere. It seems that for same-sex marriage proponents, the religious 
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signally [sic] failed to achieve much, if any, meaningful 
accommodation of religious freedom in the recent legislative 
enactments of same-sex marriage in New York, Minnesota, Rhode 
Island, and Delaware.”39 
These opponents see only one way forward: fighting to the bitter 
end. As one commentator encapsulates this position:  
[T]hey have to win this battle entirely or be crushed 
everywhere, as segregationists were, and for the same reason: 
their views will be deemed too abhorrent to be tolerated. On 
this view, preserving religious liberty cannot be separated from 
preserving traditional marriage.40 
This Article contends that we stand at a critical moment in the same-
sex marriage movement. On both sides, some perceive that the 
delicate state of affairs that has thus far yoked enactment of same-sex 
marriage to protection of religious liberty is dissipating. However, a 
clear-eyed examination of the marriage movement’s success—and the 
challenges facing it going forward—reveals that both sides will benefit 
from remaining at the bargaining table, although the gains for each 
will be different.  
Marriage equality advocates have exhausted those jurisdictions in 
which a “perfect storm” of popular support, political characteristics, 
and background legal protections coalesced to yield marriage equality. 
As advocates move to more difficult political terrain, trading religious 
liberty protections will remain essential to securing marriage equality, 
at least in the near term,41 since it is unclear whether and when the 
U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in. On the other side, opponents 
rightfully worry about the existing scope and degree of protections for 
religious dissenters. But as the movement moves to more difficult 
political terrain, opponents will be in a considerably stronger position 
to get more robust protections. The price tag for those protections, 
however, will be to agree to recognition of same-sex marriage on the 
merits. 
 
freedom of saying ‘no’ to same-sex weddings belongs only to ‘religious 
organizations,’ not to similarly situated religious persons, despite the 
obviously personal character of the First Amendment’s free exercise of 
religion.” (emphasis in original).  
39. Id. 
40. Rod Dreher, Does Faith = Hate?: Gay Marriage and Religious Liberty 
Are Uneasy Bedfellows, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 2013), at 12, 15 
(attributing this view to Robert George). 
41. See infra note 54 and Part V. The near-term benefit of bargaining 
assumes that judicial decisions from lower courts striking state marriage 
bans, as in Oklahoma and Utah, are stayed pending ultimate resolution 
See supra notes 4–5. 
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Part I demonstrates that same-sex marriage has spread across 
American through three different avenues: judicial decisions, state 
laws enacting same-sex marriage, and ballot initiatives. One of these 
avenues, judicial decisions, is fraught with risk for religious dissenters 
precisely because it leaves no meaningful opportunity for balancing 
competing goods, namely, marriage equality with religious liberty. Six 
of the seven states recognizing same-sex marriage by judicial decision 
gave no new protections to religious objectors. By contrast, the one 
ballot initiative state and the Enacting Jurisdictions all offer 
important, if flawed, protections to religious organizations and 
individuals. Although they could have gone farther, these protections 
were enhanced over the course of legislative consideration through 
extensive negotiation.  
Parts II and III document that the “perfect storm” of 
characteristics favoring marriage equality in the Enacting 
Jurisdictions, together with extensive bargaining around religious 
liberty, nudged same-sex marriage legislation over the finish line. In 
every Enacting Jurisdiction except one, a majority of the populace 
supported same-sex marriage at the time of enactment42—a marked 
departure from the states that have not recognized same-sex 
marriage. In virtually all of the Enacting Jurisdictions, Democrats 
controlled both houses of the legislature;43 Democrats held the 
Governor’s office;44 and the state ranked among the least religious in 
the U.S.45 but among the most educated46—all characteristics that 
political scientists say matter to support for same-sex marriage.47 In 
every Enacting Jurisdiction, same-sex marriage recognition was 
 
42. Passage of a law may not be assured even when a majority of the public 
supports it if one chamber of a state’s legislature is controlled by 
legislators strongly opposed to it. Consider the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA); more than seventy percent of Americans 
support ENDA, yet U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John 
Boehner will not permit the bill to receive a vote in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Nonetheless, where majority support is lacking, 
enactment of a law is less likely. See Andrew Gelman, Polls Say ENDA 
Has Majority Support in Every Congressional District, The Monkey 
Cage (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2013/11/20/polls-say-enda-has-majority-support-in-every-
congressional-district/. 
43. New York is the sole exception, where Republicans controlled the 
Senate. See infra Table A5. 
44. See infra notes 185–186 (discussing Connecticut and Vermont). 
45. Eight of the enacting jurisdictions are in the bottom third for religiosity, 
while the rest are in the middle third. See infra Figure 13. 
46. All but Hawaii are in the top third for post-secondary educational 
attainment. See infra Figure 14. 
47. See infra Part III. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1174 
preceded by a statewide law prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. And in no Enacting Jurisdiction did the state 
constitution enshrine a ban against same-sex marriage. 
Notwithstanding these favorable conditions, marriage equality bills 
just barely squeaked over the line to enactment,48 helped in part by 
religious liberty protections.49 
That advantageous political terrain is now nearly exhausted, as 
Part IV documents. In the thirty-one states that have not enacted 
same-sex marriage or recognized it by judicial decision 
(“Nonrecognizing States”), the characteristics that favored legislative 
recognition splinter and, in some places, vanish entirely. Where the 
Enacting Jurisdictions are heavily blue states, the Nonrecognizing 
States are heavily red states. Republicans occupy the Governor’s 
office in 24 states and control the legislature in twenty-six states, 
while splitting control in two others. More than 80% of the 
Nonrecognizing States rank among the top two-thirds of states for 
religiosity and the bottom two-thirds for educational attainment.50 
Only four Nonrecognizing States assure sexual orientation 
nondiscrimination by state law.51 And twenty-seven of the thirty-one 
Nonrecognizing States ban same-sex marriage in the state’s 
constitution, erecting a significant (but not impossible) hurdle to 
voluntary same-sex marriage recognition.52 Going forward, one would 
reasonably expect more robust religious liberty protections to play a 
central part in any legislative compromises over same-sex marriage, at 
least for the near term.  
Part V evaluates the impulse of some opponents to dig in, 
resisting same-sex marriage at all costs. It first shows that 
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage do not provide 
the bulwark against change that some assume. Only a fourth of the 
constitutional amendment states (seven of the twenty-seven) erect a 
significant hurdle to removal of the ban. Moreover, while large swaths 
of the country today show deep resistance to same-sex marriage, 
public support is mushrooming. Increasing acceptance is fueled by 
increased familiarity with and acceptance of lesbians and gays by 
Americans. Public opposition will only recede further as the oldest 
 
48. See infra Table 1 and Part II; Table A5. 
49. See infra Part II. 
50. See infra Part III and Table A4. Oregon, Alaska, Nevada, Wyoming, 
Colorado, and Montana all rank in the bottom one-third for religiosity, 
while Oregon, Virginia, and Colorado rank in the top one-third for post-
secondary educational attainment. See infra Figures 18, 19.  
51. See infra Figure 20 (showing Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, and Wisconsin). 
52. See infra Figure 21 (showing that Wyoming, Indiana, West Virginia, 
and Pennsylvania do not ban same-sex marriage in the constitution).  
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generation passes on.53 Thus, “[t]ime is on the gay-rights side.”54 At 
some point, public support will swamp those characteristics that 
augur against same-sex marriage recognition, making enactment of 
same-sex marriage in the absence of religious liberty protections 
possible—at least in the 20 states where state constitutions can be 
readily amended.55 One should not overlook the fact that court 
decisions striking bans under the federal constitution have  
already occurred in red states, creating yet more urgency to  
compromise now.56 
Part VI concludes that, in the tougher political terrain that 
looms, those who care about marriage equality can continue to sew up 
legislative victories—but the price tag in the short term will be to 
agree to robust religious liberty protections for 
dissenters.57 Concededly, many believe that the early judicial decisions 
striking down marriage bans portend a favorable Supreme Court 
decision in the near term. Although that result is increasingly likely, 
it is nonetheless not assured. Moreover, if the lower federal courts 
uniformly strike down marriage bans, that success in the courts may, 
ironically, delay ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court, which 
often declines review until a meaningful circuit split arises.58 Thus, 
marriage equality supporters continue to gain from the voluntary 
embrace of same-sex marriage.  
The case for bargaining is even stronger for marriage equality 
opponents. Those who wish to protect religious objectors from the 
unintended consequences of same-sex marriage should act with all 
 
53. See infra Part II and Figs. 6–10; but compare note 156 (discussing Rice 
University study). 
54. Dreher, supra note 40. See infra Parts II and V. 
55. See infra Part I. See also Rachel Zoll, Divide over Religious Exemptions 
on Gay Marriage, AP, Aug. 25, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
divide-over-religious-exemptions-gay-marriage (quoting Douglas 
Laycock, a “church-state expert” from the University of Virginia who is 
recommending a more pragmatic course, as stating that “The more 
same-sex marriage seems inevitable, the less likely we are to see religious 
liberty protection in blue states”). 
56. See supra Part V (discussing the deeply red character of Oklahoma and 
Utah, where court decisions striking state constitutional bans are 
presently stayed). 
57. See Zoll, supra note 55 (quoting Douglas Laycock as stating that, “The 
religious community would have done much better to ask for protection 
for their religious liberty instead of trying to stop same-sex marriage and 
try to prevent it for everybody . . . .”).  
58. Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson, & Michael S. Lynch, The 
Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari 
Decision, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2138211&download=yes.  
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deliberate speed to lock in robust religious liberty protections because 
the window for securing them is almost certainly closing. But that 
window will not, as some predict, slam shut if the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognizes same-sex marriage as a federal constitutional right in 
2015 or later. The same factors that make the legislative terrain going 
forward difficult suggest that red states will be able to enact religious 
liberty protections, if for no other reasons than they will have the 
naked power to do so. And even after this point, same-sex marriage 
opponents will still have some bargaining leverage if they are willing 
to provide a promise of non-discrimination based on sexual 
orientation as the quid pro quo for religious liberty protections. 
This focus on the pragmatic value of bargaining should not 
detract from principled arguments favoring a live-and-let-live regime 
that both respects marriage equality and religious diversity. The same 
fundamental values of personal liberty that support an individual’s 
right to live according to his or her religious convictions also support 
an individual’s right to follow and fulfill his or her essential identity, 
including sexual identity and same-sex relationships.59 
I. The Importance of Bargaining Before 
Judicial Action 
Same-sex marriage opponents are running a race against time. As 
Parts II and III will show, in the next decade, swelling public support 
for same-sex marriage will swallow nearly all opposition to enacting it. 
This will likely eliminate, in the not too distant future, the need for 
supporters to bargain around religious liberty and same-sex 
marriage.60 The more immediate threat to the opportunity to seek  
59. Professor Chai Feldblum (now a Commissioner for the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission) argues that the “identity 
liberty” same-sex couples have in marriage and the “belief liberty” 
objectors have in their religious tenets are both fundamental values that 
deserve protection, however, these values can come into direct conflict 
when civil rights laws require one to accommodate the other. See Chai 
R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in EMERGING 
CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 123, 157. Professor Feldblum concludes 
that the demand of civil rights laws “can burden an individual’s belief 
liberty interest” but that “[a]cknowledging [the burden’s impact] . . . 
does not necessarily mean that [civil rights] laws will be invalidated or 
that exemptions . . . will always be granted to individuals holding such 
beliefs.” Id. at 125; see also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage 
and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. 
Pol’y 206, 219–20, 230–32 (2010) (engaging Feldblum’s argument); see 
also Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex 
Marriage and Religious Liberty, 99 Va. L. Rev., In Brief 1 (2013) 
(noting that religious freedom and marriage equality both seek to 
protect minorities that have been historically oppressed). 
60. See infra Parts II and III. Mushrooming public support may lead not to 
just successful enactment of marriage equality legislation, but to voter 
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compromise is a judicial decision by a state or federal court 
authorizing same-sex marriage. While the U.S. Supreme Court could 
resolve the federal constitutional entitlement to same-sex marriage 
decisively,61 it is unlikely to do so until a meaningful circuit split 
arises and even then, not before 2015 at the earliest.62 Experience 
 
led ballot initiatives as well. It is instructive that Maine, the only state 
to enact same-sex marriage by popular referendum to date, included 
tangible protections of dissenting religious organizations. See infra Table 
A1. Nonetheless, it is not at all clear that a ballot initiate will include 
adequately developed religious liberty protections. See infra Table A3. 
The absence of direct input of religious liberty scholars (to my 
knowledge), and the fact that (a) sponsors do not conduct hearings as 
legislators do, (b) interested parties do not have the opportunity with 
ballot sponsors to enlarge protections with specific constituents in mind 
(e.g., religiously affiliated social services agencies, like Catholic 
Charities), and (c) protections are not improved across the legislative 
cycle all auger against meaningful protections. See infra Parts II and III. 
61. Constitutional challenges to marriage restrictions proceeded early on as 
challenges under state constitutional guarantees, while later challenges have 
now been brought under the U.S. Constitution as well. Compare Kerrigan 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that the 
Connecticut's state constitution was violated by restricting marriage to 
heterosexual couples), and Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that limitations for the protections of same-sex 
individuals violated Massachusetts' state constitution), with Bishop v. 
United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013, 
at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (holding that Oklahoma's amendment 
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the U.S. constitution), and Kitchen 
v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *30 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 
2013) (holding that Utah's amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage 
violated the U.S. constitution). Dean Erwin Chemerinsky believes that early 
constitutional challenges under state constitutional guarantees delivered 
important, early judicial wins to advocates, without the threat of a federal 
court of appeals or Supreme Court decision going the other way. See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Keynote at the U.C. Davis Law Review Symposium, Not 
Equal Yet: Building Upon Foundations of Relationship Equality (Feb. 7, 
2014). A decision from a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals under federal 
constitutional guarantees would answer the question dispositively in that 
circuit, absent a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, 
a decision in the 10th Circuit would encompass Colorado, Kansas, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. 
62. See supra note 58 (discussing the importance of circuit splits to Supreme 
Court decisions to grant review); Liptak, supra note 11 (“Whatever the 
Supreme Court does regarding a stay, it is hard to see how it could hear 
the larger issue in the case in the current term. But a decision in the 
court’s next term, culminating in a decision in June 2015, is entirely 
possible.”). For a discussion of avoiding unintended consequences on 
bargaining of a Supreme Court decision, see Robin Fretwell Wilson and 
Anthony Kreis, Balancing marriage equality with other social goods, 
SCOTUSBlog (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2011/08/balancing-marriage-equality-with-other-social-goods/ (“But if 
the Supreme Court does weigh in here, an unintended consequence of its 
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shows, however, that a state-specific judicial decision removes the 
urgency to bargain in order to secure legislative recognition of same-
sex marriage in that state.63  
 
decision may be to strangle the delicate process unfolding in state 
legislatures across the country by changing the political calculus for 
granting robust accommodations. If the Court recognizes a federal 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, it should take care to leave a 
space for individual states to continue to decide how best to balance 
marriage equality with other goods in society.”); see also Douglas 
Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty, 99 Va. L. Rev., In Brief 1 (2013) (arguing that if 
the Court recognizes same-sex marriage (as they argue it should), it 
should expressly endorse religious liberty protections); Douglas Laycock 
& Thomas C. Berg, Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish 
Committee in Support of the Individual Respondents on the 
Merits (2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Marriage-Cases-AJC-Brief-Final.pdf. 
 Some believe that if the Court constitutionally recognizes same-sex 
marriage, religious objectors will be in the place of asking for concessions 
because “now they are the ones who are the outliers hoping to be 
accommodated.” See Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live? The 
Asymmetry of Accommodation (manuscript at 10) (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2484801. As Part V explains, the more challenging terrain facing 
marriage equality advocates going forward will place a premium on 
granting religious liberty protections even after a Supreme Court 
decision. In the perfect world, those protections would be tied to mutual 
benefit to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
community, like a promise of nondiscrimination in state law.  
63. A judicial decision recognizing same-sex marriage means that advocates 
need not bargain around religious liberty protections in order to achieve 
marriage equality. After a judicial decision, legislators may resist codifying 
legislation, worried that including religious liberty protections may be seen 
as chipping away at the broader right established by the court. See infra 
Part II. That dynamic is seen most vividly in New Jersey.  
 In October 2013, New Jersey joined those states recognizing same-sex 
marriage by judicial intervention. See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 
A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (permitting same-sex marriage 
in New Jersey). Three weeks later, state officials dropped the state’s 
appeal of the decision. See Dismissal of Appeal, App Div. Doc. No. A-
0521-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 21, 2013), available at: 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/samesex/AG%20Withdrawal%20of%20A
ppeal%20102113.pdf. Only 8 months before, Governor Christie vetoed a 
2012 same-sex marriage bill that contained modest religious liberty 
protection for organizations. See Kate Zernike, Christie Keeps His 
Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A19. 
The provision would have protected religious institutions against civil suit 
or government penalty for refusing to “provide space, services, 
advantages, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization, celebration 
or promotion of marriage if such solemnization, celebration or promotion 
of marriage is in violation of the beliefs of such religious society, 
institution or organization.” S.B.1, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (enacted).  
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As Figure 1 shows, state and federal courts are handing down 
judicial decisions more readily after Windsor.64 As of this writing, 
seven states65 (California,66 Iowa,67 Massachusetts,68 New Jersey,69 New 
Mexico,70 Oklahoma,71 and Utah72) have recognized same-sex marriage 
by judicial decision (“Judicial Decision States”).  
 
 In the weeks after Garden State Equality v. Dow, legislators considered 
whether to override the Governor’s veto, which would have placed that 
modest religious liberty protection into law. When the window for 
overriding the governor’s veto closed, Senators Loretta Weinberg and 
Raymond J. Lesniak introduced Senate Bill 3109 on December 12, 2013 to 
“codify the ruling . . . in Garden State Equality v. Dow.” S.B. 3109, 215th 
Leg. (N.J. 2013) (enacted), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012 
/Bills/S3500/3109_I1.PDF. Intending to “leave decisions about religious 
marriage to religions, and to uphold the free exercise of religion,” SB 3109 
included a limited exemption for religious organization identical to the one 
that Governor Christie vetoed. As noted in the Introduction, Weinberg, 
under pressure from same-sex marriage advocates, withdrew the bill. 
 Of course, this could have unfolded differently, as it did in Connecticut 
where the legislature followed on the heels of a same-sex marriage decision 
with legislation codifying the result and protecting religious liberty. See 
infra note 66 and Table A1. 
64.  As of Jan. 16, 2014, there have been four decisions recognizing same-sex 
marriage since Windsor, in New Jersey, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Oklahoma. See cases cited supra note 8.  
65. In addition to these seven Judicial Decision States, same-sex marriage was 
also originally recognized in Connecticut by judicial decision. See Kerrigan 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (concluding that 
the state statutory scheme impermissibly discriminated against gay 
persons). However, Connecticut is not treated here as a Judicial Decision 
State because the state enacted same-sex marriage legislation following 
the Kerrigan decision. See infra note 91 and Table A1. 
66. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (holding in 
June 2013 that private parties lacked standing to appeal lower court 
decisions finding unconstitutional California’s state constitutional same-
sex marriage ban, permitting California to resume same-sex marriages).  
67. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding that 
the Iowa marriage statute limiting marriage to one man and one woman 
violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution).  
68. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that barring an individual from civil marriage simply because 
the person will marry someone of the same sex violated the 
Massachusetts Constitution). 
69. See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 2013) (striking down New Jersey’s civil union statute, which 
provided the only relationship recognition for same-sex couples, as 
violative of the New Jersey Constitution and requiring the state to 
permit same-sex couples to marry). 
70. See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) (authorizing same-sex 
marriage in New Mexico).  
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Same-sex marriage by judicial decision alone is the real 
“nightmare for religious liberty” that opponents fear.73 As Figure 2 
shows, judicial decisions leave religious objectors the most exposed.74  
 
Figure 2: Degrees of Protection in Same-Sex Marriage States 
Six of the seven Judicial Decision States give no protection to 
religious objectors that objectors did not already have prior to the  
71. See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 
2014 WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (declaring that the 
Oklahoma constitutional Amendment precluding same-sex couples from 
receiving a marriage license violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution).  
72. See Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *30 (D. Utah 
Dec. 20, 2013) (declaring that the amendment to the Utah constitution 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).  
73. Ryan T. Anderson, In Illinois, Redefining Marriage Threatens Marriage 
and Religious Freedom, THE FOUNDRY, (Jan. 4, 2013, 1:16 PM), 
http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/04/in-illinois-redefining-marriage-
threatens-marriage-and-religious-freedom/ (“As my Heritage Foundation 
colleague Tom Messner has documented again, and again, and again, 
redefining marriage has already been—and will continue to be—a nightmare 
for religious liberty.”).  
74. After state courts in Iowa and Massachusetts held that their respective 
state constitutions required the recognition of same-sex marriages, the state 
legislatures did not revisit preexisting nondiscrimination law. See Zoll, supra 
note 55 (“Massachusetts and Iowa, where same-sex marriage won 
recognition through the courts, have approved no enhanced religious 
exemptions related to the rulings.”). California’s legislature enacted minimal 
protections as litigation over Prop 8 worked its way through the courts, 
resulting in the Hollingsworth decision. See infra Tables A1 and A3. 
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decisions (Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
and Utah).75 The one Judicial Decision State that does give new 
statutory protections specific to marriage, California, did so by 
legislation, as noted below. The failure of the judiciary to protect 
religious objectors is hardly that fault of the courts. Courts lack the 
inherent ability of legislatures to conduct hearings and take testimony 
about how to balance competing goods in a plural society. Moreover, 
protecting religious objectors is not the issue presented in cases 
establishing a right to same-sex marriage. 
Contrast this with the Enacting Jurisdictions. The Enacting 
Jurisdictions placed into law statutory protections specific to 
marriage76 that, while imperfect, generally insulate religiously 
 
75. Some same-sex marriage decisions acknowledge the possibility of an 
impact on something other than solemnization of the marriage itself. 
See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) (“Our holding will 
not interfere with the religious freedom of religious organizations or 
clergy because (1) no religious organization will have to change its 
policies to accommodate same-gender couples, and (2) no religious 
clergy will be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or 
her religious beliefs.” (emphasis added)). Griego cites N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-1-9(B) & (C) (1978 & Supp. 2012), which exempts religious 
organizations from the New Mexico Human Rights Act, to support its 
holding. But judicial decisions have not, and cannot, provide the kind of 
protection for religious dissenters that have been forthcoming from state 
legislatures. 
 Religious objectors may or may not receive protection from the state’s 
background nondiscrimination laws. For example, while Iowa’s 
background law insulates religious organizations when hiring for a “bona 
fide religious purpose,” Massachusetts’ public accommodation statute 
provides no express protection for religious organizations. IOWA CODE 
ANN § 216.7 (West 2013); see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 92A 
(West 2000) (defining a public accommodation). The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the Massachusetts Constitution 
to require the application of strict scrutiny to free exercise claims. See 
Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1994) (rejecting the 
Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
standard for free exercise claims under the Massachusetts Constitution 
and applying strict scrutiny). State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
(RFRAs) in the Judicial Decision States may provide some protection. 
See N.M. Stat. §§28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, 
§§251-258 (West 2010). The federal and state RFRAs all “facially 
require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices.” 
Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A 
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 595, 598 
(1999) (arguing that while “RFRAs have more specific, binding text 
than does the Free Exercise Clause,” they leave open a number of 
questions). See also Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After 
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466 (2010). 
76. Religious objectors may receive some protection from the state’s 
background laws. In three Enacting Jurisdictions, a state RFRA, 
modeled on the federal RFRA, is also in place. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 
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affiliated nonprofits from private suit and government penalty for 
refusing to solemnize or celebrate a marriage if doing so would violate 
their religious beliefs, as Table A3 shows.77 Protections, especially for 
religious nonprofits, are crucial because religious groups have faced 
both lawsuits and penalty by the government. For example, the 
Salvation Army lost $3.5 million in social service contracts with the 
City of San Francisco because it refused, on religious grounds, to 
provide benefits to its employees’ same-sex partners.78 In Maine, 
Catholic Charities lost access to municipal development funds for 
similar reasons.79 In New Jersey, a Methodist nonprofit association 
violated New Jersey’s law against discrimination when the nonprofit  
Ann. §52-571b (West 2009); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/1-99 (West 
2009); R.I. Gen. Laws §§42-80.1-1 to -4 (2006). In addition, three 
Enacting Jurisdictions (Maine, Minnesota, and Washington) have 
interpreted their state constitutions to protect against neutral and 
generally applicable laws that substantially burden religious belief or 
practice. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 
(Wash. 1992); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Rupert v. 
City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). These generalized protections 
may or may not provide anything more than the statutory protections 
specific to marriage. But they are there, and people can invoke them in 
the marriage context. 
 Finally, the anti-discrimination law in several Enacting Jurisdictions 
give modest protection to religious organizations. See Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 363A.26 (West) (2012) (providing accommodation to religious 
associations in matters relating “to sexual orientation, [when] taking any 
action with respect to education, employment, housing and real 
property, or use of facilities”); Md. Code Ann., Md. State Gov’t 
§ 20-604(2) (2011) (prohibiting discrimination in employment but 
exempting religious organizations); N.Y. Exec. Law § 11 (2011) 
(providing religious liberty accommodations for rental and housing in 
discrimination ban). In some cases, however, these laws provide little 
sanctuary for objectors. 
77. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45b-35a (Supp. 2013); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e) 
(LexisNexis 2012); Md. H.B. 438 §§ 2–3 (West 2012) (codified as Md. 
Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (2012)); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 517.09 (West 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (West 2004); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 15-3-6.1 (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4502(1) (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(6) (West 2012). See also infra Table A3.  
78. See Manny Fernandez & April Lynch, Salvation Army Cuts S.F. 
Programs: Charity Spurns City’s Domestic Partner Law, S.F. 
Chronicle, June 4, 1998, at A1, A15 (providing details on the cuts to 
the Salvation Army in San Francisco for refusing to provide same-sex 
benefits for employees).  
79. See Catholic Charities of Maine, Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 
2d 77 (D. Me. 2004) (upholding ordinance requiring religious charity to 
either extend employee spousal benefit programs to registered same-sex 
couples, or to lose eligibility for all city housing and community 
development funds). 
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association denied two same-sex couples’ requests to use the group’s 
boardwalk pavilion for their civil union commitment ceremonies.80  
In many Enacting Jurisdictions, religious individuals, universities, 
social services agencies, and fraternal organizations receive 
protections, as well.81 As Table A3 shows: 
 Four jurisdictions allow the Knights of Columbus or other 
religious organizations to continue to offer an insurance product 
for spouses in heterosexual marriages (Vermont, New 
Hampshire, Maryland, and Rhode Island). 
 Five jurisdictions expressly say religious organizations need 
not promote same-sex marriage through religious counseling 
or retreats (Maryland, DC, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
and Washington). Three extend this to married-couple housing 
(Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New York). 
 Four jurisdictions allow religiously affiliated adoption 
agencies to continue to place children only with heterosexual 
married couples (Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, and 
Rhode Island); three condition the exemption on not 
receiving government funding for the program (Connecticut, 
Maryland, and Minnesota). 
 Six states expressly exempt individual employees of a covered 
entity from celebrating or promoting same-sex marriages—
while it is hard to imagine who this protects, think of a 
lawsuit filed against a church employee, instead of suing the 
church (Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Washington).82  
80. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, OAL DKT. CRT 
6145-09, 2012 WL 169302, at *1, 2 (N.J. Adm., Jan. 12, 2012) (“The 
Green Acres program is designed to preserve open space and the statutory 
scheme authorizes a tax exemption for non-profit corporations utilizing 
property for conservation or recreational purposes. One condition of the 
exemption is that the property be ‘open for public use on an equal 
basis.’”); see also Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious 
Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NPR (June 16, 2008, 12:12 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486340. The 
group also lost its exemption from ad volorem property taxes on the 
pavilion, but that loss was hastened by the group’s own decision to tie its 
property tax exemption to a public lands program. Although the loss of a 
tax exemption expressly conditioned upon “public access” to a parcel of 
land hardly seems unfair, see Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21, tax-exempt 
religious groups fear that they may lose valuable benefits if their views of 
marriage become “disfavored.” 
81. See infra Table A3; see also infra Part II for a discussion of the extent of 
protection for religious objectors in state same-sex marriage laws. 
82. See Md. H.B. 438 §§ 2–3(b) (codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law 
§§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09(3)(b) 
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 Six states specifically carry forward religious liberty protections 
present in the underlying anti-discrimination statute or state 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Delaware, Illinois, 
Minnesota, New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island).83  
 One state, Delaware, permits justices of the peace and judges 
to choose to solemnize only those marriages they choose to.84 
Until Delaware, no jurisdiction had provided protection to 
government officials. Where protections are lacking, justices of the 
 
(West Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. 
Law. § 10-b (1); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2)(e) (LexisNexis 
2013); Wash. Rev. Code § 7(a)(i). 
83. Legislation in Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, New Hampshire, 
and Rhode Island also contained “catch-all” protections, carrying forward 
existing preexisting exemptions in each state’s underlying statutory 
scheme barring discrimination. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (West 
2004) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or construed to limit the 
protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under RSA 
354-A:18.”); SF 925, 88th Legis. Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013) (“This chapter 
does not alter or affect the protections or exemptions provided in chapter 
363A for a religious association, educational institution, business, labor 
organization, place of public accommodation, employer, or other 
person.”); SB 10, 98th Gen. Assm. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (“Nothing in this 
Act is intended to abrogate, limit, or expand . . . the Illinois Human 
Rights Act or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”); 3. N.Y. Dom. 
Rel. Law § 10-b. (“Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to 
limit the protections and exemptions otherwise provided to religious 
organizations under section three of article one of the constitution of the 
state of New York.”); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1 (“Nothing in the 
marriage laws of this state shall be deemed or construed to limit the 
protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under GL 
paragraph 28-5-6(7)(ii) and subsection 34-37-4.2(a)”). Delaware’s law 
provides that the same-sex marriage law “does not affect rights, duties or 
obligations that matured or were owed, penalties that were incurred, or 
proceedings that were begun, before its effective date.” Delaware Laws 
Ch. 19 (H.B. 75 2013); see also Table A3. 
 For Enacting Jurisdictions with state RFRAs, see supra note 76 
(cataloging those Enacting Jurisdictions that had enacted state Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts before same-sex marriage). For details of the 
sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws that preceded same-sex 
marriage recognition in the Enacting Jurisdictions, see Table A2. 
84. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/ 
title13/c001/sc01/index.shtml (“[N]othing in this section shall be 
construed to require any person (including any clergyperson or minister 
of any religion) authorized to solemnize a marriage to solemnize any 
marriage, and no such authorized person who fails or refuses for any 
reason to solemnize a marriage shall be subject to any fine or other 
penalty for such failure or refusal.”). 
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peace have been told to “follow the law, whether you like it or not.”85 
The Iowa Attorney General told county recorders to effect same-sex 
marriages or face possible “legal actions”—like firing.86 Judges in Iowa 
were told they have discretion to decide which marriages over which 
to preside, but they better not use that discretion in a biased way, 
notwithstanding sincerely held religious convictions.87  
Religious liberty protections obviously redound to the benefit of 
people who cannot, consistent with their religious beliefs, celebrate or 
assist with certain marriages.88 Often overlooked is the fact that the  
85. Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 26. 2004, at A15 (“Daniel B. Winslow, chief counsel for 
Gov. Mitt Romney said . . . ‘If you hold true to your oath of office and 
follow the law, whether you agree with it or not, you will fulfill your 
duty as a justice of the peace.’ Mr. Winslow urged any justice with 
qualms about officiating for same-sex couples to resign.”). 
86. Statement of the Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, County Recorders 
must Comply with Supreme Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/ 
releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html (“We expect duly-elected 
county recorders to comply with the Iowa Constitution as interpreted 
unanimously by the Iowa Supreme Court, the highest court in Iowa. 
Our country lives by and thrives by the rule of law, and the rule of law 
means we all follow the law as interpreted by our courts—not by 
ourselves. We don’t each get to decide what the law is; that would lead 
to chaos. We must live by and follow what the courts decide.”). 
87. See Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Performing Marriages, 
EDGE BOSTON, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.edgeboston.com/ 
index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=90310 (quoting Bob 
Brammer, a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office).  
 For an argument that protections for officials who can effectively block 
a couple’s access to marriage should be qualified by hardship to same-
sex couples, see Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation, at 1480 
(criticizing an “exemption for government employees or officials—
unqualified by hardship—[as possibly] erect[ing] a roadblock to 
marriage”); Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Emerging Conflicts, supra 
note 30, at 200 (arguing that “[r]eligious dissenters can live their own 
values, but not if they occupy choke points that empower them to 
prevent same-sex couples from living their own values. If the dissenters 
want complete moral autonomy on this issue, they must refrain from 
occupying such a choke point”). 
88. For many scholars, it is not enough to just protect religious objectors—
the interests of same-sex couples must also be taken into account. A 
group of scholars with which I work has argued for qualified exemptions 
for individuals—that is, an exemption that allows individual religious 
objectors to step away from facilitating any marriage but only when a 
hardship will not result for those seeking a service. Religious 
organizations would be permitted to decline to solemnize or celebrate or 
facilitate a solemnization or celebration, or to recognize a marriage when 
doing so would violate the organization’s religious tenets, 
notwithstanding hardship to others. For the current text of the model 
protection, see Letter from Thomas C. Berg et al., to Hawaii State 
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same provisions benefit same-sex marriage advocates because they 
take a powerful argument away from marriage opponents.89 Taken as 
a whole, these protections extend well beyond the church sanctuary 
and provide greater protection than what the Supreme Court has said 
is constitutionally commanded.90 Even Maine, the only jurisdiction to 
recognize same-sex marriage by popular ballot, included some 
meaningful protections for dissenting religious organizations.91 
Although the scope and contours of the protection granted by Maine 
 
Senators (May 2, 2013), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs. 
com/files/hawaii-special-session-letter-10-17-13.pdf (providing model 
religious liberty protections). Under this proposal, the ability to object is 
not limited to same-sex marriage, but extends to objections for reasons 
of faith to any marriage—such as interfaith marriages or second 
marriages. Id.  
89. See Robin Wilson, Op-Ed, Rhode Island marriage law should shield 
religious liberty, The Providence J., Feb. 13, 2011, at A19. One 
prominent gay rights leader, Jonathan Rauch, has pointed out, the 
smart move is to “bend toward accommodation,” not away from it. See 
Jonathan Rauch, The Majority Report, The Advocate (Nov. 19, 2010, 
4:00 AM), http://www.jonathanrauch.com/jrauch_articles/the-
emerging-gay-majority/ (arguing that gay marriage advocates adopt 
“two important strategic changes . . . . First, accept legal exceptions 
that let religious organizations discriminate against gays whenever their 
doing so imposes a cost we can live with. Second, dial back the 
accusations of ‘bigot’ and ‘hater’ . . . . Not every religious 
accommodation is valid, and it’s not always clear where to draw all the 
lines. But the smart approach is to bend toward accommodation, not 
away from it, whenever we can live with the costs.”). 
90. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding 
that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First 
Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual’s or 
organization’s exercise of religious liberty), superseded by statute, 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2006), as 
recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). Whether the 
Smith decision was correctly decided or represents an improper restraint 
on free exercise remains a deeply contested question. See, e.g., David B. 
Frohnmayer, Employment Division v. Smith: “The Sky That Didn’t 
Fall”, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011); Douglas Laycock, The Religious 
Exemption Debate, 11 RUT. J. L . & RELIGION 139, n.44 (2009); Kent 
Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and 
Liberties of Speech 138 (1995) (“The decision was statist and 
majoritarian in a virulent form. It was inadequate whether one focuses 
on individual liberty, church autonomy, or long-term benefit of the 
polity.”). For a discussion of possible challenges to religious liberty 
protections based on the Establishment Clause, see Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee 
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 
318 (2010). 
91. See infra Table A3. 
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and the Enacting Jurisdictions vary from state to state, all provide far 
more insulation than the alternative—a judicial decision alone.92  
Nothing prevents a legislature from following on the heels of a 
judicial decision with legislation that is more protective of religious 
objectors.93 But at the date of this Article’s writing, only Connecticut 
and California have followed a judicial decision requiring recognition 
of same-sex marriage with legislation giving religious liberty 
protections.94 Connecticut expressly allows a religious organization95 to 
refuse to “provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such . . . is 
related to the . . . solemnization or celebration” of any marriage—for 
example, by hosting the wedding reception—when doing so would 
violate their religious tenets.96 Connecticut also shields covered groups 
from private civil suits for refusing to solemnize or celebrate a 
marriage.97 It further protects them from state action to penalize them 
or withhold benefits for such refusals.98 Lastly, Connecticut expressly 
allows a religiously affiliated adoption or foster care agency to place 
children only with heterosexual married couples so long as they 
receive no government funding for that program.99  
 
92. For additional detail, see infra Table A3. 
93. Connecticut passed legislation on the heels of a judicial decision 
requiring same-sex marriage. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Table A1. 
94. See S.B. 899, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (enacted); 
S.B. 1140 (Cal. 2012) (amended as Section 400 of the Family Code); see 
also Kreis &Wilson, supra note 21.  
95. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–35a (West Supp. 2013) (covering “a 
religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution 
or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction 
with a religious organization, association or society”). 
96. Id.  
97. See id. (“Any refusal . . . shall not create any civil claim or cause of 
action . . . .”). 
98. See id. (“Any refusal . . . shall not . . . result in any state action . . . .”). 
99. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35b (West Supp. 2013) (“Nothing . . . 
shall be deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a religious 
organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such 
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds for that 
specific program or purpose.”). For a discussion of an exodus from the 
marketplace when an exemption for religiously affiliated social services 
was not forthcoming see Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of 
Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-sex Marriage, and Other 
Clashes Between Religion, and the State, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1417 (2012) 
(chronicling the exodus of Catholic Charities after 103 years). 
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California enacted stand-alone legislation after Proposition 8,100 
giving clergy unneeded protection from a duty to solemnize any 
marriage, if and when same-sex marriage became legal101—a protection 
that was more symbolic than substantive since the right to refuse is 
almost certainly secured to them by the First Amendment.102 
California’s stand-alone law also assured religious denominations that 
they could not lose their tax exemption if they refuse to solemnize any 
marriage. Because the stand-alone bill protects the tax-exempt status 
of religious denominations only when refusing to “solemnize” a 
marriage, a decision surely secured to religious denominations 
already,103 it is highly doubtful whether the stand-alone bill adds 
anything to constitutional guarantees. 
It should surprise no one that the Enacting Jurisdictions provide 
more meaningful shelter to religious objectors than California’s stand-
alone legislation—and certainly than judicial decisions alone. 
Bargaining power is at its zenith when one party can provide 
something the other wants.104 In the Enacting Jurisdictions, same-sex 
marriage opponents demanded religious liberty concessions in 
exchange for support of same-sex marriage.105  
 
100. S.B. 1140 (Cal. 2012) (amended as Section 400 of the Family Code). 
101. See Cal. Fam. Code § 400 (West Supp. 2013) (“Although marriage is a 
personal relation arising out of a civil, and not a religious, contract, a 
marriage may be solemnized by any of the following who is 18 years of 
age or older: (a) A priest, minister, rabbi, or authorized person of any 
religious denomination. A person authorized by this subdivision shall 
not be required to solemnize a marriage that is contrary to the tenets of 
his or her faith. Any refusal to solemnize a marriage under this 
subdivision, either by an individual or by a religious denomination, shall 
not affect the tax-exempt status of any entity.”). 
102. Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in Emerging 
Conflicts, supra note 30; see also Corvino, supra note 26. 
103. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 706–07 (holding that the ministerial exception, grounded in the 
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, applies to an employee who works 
in a church-affiliated entity (e.g., in a church school), based on an 
overall assessment of the role of the employee, which in turn derives 
partially from the church’s own understanding of that role, barring 
recovery against the entity under the Americans with Disabilities Act).  
104.  See Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Evangelicals’ Favorite Same-Sex Marriage 
Law? CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.christianity 
today.com/ct/2014/january-web-only/evangelicals-favorite-same-sex-
marriage-law-oklahoma-utah.html (As Professor Laycock explains, 
“Somebody has to credibly say, ‘Give us a real religious liberty provision 
and we’ll withdraw our opposition.’”). 
105. See supra Introduction and accompanying note 24 (interviewing Rick 
Watrous); see also infra note 116 (interviewing Kach); Schuermann, 
supra note 21. Clearly, some legislators vote for same-sex marriage 
because they view it as the right thing to do. For example, 
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And same-sex marriage advocates gained from the exchange, too. 
Consider the legislative experience enacting same-sex marriage in 
Maryland, charted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Maryland Same-Sex Marriage Legislation 
In 2008,106 and again in 2009,107 bills with illusory, clergy-only 
exemptions failed.108 In 2011, the Maryland House of Delegates again 
 
Representative Heidi Schuermann of the Vermont House of 
Representatives explained: “I wanted to ensure that equality was there, 
but at the same time, I wanted to make sure that the language in the 
public accommodations act allowed [religious organizations] to keep 
doing the things they’ve always done.” Id. 
106. H.B. 351, 425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2008); S.B. 290, 425th Leg., 
2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008). 
107. H.B. 1055, 426th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2009); S.B. 565, 426th 
Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2009). 
108. Compare H.B. 351, 425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2008) (“That this 
Act may not be construed to require an official of a religious institution 
or body authorized to solemnize marriages to solemnize any marriage in 
violation of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Maryland 
Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); and S.B. 290, 
425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2008) (“That an official of a religious 
institution or body authorized to solemnize marriages may not be 
required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the right to free 
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United 
State Constitution and by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.”) with H.B. 1055, 2008 Reg. Sess., 426th Leg. 
(Md. 2009) (“That an official of a religious institution or body 
authorized to solemnize marriages may not be required to solemnize any 
marriage in violation of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed 
by the First Amendment of the United State Constitution and by the 
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introduced a clergy-only bill and sent it across to the Senate, which 
enlarged the protections and sent it back.109 Those new protections 
ultimately proved insufficient to satisfy hold-out legislators, so the  
bill died.110 
 In 2012, Governor Martin O’Malley added more protections to 
the failed bill, this time shielding religious adoption agencies111 in “a 
conscious attempt” to “pick up additional support in the House.”112 
The Maryland House narrowly passed the Governor’s bill, with a 
seventy-two to sixty-seven vote, and it cleared the Senate by an 
 
Maryland Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); S.B. 565, 
2009 Reg. Sess., 426th Leg. (Md. 2009) (“That an official of a religious 
institution or body authorized to solemnize marriages may not be 
required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the right to free 
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United 
State Constitution and by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.”) 
 Bills with such “hollow” protections have failed everywhere they have 
been tried. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21.  
109. Compare the First Reading version of H.B. 175 and the First Reading 
version of S.B. 116, 2011 Reg. Sess., 428th Leg. (Md. 2011), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0116f.pdf (restating con-
stitutional protections for the clergy only) with the second iteration of 
the bill at third reading: S.B. 116, 2011 Reg. Sess., 428th Leg. (Md. 
2011) (providing protections for religious organizations and religiously 
affiliated nonprofits from any requirement to facilitate marriages 
through accommodations, religious programs, counseling, educational 
courses, summer camps, and retreats). Senate Bill 116 was amended to 
immunize these groups from civil claims and government penalties, 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0116t.pdf. 
110. Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21, at n.90 (quoting Maryland Delegate Pam 
Biedle, as saying that “[t]he Speaker took a whip count and we knew we 
were a couple votes short”); see also Luke Broadwater, Md. Bishops Call 
On Catholics to Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, Balt. Sun (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-09/news/bs-md-catholic-call-
20111109_1_religious-liberty-roman-catholic-bishops-religious-freedom 
(discussing a letter from Maryland’s Roman Catholic bishops criticizing 
the pending same-sex marriage bill for failure to include more expansive 
religious liberty protections). 
111. H.B. 438, S.B. 241, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). The bill introduced 
on February 1, 2012, broadened the 2011 protections to encompass 
“promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or 
services, in violation of the entity’s religious beliefs, unless State or federal 
funds are received for that specific program or service.” Id. 
112. John Wagner & Aaron C. Davis, Governor Unveils Details of his 
Legislative Agenda, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2012), at B5 (“Religious-
exemption language included in O’Malley’s same-sex marriage bill is 
intended to pick up additional support in the House of Delegates, where 
a bill fell unexpectedly short last year after clearing the Senate.”). 
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equally slim margin, twenty-five to twenty-two.113 The law survived a 
referendum challenge, with 52.4% of Marylanders approving it.114  
Additional protections made all of the difference to the 2012 bill’s 
success. Maryland House of Delegates Speaker Michael Busch  
said that:  
We didn’t want to inhibit any religious organization from 
practicing their beliefs. One of the issues was the adoption issue. 
We wanted to make sure we didn’t impede on the Catholic 
Church for adoption services. We had a clearer initiative in 2012 
and I know for a fact that for two or three delegates [including 
religious liberty protections] was an important component in 
their decision to vote for it.115 
Speaker Busch was not alone in believing that religious liberty 
protections were critical to the bill’s passage. A last-minute vote in 
support of same-sex marriage came from Republican Wade Kach, who 
explained that “[w]ithout the religious liberty provisions, I would not 
have voted for the bill.”116 Others in the legislature thought that 
Delegate Kach would never vote for the bill.117 Delegate John 
Olszewski, a “devoted Methodist [who] was worried about churches 
that did not want to perform same-sex marriages,”118 delivered an 
equally crucial vote. He said that his support solidified between 2011 
and 2012 because of “the attention to the religious institution 
 
113. See House Bill 438; Senate Bill 241, General Assembly of 
Maryland (2012), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx
?tab=subject3&ys=2012rs/billfile/hb0438.htm. 
114. See 2012 Presidential General Election Results, Maryland.Gov 
(Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/
results/general/gen_detail_qresults_2012_4_0006S-.html. 
115. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Michael Busch, Speaker of 
the Md. House of Delegates (July 3, 2012). 
116. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Wade Kach, Member of 
Md. House of Delegates (Nov. 30, 2012). 
117. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Luke Clippinger, Member 
of Md. House of Delegates (Nov. 19, 2012) (describing Wade Kach as a 
vote same-sex marriage advocates “never thought we would get”). 
118. See Annie Linskey, Searching Souls on Gay Marriage; In the Face of 
Formidable Pressure, Six Delegates Cast the Deciding Votes, Balt. Sun, 
Feb. 19, 2012, at 1A. (noting that Del. Olszewski’s vote was needed to 
push “the vote count past the 71 needed to pass the measure”). 
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protections.”119 Had three votes gone the other way, a bill that passed 
seventy-two to sixty-seven would have failed sixty-nine to seventy.120  
 Religious liberty provisions may have mattered to the 
referendum’s success as well. The ballot text emphasized religious 
liberty freedoms. While the extent to which Maryland voters 
understood and accounted for the religious liberty protections in the 
Civil Marriage Protection Act is unknown, supporters emphasized 
them in the run up to the referendum.121 Governor O’Malley 
emphasized that there are “strong religious freedom protections for 
people of all faiths” in Maryland’s same-sex marriage legislation.122 
In short, proponents succeeded when they expanded and honed 
religious liberty protections. Of course, New York’s watershed law six 
months before the 2012 session,123 the active involvement of Governor 
O’Malley,124 and growing public support for same-sex marriage 
certainly also factored in.125 
 
119. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with John Olszewski, Member of 
the Md. House of Delegates (June 14, 2012). 
120. See House Bill 438; Senate Bill 241, General Assembly of Maryland 
(2012), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?tab=sub 
ject3&ys=2012rs/billfile/hb0438.htm. See also Linskey, supra note 118.  
121. See, e.g., Gene Robinson, Liberty and Justice for All in Maryland, On 
Faith (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2012/10/ 
10/liberty-and-justice-for-all-in-maryland/10097 (endorsing Maryland’s 
same-sex marriage legislation and stating “Maryland is one of many 
states that has demonstrated the freedom to marry and the freedom to 
worship are wholly compatible with one another”).  
122. Gov. Martin O’Malley for Question 6, Youtube (Nov. 3, 2012, at 0:18), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eo95lDAiBEU; see also Protecting 
Religious Freedom and All Marylanders: Rev. Donté Hickman, Youtube 
(Oct. 3, 2012, at 0:23), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SYSVSQnTnA 
(supporting the Maryland same-sex marriage law as “protecting religious 
freedom and all Marylanders equally under the law”). 
123. See, e.g., Busch, supra note 115 (“Once [same-sex marriage legislation] 
passed in New York on a bipartisan basis that helped, too.”).  
124. Maryland’s experience began with key legislators taking the lead on crafting 
religious liberty protections. Later, Governor O’Malley, like Governor 
Cuomo, guided the crafting of religious liberty protections and championed 
the underlying legislation. See Annie Linskey, O’Malley introduces same-sex 
marriage bill, Balt. Sun (Jan. 23, 2012), http://articles. 
baltimoresun.com/2012-01-23/news/bs-md-same-sex-bill-20120123_1_ 
marriage-bill-religious-protections-marriage-debate (“O’Malley last year said 
he would sign a same-sex marriage bill if it passed the General Assembly, 
but he did not include such legislation in the administration’s package. This 
year, he has said he will lead the fight for the bill.”). 
125. See Amanda Terkel, Maryland Marriage Equality Poll Shows Increased 
Support From African-American Voters, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 
2012, 11:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/ maryland-
marriage-equality_n_1732555.html (noting the shifting popular opinions 
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Like Maryland, in all Enacting Jurisdictions with the exception of 
two (Minnesota and Delaware), the successful legislation resulted 
after unsuccessful attempts to enact same-sex marriage with purely 
symbolic religious liberty protection limited only to the clergy.126 Only 
after ponying up more robust, if imperfect, religious liberty 
protections did advocates achieve their goal.  
Maryland’s experience is typical of the progression of successful 
legislation thus far. Religious liberty protections expand over the 
course of legislative consideration. Only in Delaware did religious 
liberty protections not improve over the course of legislative 
consideration.127 In Judicial Decision States, however, there is no 
opportunity for give-and-take over religious liberty protections—
absent a later codifying bill. 
Some critics say that bargaining for religious liberty protections 
has “gotten exactly nowhere”—lumping together tangible protections 
for religious organizations with the almost nonexistent protections for 
individuals.128 Now, it is abundantly clear that existing religious 
liberty protections do not go far enough to protect individuals outside 
religious organizations. Legislators have largely ignored the plight of 
judges, government employees, and those in the wedding industry 
who cannot assist with a same-sex marriage because of a “relationship 
with Jesus Christ”129—or for any other sincerely held religious 
reason.130 Individuals “find little asylum outside the walls of their 
 
towards same-sex marriage and that “a growing majority of state voters 
say[] they would . . . uphold a state law legalizing same-sex marriage. . . [in 
addition to rising] support among African-Americans”); see also Nate Silver, 
How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What it Means, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-
changing-and-what-it-means/ (discussing the trend of public opinion on 
same-sex marriage between 1996 and 2013). See generally infra Part II; 
Table A5. 
126. See Kreis & Wilson, Embracing Compromise, supra note 21.  
127. Id. 
128. See Franck, infra, note 37. 
129. For example in Washington, a small florist, Arlene Flowers, which had 
served a same-sex couple for a decade, now faces lawsuits from the state 
attorney general and the couple for refusing to provide flowers for the 
couple’s wedding because of the owner’s “relationship with Jesus Christ.” 
Joel Connelly, AG Sues Florist Who Refused Flowers to Gay Wedding, 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Apr. 9, 2013), http://blog.seattlepi.com/ 
seattlepolitics/2013/04/09/ag-sues-florist-who-refused-flowers-to-gay-
wedding/. 
130. See Wilson, supra note 89 (discussing firings and other discipline of 
government clerks who could easily be staffed around without undue burden 
to employers or coworkers); see also Wilson, supra note 99 (describing 
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churches,”131 facing the cruel choice: your livelihood or your 
conscience.132 In effect, without protections, there is the real 
possibility that members of a number of Christian, Jewish, and other 
religious groups will effectively be debarred from certain professions 
relating to weddings.133 
Nonetheless, circumscribed as they are, religious liberty 
protections in the Enacting Jurisdictions have netted out to the gain 
of religious organizations. While critics legitimately fault state 
lawmakers for not providing all of the religious liberty protections 
that some urge,134 it simply is not true that the legislative process has 
yielded nothing for religious objectors. As the remainder of this 
Article documents, acting proactively to lock-in religious liberty 
protections will pay dividends for all.  
II. A (Closing) Political Window for Securing 
Religious Liberty 
In the past decade, support for same-sex marriage has escalated, a 
phenomenon that will only continue. This Part, along with Part III, 
demonstrates that increasing support, propelled by a constellation of 
characteristics in the Enacting Jurisdictions, produced a favorable 
environment for enacting same-sex marriage legislation.  
Over the last five years, there has been a tremendous shift in 
favor of support for same-sex marriage. Nate Silver, a statistician 
whose modeling has accurately predicted the results of many same-sex 
 
methods for staffing around religious objectors that are invisible to the 
public, preserving the dignity interests of same-sex couples). 
131. Dreher, supra note 40, at 12, 15.  
132. Matthew J. Franck, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, 
Fundamentally At Odds, Witherspoon Institute (June 18th, 2013), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/06/10393/ (“No state, on the 
other hand, has credited or accommodated the religiously grounded 
objections of other private actors—professionals or small business 
owners—to being dragooned into offering their services on the wedding 
day to same-sex couples. There are several well-known cases of bakers, 
photographers—even a religious nonprofit property owner—facing grave 
legal jeopardy for their refusal to offer their services or facilities in 
contradiction of their felt obligations to witness to the truth about 
marriage as it is taught by their faith.”). 
133. See Laycock, supra note 87 (chronicling the historical barring of Catholics 
from certain professions in England and Ireland, and Jews elsewhere). 
Stated differently, without protections specific to marriage, there will be 
no Evangelical photographers, Orthodox Jewish florists, and the like. 
134. See supra note 88 (proposing model religious liberty protections specific 
to marriage ceremonies or recognition). 
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marriage ballot initiatives,135 analyzed results from 2008 exit polls in 
three states.136 From that data, he distilled more than a dozen 
characteristics that were influential to public support or opposition to 
same-sex marriage; he extrapolates from those characteristics to 
predict how other jurisdictions would have viewed same-sex marriage 
if polled in 2008.137 Figure 4 shows Silver’s calculations for 2008.138 
  
 
135. See Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, The 
N.Y. Times (June 29, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/the-future-of-same-sex-marriage-ballot-
measures/; Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Speech at UC Davis 
Law Review Symposium (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://mediasite. 
ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/Play/29ec228147e74da09625f244b3de28081d. (Professor Chemerinsky named Nate Silver “if not the best, then the most 
prominent pollster.”). 
136. Silver, supra note 135 (analyzing “individual-level survey results from 
exit polls in 2008 in the three states that voted on same-sex marriage 
ballot initiatives that year (California, Florida, and Arizona). Each of 
these states are quite demographically diverse, and among them more 
than 5,000 voters were surveyed in the 2008 exit polls.”) 
137. Id. (explaining his regression analysis: “[i]n essence, the technique is to 
predict how likely an individual voter is to support same-sex marriage 
given their particular demographic profile”). 
138. A literature suggests that ballot exit polls after elections better predict 
actual views of voters than telephone or other polls because of what is 
known as the Bradley Effect. The term comes from an election contest for 
Governor of California in 1982 between African-American mayor of Los 
Angeles, Tom Bradley, and white opponent, George Deukmejian, in which 
polls before the election showed measurably more support for Bradley. 
“Analysts assume that one reason for the discrepancy between the polls 
and the election result was that white supporters of Deukmejian were 
reluctant to appear intolerant to survey researchers and thus falsely 
reported being ‘undecided.’” Patrick Egan, Is There Really a “Bradley 
Effect” for Same-Sex Marriage Initiatives? (Sept. 22, 2008) available at: 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4819/Egan_Bradley_Effect_in_SSM
_Initiatives.pdf. As to polling about same-sex marriage, Egan believes “a 
careful analysis of polling data and election results indicates that if any 
such ‘Bradley effect’ exists with regard to same-sex marriage initiatives, it 
is small—and in 2006 it was effectively zero.” Id.; see also Patrick J. 
Egan, Findings from a Decade of Polling on Ballot Measures Regarding 
the Legal Status of Same-Sex Couples (June 15, 2010) available at 
http://www.haasjr.org/sites/default/files/Marriage%20 Polling.pdf. 
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Figure 4: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Ballot 
Initiative (2008) 
Figure 4 shows support in lighter shades and opposition in darker 
ones. Support exceeded 50% in only nine states located in the 
Northeast—not surprisingly, the incubator of same-sex marriage laws. 
In the remaining states, support was below 50% and in twenty-one 
states, below 39%. 
Using the 2008 baseline, Silver projected support, state-by-state, 
into the present (gauged by his projections for 2012) and out as far as 
the year 2020.139 Figure 5 documents a drastic change in public 
support between Silver’s estimates in 2008 and projections in 2012.  
 
 
139. Id. 
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Figure 5: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage Ballot 
Initiative (2012) 
By 2012, according to Silver’s projections, in twenty-one 
jurisdictions, a majority of the population supported same-sex 
marriage (those in the lighter shades). In three jurisdictions, Rhode 
Island, D.C., and Massachusetts, support ranged as high as 63%. Only 
seven states showed support below 39%, with a total of thirty states 
having support below 50%.  
Of course, Silver’s estimates of support for same-sex marriage in 
2008 and 2012 may be too generous or even too stingy. Yet, Silver’s 
projections mesh with other reported increases in support for same-sex 
marriage. According to Gallup, public support has risen consistently 
since 1996.140 In 1996, only twenty-seven percent of Americans 
believed that marriages between same-sex couples should be legally 
recognized, providing the same rights as traditional marriages.141 By 
 
140. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% 
in U.S., GALLUP POLITICS (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup. 
com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-above.aspx (telephone 
interviewing those 18 and older living in all states and D.C. Gallop 
weights samples to adjust for “unequal selection probability, 
nonresponse, and double coverage of landline and cell users in the two 
sampling frames. They are also weighted to match the national 
demographics of gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, 
population density, and phone status”). 
141. Id. (“27% in Gallup’s initial measurement on gay marriage, in 1996.”). 
Gallop asked a random sample of 1,535 adults in a May 2–7, 2013, phone 
interview the following: “Do you think marriages between same-sex 
couples should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the 
same rights as traditional marriages?” Fifty-three percent responded that 
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2004, that slice grew to 42%, before falling to 37% the next year—a 
wobble up and down that nonetheless continued in an upward trend 
 
it “should be valid”; 45% responded that it “should not be valid”; and 3% 
had “no opinion.” Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies 
Above 50% in U.S.: Support Has Been 50% or Above in Three Separate 
Readings in Last Year, Gallop Politics (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-
solidifiesabove.aspx.  
 Mere months later, pollsters at Quinnipaic University asked 1,776 
American adults in a phone interview to land lines and cell phones in 
September 2013, “Would you support or oppose a law in your state that 
would allow same-sex couples to get married?” and reported that for all 
adults, 56% would support it, 36% would oppose it, and 8% did not know. 
Views of registered voters tracked these findings closely, splitting 57%, 
36%, and 6%, respectively. U.S. Catholics Back Pope on Changing Church 
Focus, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Catholics Support Gay 
Marriage, Women Priests 2–1, Quinnipiac University (October 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-
institute/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=1961. It should surprise no 
one that results may differ since responses are sensitive to how a 
particular question is framed and the questions that precede it. For a 
survey finding significantly less support, see Pew Research Center, infra 
note 157 (discussing longitudinal study of Americans by Rice University). 
The well-known Bradley Effect may influence stated support. See Egan, 
supra note 138. 
 Some also point out that Gallup’s question followed a question that asked 
whether “gay or lesbian relations between consenting adults should or 
should not be legal” and suggest that the order of questions may boost 
stated support as a result of “priming.” Mark Regnerus, What Polls Really 
Say About Gay Marriage, Chicago Sun-Times (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/otherviews/22053066-452/what-polls-
really-say-about-gay-marriage.html (citing News That Matters, by political 
psychologists Donald Kinder and Shanto Iyengar that “document[s] how 
priming shapes respondents’ answers to subsequent questions, particularly 
where sentiments about a previous question spill over”).  
 In its briefs about same-sex attitudes, Gallup presents “Trends for 
Comparison” to illustrate responses when the same-sex marriage question 
followed a sexual relations question and when it did not. Jeff Jones & 
Lydia Saad, Gallop News Service: Gallup Poll Social Series: Values and 
Beliefs Gallop Politics (May 2–7, 2013) http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/ 
162404/Gay_marriage_130513.pdf. There, a quick review of those 
answers shows skewing, but in different directions at different times. 
Thus, in an August 22–25, 2005, poll in which the same-sex marriage 
question was preceded by the sexual relations question, 37% said same-sex 
marriage “should be valid.” Id. at 2. A contemporaneous survey 
conducted on April 29–May 1, 2005, asking only the marriage question 
found that slightly more, 39%, said it should be valid. By contrast, in 
2004, 42% responded that same-sex marriage “should be valid” in a 
survey that first asked about the legality of sexual relations. In a 
contemporaneous survey with only the marriage question, 33% said it 
should be valid. Id. at 2 (reporting results of polls in May 2–4, 2004, and 
March 5–7, 2004, respectively). 
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for several years.142 By the end of 2010, a majority of those polled 
believed that “marriages between same-sex couples should . . . be 
recognize[d] by the law.” And that number reached 53% in 2011. 
Gallop reported in May 2013 that support across the United States 
remained at or above 50% in “three separate readings in the  
last year.”143 
It is worth pausing to note the explanatory power of these 
statistics. Until 2012, same-sex marriage opponents had “won” 
twenty-nine consecutive constitutional amendments fights—putting 
aside Arizona’s 2006 failed constitutional amendment to ban same-sex 
marriage and civil unions both.144 That streak ended abruptly in 2012 
when opponents lost the referenda over Washington145 and Maryland’s 
same-sex marriage laws,146 failed to secure a constitutional amendment 
in Minnesota,147 and Maine voters enacted same-sex marriage at the 
ballot box148—all of which occurred after the tide of national public 
opinion had shifted in favor of same-sex marriage. 
Silver projects that this uptick in support will only continue. As 
Figure 6 shows, by 2016, more than half of all voters in a clear 
majority of jurisdictions, thirty-two, are projected to support same-
sex marriage. Voters in only two states, Alabama and Mississippi, 
show support below 39%, while in nineteen states support remains 
below 50%. Silver projects that in thirteen states, more than 60% of 
voters will support same-sex marriage.  
 
142. Jones, supra note 140 (presenting results of Gallup polling across time). 
Support grew to 46% by 2007 but fell again to 40% in years 2008 and 
2009. 
143. Id. 
144. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21. 
145. Voters sustained Washington’s law by a popular vote of 53% to 47% in 
the November 2012 referendum. See Noah Michelson, Minnesota 
Amendment 1 Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measure Fails, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 7, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/11/07/minnesota-amendment-1-results-2012_n_2050310.html. See 
generally Table A5 for support in the state at the time of legislation. 
146. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (describing Maryland’s 
2012 referenda supporting same-sex marriage). See generally Table A5 
for support in the state at the time of legislation. 
147. See Michelson, supra note 145 (“Minnesota voters voted against an 
amendment on Nov. 6 that would have defined marriage as being 
between a man and woman in the state's constitution . . . .”). 
148. 2012 General Election Results for Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS 
(last updated Nov. 14, 2012), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20130118025105/http://maineelections.bangordailynews.com/ (47.4% 
responded “no”) (accessed by searching for the original URL in the 
Internet Archive index).  
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Figure 6: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Ballot 
Initiative (2016) 
By 2020, represented in Figure 7, Silver projects overwhelming 
support for same-sex marriage. At that point, only in Mississippi will 
support for same-sex marriage remain below 39%. In all states but six 
(South Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, and 
Mississippi), a majority of voters are projected to support same-sex 
marriage. In four of the latter (South Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, 
and Louisiana), support for same-sex marriage is projected to be 
within two percentage points of a majority. In twenty-four 
jurisdictions, over 60% of voters are projected to support same-sex 
marriage.  
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Figure 7: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Ballot 
Initiative (2020) 
In Silver’s view, “the steadiness” of this trend-line: 
makes same-sex marriage virtually unique among all major 
public policy issues, and which might give its supporters more 
confidence that the numbers will continue to break their way.149 
Given all this data, it would be surprising if advocates did not think 
same-sex marriage was inevitable. In fact, 85% hold the belief that 
“legal recognition of same-sex marriage is ‘inevitable.’”150  
Fifty-nine percent of opponents also believe it is inevitable.151 Of 
all people polled on the question, 72% in 2013 said “legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage is ‘inevitable,’” up from 59% in 2004.152 In every 
demographic group polled, except those aged 18-29, the fraction who 
believed same-sex marriage to be inevitable increased from March of 
 
149. Silver, supra note 125.  
150. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, In Gay 
Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal 
Recognition as “Inevitable” 1 (2013). 
151. Id. Interestingly, the belief of inevitability extends to those most 
opposed to same-sex marriage. Seventy percent of white evangelicals, 
only 22% of whom favor same-sex marriage, believe same-sex marriage 
recognition is inevitable. Id. at 3. While 31% of Republicans favor same-
sex marriage, 73% believe recognition is inevitable. Id. Finally, 39% and 
45%, respectively, of blacks and those 50–64 favor same-sex marriage, 
while 69% and 74%, respectively, believe it to be inevitable. Id. 
152. Id. at 1. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1202 
2004 to May of 2013.153 Even the most “tireless opponent” of same-sex 
marriage, Maggie Gallagher, believes same-sex marriage is a “foregone 
conclusion.”154 
Of course, people could be misgauging opposition, causing a rush 
to the judgment that “the game is over.” But at least Gallup polling 
suggests otherwise. When people misjudge public support, they tend 
to see “most Americans [as] com[ing] down on the side of not 
legalizing it.”155 In other words, most people who misjudge support for 
same-sex marriage estimate on the low side, not the high side, but 
they nonetheless see same-sex marriage as inevitable. 
The demographic profile of those opposed to same-sex marriage 
can only make same-sex marriage more inevitable.156 Social scientists 
 
153. Id. at 7. 
154. Dreher, supra note 40, at 12. 
155. See Jones, supra note 140 (emphasis in original). 
156. It is always difficult to predict the future. One thorny question is whether, 
notwithstanding the broader trend of increasing support for same-sex 
marriage, individual attitudes will harden against same-sex marriage as 
those individuals age (e.g., if they become more conservative with age) or 
for other reasons. Far more probative of this possibility than national 
polls over time are longitudinal surveys of the same respondents. 
Researchers at Rice University have tracked responses to the statement,
“the only legal marriage should be between one man and one woman.” 
Michael O. Emerson & Laura J. Essenburg, What Is Marriage? 
Americans Dividing, Kinder Institute for Urban Research (June 24, 2013) 
available at http://kinder.rice.edu/uploadedFiles/Kinder_Institute_for_ 
Urban_Research/Publications/White_Papers/Marriage%20Definition%20
White%20Paper.pdf. Interviewing  the same 1,294 Americans in 2006 and 
again in 2012, researchers found that “no significant overall change 
between 2006 and 2012,” with a slight majority, 57% and 53%, opposed to 
same-sex marriage in 2006 and 2012, respectively. Id. In those years, 31% 
and 33%, respectively, supported same-sex marriage. Id. at 5, Fig. 1. This 
rough constancy masked changes in individual attitudes.  
 Sixteen percent of those who originally opposed same-sex marriage (i.e., 
agreed with the statement) changed their view to supporting same-sex 
marriage (i.e., disagreed) over the intervening years. Id. at 5–6, Fig. 2. 
Twenty-eight percent of people who supported same-sex marriage in 2006 
(i.e., “disagreed” with the statement) reported being against same-sex 
marriage by 2012 (i.e., they “agreed”). Id. at 6. Nearly two-thirds of those 
in the undecided category, “who in 2006 neither disagreed nor agreed with 
the statement (13% of the sample), by 2012 . . . had taken a different 
position: 42% disagreeing, and 23% agreeing.” Id. at 6. In all, among those 
who people changed a fixed view, a greater fraction went from supporting 
same-sex marriage to opposing it (i.e., from “disagreeing to agreeing”); for 
those on the fence in 2006, a greater fraction embraced same-sex marriage 
by 2012. 
 The division in opinion between 2006 and 2012 grew “along educational, 
religious, and age lines,” suggesting a “growing cultural divide  across the 
nation.” Id. at 1. 
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and polling groups alike have all documented a generational divide 
over same-sex marriage.157 In general, younger people are more 
supportive of same-sex marriage, and support reliably drops off  
with age. 
Pew, for example, found that in 2013, 66% of “Millenials,” those 
born after 1981, who in 2013 were less than 33 years old, supported 
same-sex marriage.158 Fifty-two percent of “Generation X,” those born 
between 1965 and 1980, who in 2013 were between 33 and 49 years 
old, support same-sex marriage.159 Only 41% of “Baby Boomers,” 
those born between 1946 and 1964, who in 2013 were between 49 and 
67 years old, support same-sex marriage.160 Only slightly more than a 
third, 35% of the “Silent Generation,” those born between 1928 and 
1945 who in 2013 were 68 to 85 years old, favor same-sex marriage.161 
In every age bracket, stated support in 2013 represented the record 
high since polling began in 2001. The gap between generations is a 
persistent one. For example, in no year since 2013 was the gap 
between the Millennials and Generation X less than 4%. This support 
 
 Importantly, the law of the jurisdiction in which the respondent lived 
seemed not to have influenced the findings. Researchers “examined the 
opinions of Americans depending on whether they live in a state that 
defines marriage as one man and one woman (29 states [at the time of the 
study]) or not (21 states [at the time of the study]),” expecting to see a 
red–blue divide. Id. at 7. 
 Instead they found that “[r]egardless of what type of state people live in, 
in 2012, 54% agreed with the marriage statement, about a third disagreed, 
and the remainder was uncertain.” They concluded that “how marriage is 
legally defined across the states has little to do with actual public opinion, 
and more to do with higher-level political debates and special interest 
groups.” Id. 
 Even though individuals who once supported same-sex marriage may 
harden against it, it seems unlikely that this hardening will reverse the 
broader trend of greater support. Younger people are not going to 
uniformly change their opinions to oppose same-sex marriage, even if some 
younger adults do as they age. See infra notes 156–65 and accompanying 
text (discussing persistent divide according to age on stated support for 
same-sex marriage).  
157. See Pew Research Center, Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, Pew 
Research: Religion & Public Life Project (June 2013), 
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/slide2.php 
(“Younger generations express higher levels of support for same-sex 
marriage.”). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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among the younger generations extends even to young evangelicals,162 
a group in which support for same-sex marriage is typically lower 
than average.163  
Opponents of same-sex marriage could afford to ignore the 
phenomenon of a generational divide if it was localized to a fraction of 
states. However, the phenomenon is universal across all fifty states, as 
Figure 8 illustrates. Taking actual polling numbers from 1994 through 
2008, which they then weighted, Professors Jeffrey Lax and Justin 
Phillips broke down support for same-sex marriage by state and age 
group for 2009.164 In no state did younger voters show less support 
than older ones. 
  
 
162. Neil King Jr., Evangelical Leader Preaches a Pullback From Politics, 
Culture Wars, Wall St. J., Oct. 22 2013, at A1. The Wall Street 
Journal reported in 2013 that 51% of young evangelicals, those aged 
18 to 34 years, either “strongly favored” or “favored” same-sex 
marriage. By contrast, only 15% of evangelicals who were 65 years and 
older either “strongly favored” or “favored” same-sex marriage. Id. 
The reporting about these findings has been controversial. See Napp 
Nazworth, Russell Moore Clarifies Misleading WSJ Article, Praises 
Predecessor’s ‘Prophetic Voice,’ Christian Post Reporter (Oct. 
24, 2013), http://www.christianpost.com/news/russell-moore-clarifies-
misleading-wsj-article-praises-predecessors-prophetic-voice-107387/. 
163. See Pew Research Center, supra note 157 (“Support among white 
evangelical and black Protestants remains lower than other groups.”). 
164. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public 
Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, Fig.8 
(online appendix only) (2009), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jr
l2124/Lax_Phillips_Gay_Policy_Responsiveness_2009.pdf.  
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Figure 8: Explicit Support for Same-Sex Marriage by State and 
Age. Data from 1994 to 2008; estimates weighted for 2008.165 
 
 And matters are only going to get worse for opponents. To show 
the effects of the strongest objectors passing from the scene, Figure 9 
replicates Lax and Phillips’ data.166 In it, each age group is weighted 
by their relative fraction in a given state’s population, using 2010 
Census data where possible.167 The calculated averages in Figure 9 
closely track Lax and Phillips’ figure.  
 
165. Id. Reprinted with permission. 
166. Id. While Figure 9 is an approximation because it begins with data in 
Lax and Phillips’ published figure as opposed to their data set, it 
illustrates the effect of the oldest generation passing away. 
167. Lax and Phillips broke out state populations into four groups: 18–29, 
30–44, 45–64 and 65+. Id. at 384. Figures 9 and 10, and the calculations 
used to generate them contained in Table A7, use Census data for age 
groups 45–64, and 65 and older. See generally U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010 Census Briefs Age and Sex Composition: 2010 (2011), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf. 
Because the Census breaks down the group that is 18–44 years into 
those who are 18–24 years and 25–44 years, it was not possible to use 
Census numbers to generate the relative fraction of these groups to the 
voting age population. Consequently, Figures 9 and 10 and Table A7 
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Figure 9: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by State and Age, 
including individuals 65 years and older 
Figure 10 then eliminates the oldest generation, the effect of 
which is that the weighted average support in every state shifts to the 
right, showing greater average support. In 2009, without the oldest 
generation, an additional eight states cross the threshold to a majority 
of the population supporting same-sex marriage, bringing the total to 
fifteen states in which a majority would have supported same-sex 
marriage. An additional six states would be closing in on majority  
use Lax and Phillips’ fractional breakdown by state for the groups 18–29 
and 30–44. 
 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 164. Thus, in Alabama, the 2010 Census 
reported that 26.8% were between 45 and 64, and 13.8% were over the 
age of 65. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Briefs Age and 
Sex Composition: 2010 7 (2011), available at http://www. 
census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf; Table A7, 3rd set of 
columns.  
 Lax and Phillips reported that 18.5% of the Alabama population was 
between 18 and 29, while 19.2% were 30–44. To generate weighted 
averages, we calculated what percent each group represented to the 
voting age population. In other words, the denominator did not include 
those under the age of eighteen.  
 Table A7 presents the relative weights of each age group used to 
produce Figures 9 and 10, as well as the state by state population 
broken down by age group drawn from the 2010 Census and Lax and 
Phillips’ data. See Table A7. 
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support, with support above 45%. While Figure 10 can only provide a 
coarse approximation,168 it illustrates that public support will likely 
balloon with time.  
 
Figure 10: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by State and Age, 
without individuals 65 years and older 
Other factors contribute to increased support, as well:  
As a rule of thumb, perhaps about half of the increase in 
support for same-sex marriage is attributable to generational 
turnover, while the other half is because of the net change in 
opinion among Americans who have remained in the 
electorate.169 
Changing attitudes toward same-sex marriage and homosexuality 
among the electorate explains some of the softening of opposition. 
More Americans have gay family members, or now know that they 
do, and more have familiarity with lesbians and gays.170 Many more 
 
168. See Table A7 for data used to arrive at the weighted average without 
individuals who are 65 and older. To really capture how quickly the 
window is closing, one would have to age in new voters who turn eighteen, 
who presumably, like their counterparts under twenty-nine, will voice strong 
support for same-sex marriage.  
169. See Silver, supra note 125.  
170. See generally Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 
supra note 150. By 2013, 87% of Americans “kn[e]w someone who is gay 
or lesbian”—up from 61% twenty years before. Id. at 1. Twenty-three 
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now do not share the view that same-sex marriage “will be bad for 
marriage, bad for children, and very bad indeed for those people of 
faith who want to maintain their faith’s teaching on marriage, in their 
religious institutions and in their work.”171 
In the face of these trends, some opponents urge that religious 
liberty protections provided cover for cowardly legislators who 
otherwise would have not voted to allow marriage equality. 
Specifically, they say exemptions “allow[ ] a legislature to do the 
wrong thing, which is pass same-sex marriage.”172 Certainly, the close 
vote counts shown in Table 1 lend credence to the view that religious 
liberty protections mattered to the outcome in some states.  
  
 
percent of people know “a lot” of gay and lesbian people while 44% 
know some. Id. Forty-nine percent have “a close family member or” a 
close friend who “is gay or lesbian.” Id. Additionally, 31% know a same-
sex couple raising children. Id. Pew Research Center explains that “even 
holding demographic factors constant, those who have many gay 
acquaintances, or close gay friends and family members, are more likely 
to favor same-sex marriage than those who do not.” Id. at 16. 
171. See Franck, supra note 37. A shrinking fraction of people express 
negative views about same-sex couples raising children. Pew Research 
Center for the People & the Press, supra note 150, at 11. Even a 
few years has made a difference. Id. When asked if it is a good, bad, or 
does not matter for “American society” to have same-sex couples raising 
children, in April 2013, 21% said it is good, 35% bad and 41% said not 
much difference in. Id. In March 2011, 14% said good, 35% bad, and 
48% said it does not make a difference. Id. In February 2007, only 11% 
said that it was good, while 50% said it was bad and 34% said it did not 
make much difference. Id. 
172. Matthew Brown, Why America’s Long History of Protecting Religion Is at 
the Center of Gay Marriage Debate, Deseret News Nat’l, 
Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865590501/Why-
Americas-long-history-of-protecting-religion-is-at-the-center-of-the-gay-
marriage-debate.html?pg=all (quoting Matt Franck as saying exemptions 
“‘allow[ ] a legislature to do the wrong thing, which is pass same-sex 
marriage, which is bad for marriage, bad for kids and bad for religious 
freedom no matter what concessions you think you are making’”).  
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Table 1: Enacting Jurisdictions Vote Counts and Support for 
Same-Sex Marriage 
ENACTING  
JURISDICTION 
Vote Count House Vote Count Senate Support at 
Time of 
Enactment For Against
% 
For 
For Against
% 
For
Connecticut 100 44 69% 28 7 80% 52% 
Delaware 23 18 56% 12 9 57% 54% 
District of Columbia 11 2 85% (DC is unicameral) 57% 
Hawaii 30 19 61% 19 4 83% 55% 
Illinois 61 54 53% 34 21 62% 50% 
Maryland 72 67 52% 25 22 53% 52% 
Minnesota 75 59 56% 37 30 55% 46% 
New Hampshire 198 176 53% 14 10 58% 55% 
New York 80 63 56% 33 29 53% 55% 
Rhode Island 56 15 79% 26 12 68% 56% 
Vermont 95 52 65% 26 4 87% 54% 
Vermont Veto 100 49 67% 23 5 82% — 
Washington 55 43 56% 28 21 57% 53% 
 
 
As noted above, many commentators and legislators believe that 
protections did, in fact, matter to the legislation’s ultimate success.173 
At least one legislator, Vermont House Leader Lucy Leriche, candidly 
says she and others would have supported a law without exemptions 
if it was feasible, but it was not:  
We couldn’t have [passed same-sex marriage legislation] without 
the religious liberty exemptions. If we could have, we would 
have, honestly. But we would not have been able to get enough 
votes without them.174  
A more salient question is whether any enacted law would have 
passed within a year or two, with or without protections. In every 
Enacting Jurisdiction (except Minnesota), a majority of the populace 
supported same-sex marriage at the time of enactment.175 Even in the 
states where the vote counts were closest (Illinois, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, and New York), a majority, albeit slight, of the state’s 
population supported same-sex marriage. Given growing public 
 
173. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
174. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Lucy Leriche, Vt. House of 
Representatives Assistant Majority Leader (June 26, 2012). Not every 
legislator attaches the same weight to the religious liberty protections. A 
primary sponsor of Vermont’s same-sex marriage bill, Senator Claire 
Ayer, minimized them as “putting a little oil in the water.” Telephone 
Interview by Anthony Kreis with Claire Ayer, Vt. State Senator (May 
28, 2009); see Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21. 
175. See infra Tables A4 and A5. 
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support across the country, it is likely that same-sex marriage would 
have passed eventually in some form—but it would have required 
delaying marriage for couples clamoring to marry. Making enactment 
of same-sex marriage in those jurisdictions all the more inevitable, the 
same-sex marriage movement has followed a tried and true pattern, as 
Part III shows. 
III. A Cluster of Political Factors Supported 
Marriage Equality 
Social scientists identify a short list of demographic factors that 
influence support for same-sex marriage. While other factors matter 
to public support,176 experts note that:  
1) Democrats tend to support same-sex marriage in huge 
numbers,177  
2) Religious affiliation, or lack of it, matters to same-sex 
marriage support178—as does weekly or rare church 
attendance,179  
3) Those with greater formal education tend to favor same-sex 
marriage.180  
Taking a deeper look at the Enacting Jurisdictions, it is no surprise 
that they share this cluster of characteristics.181 As Figure 11 shows, 
 
176. See Silver, supra note 125. Silver posits that a number of other factors 
also influence support for same-sex marriage (“There are clearly a 
number of other factors that also affect opinion on same-sex marriage, 
however, most notably age, race, urbanity, and education levels.”).  
177. See Pew Research Center, supra note 157. 
178. See id. 
179. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50 
States, GALLUP POLITICS (Jul. 29, 2013), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx. In a 
longitudinal study of the same 1,294 Americans in 2006 and 2012, Rice 
University researchers identified three characteristics as strongly 
influencing attitudes on same-sex marriage recognition—“most especially 
education, religion, and age.” Emerson & Essenburg, supra note 156. 
180. Id.; see also Silver, supra note 125. 
181. Obviously, some characteristics may influence (a) public support for 
same-sex marriage and (b) any specific political characteristic, like 
Democratic control of the legislature. For example, urbanity of a state 
may yield both Democratic control and high support. This Article is 
intended to give a descriptive account of a handful of state-level 
characteristics that might have influenced the legislative process. Clearly 
a more sophisticated analysis would control for multiple variables 
through regression to tease out, with greater specificity, what factors 
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in every Enacting Jurisdiction (except New York182), Democrats 
controlled both houses of the legislature. In the sole exception, the 
New York Senate, a handful of holdout Republican Senators 
demanded, and received, religious liberty protections that exceeded 
those meager protections proffered by New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo.183 
 
 
Figure 11: Legislative Control at Time of Successful Same-Sex 
Marriage Legislation 
 As illustrated in Figure 12, every Enacting Jurisdiction had a 
Democratic Governor, with the exception of Connecticut and 
Vermont.184 Connecticut’s Republican Governor had no choice but to 
sign the legislation given the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
matter most. With so few states having enacted same-sex marriage, a 
statistical analysis of this kind may not be feasible. This Article only 
seeks to take characteristics identified by others as influential and use 
them to assess the political terrain going forward. 
182. See infra Table A4 (showing that New York’s Senate was controlled by 
the Republican Party). See generally Table A4 for underlying data. 
183. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21 (showing progression of legislation in 
New York); see also Christopher W. Dickson, Inseverability, Religious 
Exemptions, and New York’s Same-Sex Marriage Law, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 181, 183 (2012) (reporting that legislators agonized over religious 
liberty protections). 
184. See generally Table A4 for underlying data. 
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Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health.185 The Vermont 
Legislature overrode the Republican Governor’s veto by a vote of 
twenty-three to five in the Senate and one hundred to forty-nine in 
the House.186 
 
Figure 12: Governor Party at the Time of Same-Sex Marriage 
Legislation  
With scattered exceptions, the Enacting Jurisdictions all had 
populations that rank among the least religious but most educated.187 
To measure “religiosity,” Gallup conducts telephone interviews with 
individuals eighteen years and older living in all states and D.C. and 
asks whether “religion is an important part of their daily life and 
[whether] they attend religious services every week or almost every 
week,” and based on that response, reports the percentage of the 
population that is “very religious.”188 To assess the influence of 
religiosity, Table A4 presents Gallop’s measure of “religiosity” by 
state. Rank-ordering the states from most religious to least allows one 
to then break those states into thirds. Every Enacting Jurisdiction  
185. 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (striking down a law limiting marriage 
to heterosexual couples based on the Connecticut Constitution’s equal 
protection clause). 
186. See Vt. State Legislature, Current Status of a Specific Bill 
or Resolution: 2009-2010 Legislative Session (2010), available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/summary.cfm?Bill=S.0115&
Session=2010. 
187. See generally Table A4 for underlying data. 
188. Frank Newport, Mississippi Maintains Hold as Most Religious U.S. 
State, Gallup Politics (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
160415/mississippi-maintains-hold-religious-state.aspx#1. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1213 
ranks among the lowest third in religiosity in the country—except 
four (Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota), which occupy the 
lower portion of the middle third, as Figure 13 shows.189  
 
Figure 13: Ranking of Enacting Jurisdictions by Religiosity 
Figure 14 is based on educational attainment data derived from 
Census Bureau reports on the percentage of the population with a 
bachelor’s or advanced degree.190 Rank ordering states from the 
highest to the lowest, in thirds, reveals that in the Enacting 
Jurisdictions, every state falls in the top one-third for educational 
attainment, except Hawaii. Hawaii appears near the top of the middle 
rung. 
 
189. One might predict that statutory, if not constitutional, protections for 
religious freedom might roughly track self-identified religiosity among 
the states populace. Here it is interesting to note that among the 
Enacting Jurisdictions, three had enacted state RFRAs, modeled on the 
federal RFRA. See supra note 76 (listing Connecticut, Illinois and 
Rhode Island as the three Enacting Jurisdictions with state RFRAs). 
So, despite, the fact that Enacting Jurisdictions are generally ranked 
low for religiosity, three of them have enacted protections for religion. 
190. See generally Table A4 for underlying data; Educational Attainment, 
US Census Bureau (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
socdemo/education/. 
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Figure 14: Ranking of Enacting Jurisdictions by Educational 
Attainment 
The short list of demographic factors posited to influence support 
for same-sex marriage likely created a favorable environment for 
same-sex marriage recognition. But existing legal constructs surely 
favored enactment of marriage equality, too. Some legislators see 
same-sex marriage legislation as “a reasonable extension”191 of the 
non-discrimination laws that open access for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) persons to housing, hiring, and public 
accommodations.192 Those same laws provide not just a platform for 
 
191. Religious Liberty Implications of D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill: 
Hearing on Bill 18-482 Before the D.C. Council, 19th Sess. (Nov. 2, 
2009) (statement of Councilmember Graham at 7:11:18) (on file with 
author) (“I assume that this is a reasonable extension of the Human 
Rights Act of the District of Columbia . . . .”).  
192. To be clear, it is shameful for a state not to give a basic promise of 
nondiscrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations to 
LGBT people. Many of these laws specifically insulate religious groups from 
predictable violations of their religious beliefs, like opening married student 
housing to unmarried couples. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, 292(9) 
(McKinney 2010) (barring discrimination based on sexual orientation in 
employment, education, housing, and public accommodations); see also 
N.Y.C, N.Y., Admin. Code § 8-107(12) (2010) (expressly not barring “any 
religious or denominational institution or organization or any organization 
operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, 
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same-sex marriage, but a powerful rhetorical argument against 
religious liberty protections, which some charge will chip away at 
those protections. Jenny Pizer, senior counsel for Lambda Legal, 
succinctly captures this contention: 
In some states, the price of equality in marriage has been 
agreeing to give up protections against discrimination as part of 
the negotiations . . . . In ways, I think, other politically 
vulnerable groups are not required to pay that price.193 
These arguments have resonated with some legislators who say that if 
same-sex marriage legislation is about “equality, marriage equality” 
then “the extent to which we keep carving away at its vitality, that’s 
very problematic.”194 (Properly understood, religious liberty 
protections should not be seen as a rollback of prior protections.)195 
 
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization 
from . . . sales or rental of housing accommodations . . . to persons of the 
same religion or denomination or from making such selection as is calculated 
by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is 
established or maintained”). 
193. Zoll, supra note 55, at 2. 
 Importantly, religious liberty protections appear in hundreds of U.S. and 
state laws including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of 
Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (2010) (listing hundreds of 
laws with accommodations for religious believers). The state’s choice to 
accommodate religious dissenters is not a denial of equality by the state. See 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (noting 
that the Court “has never indicated that statutes that give special 
consideration to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary 
to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of 
religion under the Establishment Clause”). Some have argued that the best 
doctrinal ground for recognizing same-sex marriage is equal treatment in a 
fundamental right, rather than pure equality. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah 
A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1375 
(2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1594361. 
194. See supra note 191 (statement of Councilmember Graham). 
195. Religious liberty protections in same-sex marriage laws do not roll back 
antidiscrimination laws, which “largely address commercial services, like 
hailing taxis, ordering burgers, and leasing apartments, for which it is 
hard to imagine that a refusal to serve another individual can reflect 
anything other than animus toward that individual.” Wilson, Calculus, 
supra note 99, at 1476. Unlike those commercial services, facilitating 
another’s marriage is a religiously freighted and deeply personal matter, 
where a denial can reflect something other than animus towards another 
individual. Because many nondiscrimination laws were passed decades 
before same-sex marriage was permitted anywhere in the world, those 
laws could not have foreseen application to such a deeply religious service 
like facilitating another’s marriage. See, e.g., Title II of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on 
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Not surprisingly, every Enacting Jurisdiction prohibited sexual 
orientation discrimination in housing, employment and public 
accommodations well before recognizing same-sex marriage, as Figure 
15 shows.196 Some Enacting Jurisdictions also separately prohibited 
gender identity discrimination.197  
 
specified bases, like race). Moreover, the extension by the Enacting 
Jurisdictions of such general nondiscrimination laws to sexual orientation 
discrimination occurred in some cases decades before the enactment of 
same-sex marriage by legislation. See Table A2. 
196. For Connecticut, compare Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-20a (Apr. 23, 2009) 
with Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-60 (West 2009); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 46a-64c (West 2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64 (West 
2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-66 (West 2009); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 46a-75 (West 2009) (prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public 
accommodation, credit, and education); for Delaware, compare H.B. 75, 
147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013) (July 1, 2013) with Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 19, § 711 (West 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4603 (West 2013); 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4504 (West 2013) (prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination in housing, public and private employment, 
and public accommodation); for the District of Columbia, compare D.C. 
Code § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2012) (March 3, 2010) with D.C. Code § 2-
1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012); D.C. Code § 32-408 (LexisNexis 2012); 
D.C. Code § 2-1402.21 (LexisNexis 2012); D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 
(LexisNexis 2012) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in 
private and public employment, housing, and education); for Hawaii, 
compare S.B. 1, 27th Leg. 2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (Dec. 2, 2013) 
with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 515-3 (West Supp. 2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 489-3 (West Supp 2012) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination 
in housing and public accommodation); for Illinois, compare S.B. 0010, 
98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (June 1, 2014) with 775 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 5/1-102(A) (West 2011) (prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public 
accommodation, credit, and education); for Maryland, compare Md. 
Code Ann., Fam. Law § 2-201 (Jan. 1, 2013) with Md. Code Ann., 
State Gov’t § 20-606 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013; Md. Code Ann., 
State Gov’t § 20-705 (LexisNexis 2009); Md. Code Ann., State 
Gov’t § 20-304 (LexisNexis 2009); Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424 
(LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in 
housing, private and public employment, public accommodation, and 
education); for Minnesota, compare H.F. 1054, 88th Sess. (Minn. 2013) 
(Aug. 1, 2013) with Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.08, subd. 2 (West 
2012), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.09 (West 2012), Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 363A.11, subd. 1 (West 2012), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.16 (West 
2012), subd. 1, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.13 (West 2012) (prohibiting 
sexual orientation discrimination in housing, private and public 
employment, public accommodation, credit, and education); for New 
Hampshire, compare N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1-A (Jan. 1, 2010) with 
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:6 (2009), N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:8 
(2009), N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:10 (2009), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 354-A:16 (2009); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:17 (2009) 
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in housing, private and 
public employment, and public accommodation); for New York, 
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compare N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014) (enacted 
July 24, 2011) with N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2013); N.Y. 
Exec. Law § 296-a (McKinney 2013) (prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public 
accommodation, credit, and education); for Rhode Island, compare H.B. 
5015B, 2013 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2013) (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 
(2013)) with R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (2003); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-
37-4 (2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2 (2002); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 28-5.1-8 (Supp. 2013) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination 
in housing, private and public employment, public accommodation, and 
education); for Vermont, compare Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (Sept. 1, 
2009) with Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495(a), Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, 
§ 4503 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(a) (Supp. 2013) ; 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 10403 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, 
§ 11 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 565 (Supp. 2011) 
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in housing, private and 
public employment, public accommodation, credit, and education); for 
Washington, compare Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(1) (LexisNexis 
2013) (enacted Dec. 6, 2012) with Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 
(2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.222 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 49.60.215 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.175 (2012); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 49.60.040(2) (2012) (prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public 
accommodation, credit, and education). See also States with Protections 
for Being Gay, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2013) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/31/business/States-With-
Protections-for-Being-Gay.html?ref=your-money.; Colo. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 24-34-401-402 (2013); Iowa Code Ann. § 216.6 (West 2009); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553 (2013); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 281.370 (West 2013); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:1-1–10:1-3 (West 2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-2 
(2012); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7 (2012); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-9 
(2012); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 (2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2013). See Table A2 for a calculation of how 
long the earliest nondiscrimination ban in statewide law preceded same-
sex marriage in each Enacting Jurisdiction. 
197. See generally Inst. of Real Estate Mgmt., Laws Prohibiting 
Discrimination Based On Sexual Orientation And Gender 
Identity, ( 2013). 
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Figure 15: Sexual Orientation Protection at Time of Same-Sex 
Marriage Legislation  
Leveraging a “perfect storm” of demographic variables, public 
support, and preexisting legal constructs, supporters succeeded in 
securing same-sex marriage in the Enacting Jurisdictions with modest 
religious liberty protections. Absent those protections, same-sex 
marriage surely would have been forthcoming, with or without 
protections, in a few short years. 
IV. The Political Terrain Going Forward 
So what does a die-hard opponent of same-sex marriage do in the 
face of these trends? What do the trends mean for those who are 
pursing marriage equality? Putting aside game-changing judicial 
decisions,198 Professor Laycock rightly concludes that opponents, who 
are “losing this fight . . . need to get some more liberty protections 
while they have a chance. Once a law is passed, it’s too late.”199 But, 
same-sex marriage advocates should continue to bargain as well 
because the movement has nearly exhausted states with high support 
 
198. See supra note 63 (discussing New Jersey’s judicial decision). 
199. Zylstra, supra note 104. 
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for same-sex marriage and favorable political terrain,200 and it remains 
uncertain when and if the U.S. Supreme Court will take a marriage 
equality case.201 
But unlike the Enacting Jurisdictions, in the thirty-one 
Nonrecognizing States,202 the characteristics favoring marriage 
equality fragment. In more difficult political terrain, especially states 
in which legislators are accountable to more “very religious” people, 
one might reasonably expect that legislators will tip the balance 
between marriage equality and religious liberty in favor of religious 
objectors. 
Here, the “perfect storm” works against an easier victory for 
same-sex marriage advocates, placing a premium on bargaining. As 
Figure 16 demonstrates, in the thirty-one Nonrecognizing States, 
Democrats control only three legislatures. Republicans control the 
legislature in twenty-five states and split control in three others.203 
 
200. Religious liberty advocates in the near term can deliver precious votes 
for same-sex marriage. Marriage equality proponents benefit from same-
sex marriage with religious liberty protections when the alternative is no 
marriage, at least for now. 
201. See supra note 58 (discussing the importance of meaningful circuit 
splits). 
202. The discussion of political climate in Part III backs out Utah and 
Oklahoma since lower federal court decisions striking the constitutional 
bans on same-sex marriage in those states occurred before the date cut-
off for the snapshot of state marriage laws on January 14, 2014, even 
though the decisions were stayed. See supra notes 4–5. New Jersey and 
New Mexico also recognized same-sex marriage by a dispositive judicial 
decision before January 14, 2014, and so are also not considered in Part 
III. See supra note 8. 
203. See Table A4. Compare Figure 16 with Figure 11. 
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Figure 16: Legislative Control of States That Do Not Permit 
Same-Sex Marriage (2013) 
Figure 17 shows that in the Nonrecognizing States only seven 
governors as of October 22, 2013, are members of the Democratic 
Party. Republicans occupy the governor’s mansion in remaining 
twenty-four states.204 
 
204. See Table A4. Compare Figure 17 with Figure 12. See infra note 232 for 
a discussion of changes in control of the governor’s office since the 
Symposium date. 
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Figure 17: Party of Governor in States That Do Not Permit 
Same-Sex Marriage (2013) 
In addition to being largely Republican-controlled, the 
Nonrecognizing States have more religious constituents.205 As Figure 
18 shows, only six of the Nonrecognizing States rank in the bottom 
third for religiosity. Twenty-five of the Nonrecognizing States rank in 
either the top or middle third.206 
 
  
 
205. See Table A4. Compare Figure18 with Figure 13. 
206. Not surprisingly, thirteen of the Non-recognizing states have RFRAs. 
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2009); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §§761.01-.05 (West 2010); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 73-401 to -404 
(2009); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-5301–5305; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 446.350 (2013); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 13:5231–5242 (2010); Mo. Ann. 
Stat. §§ 1.302–.307 (West 2010); 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2401–
2407 (West 2009); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2010); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 4-1-407 (2009); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§§ 110.001–.012 (Vernon 2009); Va. Code Ann. §§ 57-1 to -2.02 (2009). 
Alabama’s state constitution subjects state law burdening religious 
practice to heightened scrutiny. See Ala. Const. art. I, § 3.01.  
 Of the states with recent judicial decisions requiring same-sex marriage, 
New Mexico and Oklahoma have RFRAs. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-22-
1 to 28-22-5 (2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (West 2010). 
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Figure 18: Religiosity Index for States That Do Not Permit 
Same-Sex Marriage  
Figure 19 shows that the levels of formal education in the 
Nonrecognizing States is strikingly lower in than the Enacting 
Jurisdictions.207 While three states rank in the top tier, as nearly every 
Enacting Jurisdiction did, twenty-eight Nonrecognizing States rank in 
the bottom two-thirds for educational attainment. Only Colorado, 
Virginia, and Oregon defy this trend. 
 
207. See Table A4. Compare Figure 19 with Figure 14. 
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Figure 19: Educational Attainment for States That Do Not 
Permit Same-Sex Marriage  
 
Finally, same-sex marriage advocates will not have a background 
promise of non-discrimination working in their favor. Figure 20 shows 
that only a handful of remaining states, four, prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation in housing, hiring, and public 
accommodations.208 The absence of a statewide guarantee of  
208. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402 (2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-502 
(2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-
59-106(1)(s) (2013) (prohibiting discrimination in private and public 
employment, housing, public accommodations, and education); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 613.330 (2012); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.020 (Supp. 2013); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070 (West Supp. 2013) (prohibiting 
discrimination in private and public employment, housing, and public 
accommodations); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 (2013); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 659A.421 (2013); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403 (2013); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 659.850(2) (2013) (prohibiting discrimination in private and 
public employment, housing, public accommodations, and education); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
106.50 (West Supp. 2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52 (West Supp. 
2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 36.12 (West 2013) (prohibiting 
discrimination in private and public employment, housing, public 
accommodations, and education). Of these states, only Wisconsin does 
not also prohibit gender identity discrimination. Presumably, a state 
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nondiscrimination is significant: it means that legislators crafting 
accommodations for same-sex marriage will be writing on a blank 
slate when deciding how little latitude—or how much—to give 
religious dissenters. If nothing in state or local law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status, 
religious dissenters will not need religious liberty protections. 
Legislators interested in providing greater protections will not be 
 
legislator weighing religious liberty exemptions is concerned only about 
rolling back protections for which they are accountable. 
 Other laws can provide important protections for LGBT individuals. 
Some states ban sexual orientation discrimination by public employers, 
like Indiana, Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania. See 
http://employment.findlaw.com/employment-discrimination/sexual-
orientation-discrimination-in-the-workplace.html#sthash.T1frmnwH. 
dpuf. Executive Orders in some Nonrecognizing States do bar 
discrimination against public employees on the basis of sexual 
orientation. See, e.g., Mo. Exec. Order No. 10-24 (July 9, 2010) http: 
//governor.mo.gov/orders/2010/10-24.htm; Va. Exec. Directive No. 1 
(2010) http://www.dhrm.virginia.gov/documents/ExecutiveDirective 
One.pdf. These states are treated here as not providing state-wide 
protection against sexual orientation discrimination. 
 Further, in states that lack statewide nondiscrimination bans, 
“[m]unicipal law provides powerful protections” in many localities. 
Municipal Equality Index: A Nationwide Evaluation of Municipal Law 
Human Rights Campaign (2013), available at: http://www.hrc.org/ 
files/assets/resources/MEI_2013_report.pdf.  
 Because the number of municipalities providing such protections varies 
dramatically from state to state, localized protections are also not 
factored in, although they provide an important source of redress for 
LGBT individuals. Compare Arizona where municipal non-
discrimination bans cover only Phoenix with Nevada, where 
nondiscrimination bans covering all major cities. See id. Some states, 
while providing no promise of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, do provide special protection based on sexual orientation in 
state hate crime laws. For example, Texas has some protection built 
into their hate crime statutes. See Act of June 19, 1993, ch. 987, 1993 
Tex. Gen. Laws § 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
Texas Penal Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); Act of 
May 11, 2001, ch. 85, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws § 1.02 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Education 
Code, the Texas Government Code, and the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure). In particular, Texas’s 2001 hate crime statute requires that, 
in a criminal trial, the trier of fact determines if the defendant acted on 
basis or prejudice against a number of different classifications including 
sexual preference, id, at § 1.02, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at § 1.01 (codified 
as Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.014 (West 2014)) and 
increases the punishment if the trier of fact finds such prejudice, Act of 
June 19, 1993, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen.Laws at § 1 (codified as amended at 
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.47 (West 2014)). Further, a state 
legislator weighing religious liberty exemptions presumably is concerned 
only about rolling back protections the state impressed into law. 
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subject to the claim—which has swayed some elsewhere—that 
religious liberty protections in the same-sex marriage law will “roll 
back” existing LGBT protections.209  
 
Figure 20: Sexual Orientation Protections in State-Wide Law 
Not only do the remaining states not offer statewide non-
discrimination guarantees, nearly all of the remaining states ban 
same-sex marriage in the state constitution. As Figure 21 shows, in 
twenty-seven Nonrecognizing States the state constitution presently 
bars same-sex marriage.210 Only the constitutions of Wyoming, 
 
209. See supra note 180 (describing the force of this idea and why it should 
not be seen as rolling back protections). 
210. Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03; Alaska Const. art. I, § 25; Ariz. Const. 
art. XXX, § 1; Ark. Const. amend. LXXXIII, § 1; Colo. Const. art. 
II, § 31; Fla. Const. art. I, § 27; Idaho Const. art. III, § 28; Kan. 
Const. art. XV, § 16; Ky. Const. § 233a; La. Const. art. XII, § 15; 
Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A; Mo. 
Const. art. I, § 33; Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Neb. Const. art. I, § 
29; Nev. Const. art. I, § 21; N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 6; N.D. Const. 
art. XI, § 28; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a; 
S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9; Tenn. Const. 
art. XI, § 18; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A; Wis. 
Const. art. XIII, § 13. Utah’s and Oklahoma’s bans have been 
invalidated by federal district courts although the decisions are 
currently stayed. Okla. Const. art. II, § 35; Utah Const. art. I, § 29.  
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Indiana, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania do not ban same-sex 
marriage.211 
 
Figure 21: Same-Sex Marriage Banned in State Constitution  
 
 Some of the constitutional bans have been challenged, but ultimately 
were left in place. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 
(8th Cir. 2006) (upholding Nebraska’s state conditional ban on same-sex 
marriage against a federal constitutional challenge). A number of 
challenges to state constitutional bans are pending across the country. 
See Jillian Rayfield, 4 Pivotal Gay Rights Court Cases You Should 
Know About: The U.S. Judicial System Has Become the Main 
Battlefield in the Fight for Equal Rights, The Week (Jan. 28, 2014) 
available at: http://theweek.com/article/index/255595/4-pivotal-gay-
rights-court-cases-that-you-should-know-about (discussing challenges in 
Virginia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio). 
211. The remaining Nonrecognizing States all ban same-sex marriage by 
statute. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008) (making 
same-sex marriage unlawful in Indiana and refusing to recognize out-of-
state marriages); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704 (West 2010) 
(defining marriage as between one man and one woman); W. Va. Code 
Ann. §48-2-104 (LexisNexis 2009) (defining marriage as a lifelong union 
between a woman and a man); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (2013) 
(defining marriage as a civil contract between a male and female 
person). Unlike a constitutional ban, the statutory ban poses no special 
hurdles to removal of the ban. 
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In light of the state constitutional bans, some opponents might 
resist any bargain over same-sex marriage, believing that the outcome 
they seek—no same-sex marriage—is already in effect. However, state 
constitutional bans are not all set in stone, as Part V shows. 
Those states in which the populous is highly supportive of same-
sex marriage are no longer in play. As Figure 22 shows, in 2012, six of 
the Nonrecognizing States were deeply opposed to same-sex marriage, 
showing support less than 40%. In an additional twenty 
Nonrecognizing States, a majority of the populace simply does not 
support same-sex marriage.  
 
Figure 22: Support for Same-Sex Marriage in States That Do 
Not Permit Same-Sex Marriage  
The extent to which religious liberty protections will influence the 
fate of same-sex marriage in any given state likely will depend on a 
complicated interplay of preexisting nondiscrimination law, state 
constitutional prohibitions, popular support, legislative control, 
education, and religiosity, as well as a host of other factors, including 
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pending constitutional litigation in state and federal courts,212 and 
even the personal convictions of individual legislators.213 
V. Difficult Terrain Does Not Mean 
Opponents Can Hold Out 
Same-sex marriage opponents face the real fork in the road: 
Should they oppose same-sex marriage to the bitter end or take a 
more pragmatic approach and bargain now, trading marriage equality 
for “substantial protections for religious dissenters[?]”214 For some 
opponents (and supporters), the fight over same-sex marriage is an 
existential one, making it unthinkable to compromise.215 For others, 
 
212. As of February 2014, 42 suits challenging marriage bans were pending 
across U.S. See David Cruz at UC Davis Law Review Symposium 
(February 7, 2014) (citing James Esseks of the ACLU). 
213. See supra notes 21, 24, 29 (providing interviews with individual 
legislators, such as Hawaii Representative Jo Jordan of Hawaii).  
214. Dreher, supra note 40, at 15. Some vow to stay focused on fighting 
same-sex marriage on the merits, rather than actively (and exclusively) 
seeking religious liberty protections. See supra note 40. Some opponents 
do not see these approaches as an “either-or.” Caleb Dalton, an attorney 
for the Alliance Defending Freedom, says: 
We will continue to advocate for marriage between one man and 
one woman as the building block of society. But in cases where a 
state has chosen to redefine its marriage laws, we support the 
active inclusion of robust religious liberty protections in pending 
legislation.  
 Id. Russell Moore, president of the Southern Baptist Convention's 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, echoed the sentiment: 
So while we're fighting for religious liberty, we're articulating 
why we believe marriage is significant and important. And while 
we're fighting for marriage, we're articulating why the religious 
liberty concerns that inevitably come from these discussions are 
significant. . . . We do both, and we don't abandon or 
marginalize either plank.  
 Id. 
215. See Matthew J. Franck, “Is Sex Just Like Race?,” The Public 
Discourse (July 8, 2011), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/ 
07/3520 (“Today it is those claiming a specious ‘freedom to marry’ who 
make a claim at odds with the institution’s nature and alien to its 
purposes. It is they who would instrumentalize it by a redefinition, a 
destroying and remaking, that puts marriage to a new kind of work in 
the service of state policy.”).  
 On this issue, like other deeply divisive issues, the most strident voices 
on each side sometimes gain by seeking a total win, because it rallies 
their base. Surely some people in this fight benefit from continuing to 
oppose compromise. A perverse conflict of interest can arise because 
compromise turns down the temperature on an issue. See Sally 
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central tenets of their faith tradition direct them not to compromise 
on the particular question of marriage equality.216 But for those who 
may be swayed by pragmatic arguments,217 a clear-eyed view of the 
benefits of compromise is important.218 Arguably, the strongest reason 
not to compromise is that voters have foreclosed same-sex marriage 
by state constitutional amendment in twenty-seven states.219 But 
 
Steenland, Return of the Culture Wars: Tea Party’s Social and 
Religious Agenda and How Progressives Can Respond (Nov. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/news/ 
2010/11/29/8601/return-of-the-culture-wars-tea-partys-social-and-
religious-agenda-and-how-progressives-can-respond/29292010). 
216. For example, a Vatican document instructs:  
[W]here a matter of the common good is concerned, it is 
inappropriate for Church authorities to endorse or remain 
neutral toward adverse legislation even if it grants exceptions to 
Church organizations and institutions. The Church has the 
responsibility to promote family life and the public morality of 
the entire civil society on the basis of fundamental moral values, 
not simply to protect herself from the application of harmful 
laws (cf. no. 17).  
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Some Considerations 
Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals on the Non-
Discrimination of Homosexual Persons (July 24, 1992), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/r
c_con_cfaith_doc_19920724_homosexual-persons_en.html. 
217. Commentator Rod Dreher believes that a “consensus is emerging . . . 
that the most important goal . . . [is] to secure as much liberty as 
possible for dissenting religious and social conservatives while there is 
still time.” Dreher, supra note 40, at 12. Dreher likely is premature 
about the existence of a consensus. 
218. Professor Douglas Laycock argues that “conservative churches would do 
well to concede the liberty of the other side, including on same-sex 
marriage, and concentrate on defending their own liberty as 
conscientious objectors; and similarly, that supporters of rights to 
abortion, contraception, gay rights, and same-sex marriage would do 
well to concentrate on securing their own rights and to concede that 
conscientious objectors should rarely be required to support or facilitate 
practices they view as evil.” See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and 
the Culture Wars, U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 
1); see also Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious 
Organizational Freedom: Reflections on the HHS Mandate, J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues (2013); U. of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 13-20. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268824 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 
2268824 (arguing that religious freedom is important and that there is 
value in the social-service contributions of religious nonprofits). 
219. See Rex W. Huppke, Lawsuits filed in Cook County claiming state’s 
same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, The Chicago Tribune (May 
31, 2012) (“31 states have amended their constitutions to ban gay 
marriage.”). This tally included California’s invalidated Proposition 8. 
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unlike the U.S. Constitution, which cannot be amended without great 
difficulty, many state constitutions do no erect momentous barriers  
to change.  
To undo a constitutional ban, some states require a supermajority 
(60% or more) of legislators, followed by a majority of voters, to make 
any change, creating a strong lock-in effect. Consider, for example, 
Texas, which requires two-thirds of state legislators in both houses to 
pass the amendment, after which a simple majority of the electorate 
must also approve it.220 In some of these states, an elaborate 
convention method also permits amendment, but still nonetheless 
requires a super-majority of the legislature. Seven of the 
Nonrecognizing States erect significant barriers to amendment, and 
therefore significant barriers to repeal (Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas).221 Because  
See Chris Cillizza and Sean Sullivan, How Proposition 8 Passed in 
California—and Why It Wouldn’t Today, Wash. Post (Mar. 26, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/26
/how-proposition-8-passed-in-california-and-why-it-wouldnt-today/ 
(discussing the history and background of California’s Proposition 8). 
Hawaii was included among the thirty-one, but its constitutional 
amendment, which permitted the legislature to “reserve marriage to 
opposite sex couples,” is now mooted. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 
(“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples.”). 
220. Tex. Const. art. XVII, § 1. 
221. See Ga. Const. art. X, § 1, para. 1–6 (Legislative Method: requires 2/3 
vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the 
electorate; Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a 
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature); Idaho Const. art. XX, § 1–
3 (Legislative method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature 
and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a 
convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the 
legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); Kan. Const. art. 
XIV, § 1–2 (Legislative method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the 
legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention 
Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of 
the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); La. Const. art. 
XIII, § 1–3 (Legislative Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the 
legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention 
Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of 
the legislature); N.C. Const. art. XIII, § 1–4 (Legislative Method: 
requires 3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple 
majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can only 
be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then any 
amendment arising out of a convention must be approved by a simple 
majority of voters); S.C. Const. art. XVI, § 1–3 (Legislative Method: 
requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple 
majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can only 
be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature affirmed by a 
majority of the electorate); Tex. Const. art. XVII, § 1 (Legislative 
method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a 
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this process is so onerous, once an amendment is adopted, it cannot 
easily be undone.  
In another eight states, constitutional bans enjoy a mild lock-in 
effect. Alabama, Alaska, Kentucky, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin erect some barriers to repeal, but not ones as 
daunting as Texas’.222 Generally, these states provide a legislative 
method for amendment, requiring only a majority of legislators and a 
majority of voters to amend the state’s constitution. Some of these 
states also allow amendments by a periodic convention that either (a) 
 
simple majority of the electorate). Utah’s same-sex marriage ban was 
invalidated but would have exerted a strong lock-in effect. See Utah 
Const. art. XXIII, § 1-3 (Legislative method: requires 2/3 vote of both 
houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. 
Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of 
both houses of the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate).  
222. See Ala. Const. art. XVIII, § 284–287 (Legislative Method: requires 
3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of 
the electorate. Convention Method: a simple majority of legislators from 
both houses plus a simple majority of voters can call a constitutional 
convention); Alaska Const. art. XIII, § 1–3 (Automatic Submission 
Method: Every 10 years the voters of Alaska are asked to decide 
whether or not to hold a constitutional convention. If the majority of 
voters say they want a constitutional convention, then delegates to that 
convention are elected during the next general election. Legislative 
Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a 
simple majority of the electorate); Ky. Const. § 256–263 (Legislative 
Method: requires 3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a 
simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can 
be called by a simple majority of legislators in both houses plus a simple 
majority of voters. Any proposed amendments arising out of the 
convention must then be approved by a majority of voters); Nev. 
Const. art. 16, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators 
from both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Convention 
Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of 
the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); Or. Const. 
art. XVII, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators from 
both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Legislative Revision 
Method: the legislature may “revise” all or part of the constitution by a 
2/3 vote of both houses. The revision must then be approved by a 
simple majority of voters); Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 3 (Legislative 
Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a 
simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can 
be called by a simple majority of legislators in both houses plus a simple 
majority of voters. Any proposed amendments arising out of the 
convention must then be approved by a majority of voters); Va. Const. 
art. XII, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators from 
both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: 
a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the 
legislature); Wis. Const. art. 12, § 1 (Legislative Method: Simple 
majority of legislators from both house plus a simple majority of the 
electorate).  
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requires approval by a simple majority of voters, but the convention 
may be called only after long periods of time (e.g., ten years), or (b) 
permits a convention to take place after two steps—approval by a 
majority of legislators and approval by majority of the electorate. 
Consider, for example, Virginia, which provides two paths to adoption 
or repeal: the legislative method—requiring approval by a simple 
majority of legislators in both houses and a simple majority of the 
electorate—and periodic constitutional conventions called by the 
Legislature, where voters can approve amendments by a simple 
majority.223 Because amendments can pass without super-majority 
support in the legislature, this process creates a milder lock-in effect.  
Twelve states (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, and 
South Dakota) fall in the final category, where constitutional bans 
can be adopted or repealed with relative ease.224 A negligible lock-in 
 
223. Va. Const. art. XII, § 1–2. 
224. Ariz. Const. art. XXI, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of 
legislators from both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Voter 
Initiative Method: Petition must be signed by 15% of the total vote cast 
for governor in the preceding election. Then the proposed amendment 
appears on the ballot to be decided by a majority of voters in a general 
election. Convention Method: a convention can be called by the people by 
referendum); Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 22 (Legislative Method: Simple 
majority of legislators from both house plus a simple majority of the 
electorate); Colo. Const. art. XIX, § 1-2 (Legislative Method: requires 
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of 
the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a 
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature affirmed by a majority of the 
electorate); Fla. Const. art. XI, § 1–5 (Legislative Method: requires 3/5 
vote of both houses of the legislature and then 60% of the electorate. 
Initiative Method: Signatures of 8% of total electors voting in the last 
Presidential election for the question to be placed on the ballot. The 
ballot initiative is approved by 60%of voters. Convention Method: A 
convention can be placed on the ballot if 15% of voters based on the last 
Presidential election sign a petition requesting a petition. The issue is then 
placed on the ballot and a convention is called if a simple majority of 
voters approve); Mich. Const. art. XII, § 1–3 (Voter Initiative Method: 
Petition must be signed by 10% of the total vote cast for governor in the 
preceding election. Then the proposed amendment appears on the ballot 
to be decided by a majority of voters in a general election. Automatic 
Submission Method: Every 16 years the question of whether or not to 
have a constitutional convention reaches the ballot in a general election. 
The people can vote to have a constitutional convention by a simple 
majority. They then can approve the proposed amendments coming out of 
the convention by a simple majority. Legislative Method: requires 2/3 
vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the 
electorate); Miss. Const. art. XV, § 273 (Legislative Method: requires 
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of 
the electorate. Voter Initiative: “An initiative to amend the Constitution 
may be proposed by a petition signed over a twelve-month period by 
qualified electors equal in number to at least twelve percent (12%) of the 
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votes for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election. 
The signatures of the qualified electors from any congressional district 
shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of signatures required 
to qualify an initiative petition for placement upon the ballot.”); Mo. 
Const. art. XII, § 2–3 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators 
from both houses plus a simple majority of the electorate. Automatic 
Submission Method: Every 20 years the question of whether to hold a 
constitutional convention is placed on the ballot. A convention can be 
called by a simple majority of the electorate); Mont. Const. art. XIV, 
§ 1–9 (Voter-Initiated Convention Method: 10% of voters in each of 
2/5ths of the legislative districts must sign a petition for a constitutional 
convention and submit it to the secretary of state. Automatic Submission 
Method: Every 20 years the question of whether or not to have a 
constitutional convention reaches the ballot in a general election. The 
people can vote to have a constitutional convention by a simple majority. 
They then can approve the proposed amendments coming out of the 
convention by a simple majority. Legislative Method: requires 2/3 vote of 
both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. 
Legislatively-Initiated Convention Method: a convention can also be called 
by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature. Voter Initiative: “The 
people may also propose constitutional amendments by initiative. 
Petitions including the full text of the proposed amendment shall be 
signed by at least ten percent of the qualified electors of the state.”); Neb. 
Const. art. XVI, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: requires 3/5 vote of both 
houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. 
Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a 3/5 vote of 
both houses of the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); 
N.D. Const. art. III, § 1–9 (Initiative Method: petitioners must gather 
signatures equaling 2% of the resident population at the last federal 
census for a proposed amendment to make the ballot. After crossing this 
threshold, the amendment is approved or disapproved by simple majority 
vote in the general election); Ohio Const. art. XVI, § 1–2; 2 (Legislative 
Method: requires 3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a 
simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can 
only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature affirmed by a 
majority of the electorate. Automatic Submission Method: Every 20 years 
the voters of Ohio are asked to decide whether or not to hold a 
constitutional convention. If the majority of voters say they want a 
constitutional convention, then delegates to that convention are elected 
during the next general election. The convention delegates then have 
plenary power to amend the constitution subject only to ratification by 
the people by a simple majority. Voter Initiative: “The . . . power 
reserved by the people is designated the initiative, and the signatures of 
ten per centum of the electors shall be required upon a petition to propose 
an amendment to the constitution.”); S.D. Const. art. XXIII, § 1–3 
(Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators from both houses plus 
a simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: A convention 
may be called by 3/4 of legislators in both houses. Voter Initiative: “An 
amendment proposed by initiative shall require a petition signed by 
qualified voters equal in number to at least ten percent of the total votes 
cast for Governor in the last gubernatorial election.”).  
 Oklahoma’s same-sex marriage ban was invalidated but would have 
exerted a negligible lock-in effect. See also Okla. Const. art. 24, § 1–3 
(Legislative Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature 
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state permits change with only a small fraction of voters petitioning 
for it followed up with a simple majority of voters voting in support 
of the amendment. Typically, the states require 10% of the electorate 
to initiate the process, but may range as low as 4% and as high as 
15%.225 Arizona is emblematic of this approach. It requires a petition 
to be signed by 15% of the total number of voters who cast votes for 
governor in the preceding election. At that point, the proposed 
amendment appears on the ballot to be decided by a majority of 
voters in a general election. 226  
In short, state constitutional amendments are surmountable in all 
twenty-seven Nonrecognizing States, as Figure 23 shows. In all but 
seven states, constitutions can be surmounted without “super-
majority” votes by the legislature. 
 
Figure 23: Lock-In Effect of Constitutional Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban  
 
and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention and Initiative 
Methods: the voters may amend the constitution directly by referendum 
by a simple majority of voters). 
225. See sources cited supra note 205. 
226. Ariz. Const. art. XXI, § 1–2. Note that if Arizona only had a 
Legislative Method as opposed to a Legislative and a Voter Initiative 
method, then Arizona would have a mild lock-in effect. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1235 
While constitutional amendments contribute to the difficult 
political terrain, it is clear that legislation to recognize same-sex 
marriage will be possible in nearly all of these states by the end of the 
decade, as Figure 24 shows. 
 
Figure 24: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage by 2020  
By 2020, putting aside the lock-in effect, virtually every state is 
likely to have sufficient support to recognize same-sex marriage. Only 
six states show support below 50% and all but two are within a few 
percentage points of a majority. Average support for same-sex 
marriage will crest 55.8% across the Nonrecognizing States. 
Mississippi brings up the bottom with support at 37.8%, while at the 
top end, support in Oregon will hit 65.4%. 2020 may seem a long way 
away, but constitutional bans are fragile today, at least in the 
negligible and mild lock-in states.  
Because so many state constitutional bans can be undone with a 
fraction of the population’s signatures and majority support, it is 
important to stay focused on the tide of popular support. Figure 25 
shows actual support in 1994–96, actual support at the time of the 
constitutional amendment, and actual support in 2008, as well as 
projected support for 2012 and 2016.227 It shows that of the states  
227. The 1994–96 and 2010 support data are taken from the New York 
Times. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Lax & Justin Phillips, Over Time, a 
Gay Marriage Groundswell, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK3. (“In 
all of the time periods shown here, a statistical technique has been used 
to generate state estimates from national polls. Public opinion is 
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with negligible lock-ins, by 2012, a majority of the population in ten 
of the twelve do support same-sex marriage or are within striking 
distance of majority support (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, 
Montana, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota).228 By 2016, only four of the negligible lock-in effect states 
would not have majority support for same-sex marriage (Arkansas, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and South Dakota).229 Because the constitutions 
in these states are almost as easy to amend as enacting ordinary 
legislation, the need to bargain now is at its greatest. 
 
Figure 25: Projected Support in Negligible Lock-In States  
Figure 26 further illustrates the flimsiness of state constitutional 
amendments. Of the eight mild lock-in states, a majority of the 
populations in three states (Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin) already 
supported same-sex marriage by 2012, putting those bans at risk 
today.230 By 2016, in more than half of the states, five of the eight, a 
majority of the population will support same-sex marriage (Alaska, 
Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin).231   
estimated in small demographic categories within each state, and then 
these are averaged using census information to get state-level 
summaries. Estimates in 2010 are projected from 2008 state-level 
estimates using an aggregate national estimate of forty-five percent (or 
fifty percent) support for gay marriage.”). The 2012 and 2016 statistics 
are taken from Silver, supra note 125. Table A6 gives actual support at 
the time of the amendment at the ballot box by subtracting opposition 
support from one hundred. 
228. See infra Table A6. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
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Figure 26: Projected Support in Mild Lock-In States  
Figure 27 does paint a different picture. The strong lock-in effect 
states generally show low support for same-sex marriage. The seven 
strong lock-in states are not likely to enact same-sex marriage in the 
near future, based either on public support or the strength of the 
constitutional amendment.232  
 
Figure 27: Projected Support in Strong Lock-In States 
In only those states where projected support likely will remain 
well below 50% by 2020 (Mississippi and Alabama) and those strong 
lock-in states (Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Texas) are opponents reasonably assured of being 
able to push back same-sex marriage if the question is left to the 
political process. While no one can predict with confidence what the  
232. Id. 
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future holds,233 how one bargains today is often influenced by how one 
perceives the future and the bargain one believes one can strike 
tomorrow or beyond. 
Even with the difficult terrain, in the long term, advocates are 
likely to secure same-sex marriage in the political process when 
popular support eventually overpowers all other characteristics. For 
same-sex marriage opponents who may be tempted to rely on the 
more difficult terrain facing advocates,234 Utah and Oklahoma are 
illustrative. 
 
233. The political terrain of any state may change overnight. In 2013, same-
sex couples filed suit challenging Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban on 
federal constitutional grounds. See Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395, 
2014 WL 561978, (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); see also Harris v. 
McDonnell, No. 5:13-cv-00077, 2013 WL 5720355, (W.D. Va. Oct. 18, 
2013) (a class action lawsuit). Then-Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli 
defended the suits. See Robert Barnes, Virginia to Fight Gay Marriage 
Ban, The Washington Post (Jan 23. 2014). On the heels of the 
November 2013 election, Virginia’s new Attorney General Mark Herring 
will not defend Virginia’s constitutional ban, saying that he believes it is 
unconstitutional. In the vacuum created by General Herring’s decision, 
it is unclear who, if anyone, has standing to defend the law. For a 
discussion of the unique issues of standing in ballot initiatives, see 
Vikram D. Amar, Should Initiative Proponents Be Permitted Under 
Article III to Defend in Federal Court?, 48 UC Davis L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2014); Vikram Amar, Revisiting Standing: 
Proposition 8 in the Ninth Circuit, Jurist (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vikram-amar-marriage-standing.php. 
Virginia House Bill 706 seeks, after the fact, to provide the ability for 
any legislator to defend the laws of the Commonwealth. See H.B. 706, 
2014 Session (Va. 2014). Even though the dynamics of any one state 
may quickly change in important ways, some of the characteristics 
favoring marriage equality are more stable than others, like educational 
attainment and religiosity. Moreover, while characteristics may see-saw 
in an individual state, the broad pattern in the 31 Nonrecognizing States 
is likely to remain consistent. 
234. In this legislative cycle, stand-alone legislation “concerning religious 
freedoms with respect to marriage” has been introduced in states that 
are not anticipated to recognize same-sex marriage any time soon, like 
Kansas. See H.B 2453, Session of 2014 (Kan. 2014). This Article 
contends that the strongest religious liberty protections will result from 
trading protections for marriage equality. It is possible that staggering 
the two goods—religious freedom protections and the recognition of 
marriage equality—so that they happen at different points in time, may 
also result in strong protections. It is hard to know whether locking in 
protections in advance of marriage equality would grease the way for 
enabling marriage equality legislation or make it more difficult.  
 Advocates of a staggered approach say that when enabling legislation 
does arise, opponents cannot then say that marriage equality will hurt 
religious freedom. Thus, opponents of same-sex marriage forfeit a 
powerful political weapon against same-sex marriage in exchange for 
locking in religious liberty protections.  
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Judicial decisions in Utah and Oklahoma underline what is at 
stake. Oklahoma and Utah shared a number of characteristics 
suggesting that both would have been among the last states to adopt 
same-sex marriage by legislation. Party representation, religiosity, 
education, lack of statewide sexual orientation protections, the 
presence of a constitutional amendment against same-sex marriage, 
and low support for same-sex marriage all played to the opposition.  
A majority of people in Utah is not projected to support same-sex 
marriage until 2020. In 2016, Silver estimates 48.1% would support 
same-sex marriage. Utah’s Republican-controlled legislature and 
Republican Governor, its status as the second most religious state in 
the nation behind only Mississippi, its lack of a statewide sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination law, and strongly locked-in 
constitutional amendment all would make the reasonable observer 
believe that Utah would not legislatively adopt same-sex marriage any 
time soon. Only its relatively educated populace, just outside of the 
top one-third and nineteenth overall for the United States, would 
suggest otherwise. 
Oklahoma is not much different. Projected support in Oklahoma 
barely breaks a majority in 2020, with only 51.5% projected to favor 
same-sex marriage—up from a projected 44.7% in 2016. Oklahoma’s 
Republican legislature, Republican Governor, high religiosity (top 
one-third), low education levels (bottom one-third), and lack of 
 
 If enacted, these protections would appear in stand-alone legislation that 
presumably will be revisited when, and if, the state embraces marriage 
equality. This approach cleanly makes religious freedom arguments on 
their own merits, as opposed to making them during a pitched battle 
over same-sex marriage recognition. When religious freedom is raised in 
the context of a pitched battle, some advocates, members of the public, 
and legislators may suspect the religious freedom arguments are nothing 
more than an obstructionist tactic designed to defeat same-sex marriage 
on the merits.  
 In states that lack a sexual orientation nondiscrimination ban in 
statewide law, it is unclear what legal risk objectors are being 
immunized against. See Figure 20. As important, unlike the model 
protections that I and others propose, these proposals have not 
contained important constraints on the size of organizations that could 
claim an exemption, nor do they take into consideration any hardship to 
same-sex couples. See supra note 88 (providing information about model 
religious liberty protections). Standalone legislation in states that do not 
give protections to LGBT individuals also smack of a one-sided deal 
because it would protect only religious objectors while giving nothing 
tangible to the LGBT community. 
 A better way forward for this kind of legislation would be to protect or 
enlarge the rights of both sides in the same piece of legislation—for 
example, by giving LGBT people a much-needed promise of non-
discrimination in society, recognition of relationships, or access to 
marriage. 
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statewide sexual orientation protections suggest Oklahoma would 
have been a very late adopter. Oklahoma’s negligible lock-in effect for 
its constitutional ban would have mattered little in light of very low 
support for same-sex marriage. Utah and Oklahoma illustrate the 
risks of delay for religious liberty advocates. What should legislators 
in Utah and Oklahoma (and elsewhere) do now? Where federal 
district court decisions require that same-sex marriage be recognized, 
legislators who otherwise may not be inclined to grant marriage 
equality by statute should act to do so, locking in religious liberty 
protections pending the appeal. 
With all the attention paid to judicial decisions in Utah and 
Oklahoma, it is easy to forget that a number of constitutional 
amendment states are in play. A ballot initiative underway now in 
Ohio seeks to overturn Ohio’s 2004 Constitutional Amendment. In 
Ohio, a mild lock-in effect state, public opposition to same-sex 
marriage has dropped precipitously since the Amendment’s passage in 
2004, falling to a mere 37% from 62%.235 The proposed Amendment in 
Ohio would mandate marriage equality without any religious liberty 
protections.236 A similar movement is underway in Oregon where 
voters have “collected enough signatures to give voters a chance to 
legalize same-sex marriage in 2014.”237 The Oregon measure, like 
Maine’s, would provide modest religious liberty protections for 
organizations. 
Some may think that because the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to 
decide the entitlement to same-sex marriage by 2015, it is pointless to 
bargain now. Proponents may believe that it would be better to wait 
out the next state legislative round, hoping for a victory in the 
Supreme Court. Yet, there is no assurance that the Supreme Court 
will wade in on this question in the near term, especially in the 
absence of a circuit split.238 Moreover, a decision favoring marriage 
equality is not assured, even if increasingly likely. Thus, bargaining 
for marriage equality supporters delivers a concrete gain now for real 
families clamoring to marry. 
 
235. Sandhya Somashekhar & Peyton M. Craighill, Polls in 3 States See 
Gay-Union Support, Wash. Post, October 10, 2012, at A8; see Table 
A6. 
236. Anna Staver, Same-Sex Marriage Amendment In Ohio Gets Green 
Light, Huffington Post (April 3, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/same-sex-marriage-amendment-ohio_n 
_1400714.html. 
237. KATU News, Oregon same-sex marriage advocates celebrate ballot 
measure milestone, KATU.com (Dec. 9, 2013, 12:28 PM) 
http://www.katu.com/politics/Oregon-same-sex-marriage-advocates-
celebrate-ballot-measure-milestone-235105391.html. 
238. See supra note 59. 
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Even if the Court holds that marriage equality is constitutionally 
demanded, red states could still enact religious liberty protections at 
that point simply based on the state’s demographics. Ironically, the 
chances of enacting religious liberty protections on the heels of a 
Supreme Court decision may be greater in 2016 than if the Court’s 
decision comes later.239 
Others may believe that a victory in the Supreme Court at any 
time will sideline every motivation for finding a “live and let live” 
approach to same-sex marriage. True, religious liberty advocates may 
not have any bargaining leverage on the marriage issue. But they may 
have bargaining leverage if they are willing to enact sexual orientation 
non-discrimination laws as part of a package to get religious liberty 
protections with respect to marriage. In short, even if the right to 
marry is assured by the Court, the bargaining may shift to sorely 
needed nondiscrimination protections, rather than disappearing 
entirely.  
Conclusion 
No one can say with confidence that the United States Supreme 
Court will not “shut down the marriage debate and impose gay 
marriage uniformly.”240 Until that happens, there is a closing window 
of opportunity for healing the schism over same-sex marriage. The 
way forward in this very divisive debate is for both sides to be 
respectful of the other.241 As with many deeply divisive topics, the 
natural impulse often is to resist compromise, but neither side can 
afford to do so. 
Same-sex marriage by legislation has been a decidedly blue state 
phenomenon, but it will not remain so. The political terrain facing the 
marriage equality movement going forward means that religious 
liberty will remain yoked to same-sex marriage recognition until 
public support engulfs all opposition. The decision squarely in front of 
marriage equality advocates is whether to lock-in same-sex marriage 
now, with protections for religious dissenters, or to wait, relying on 
overwhelming public support alone.242  
239. See Table A4. Compare Figure 22 with Figure 24. 
240. Dreher, supra note 38, at 12 (quoting Maggie Gallagher). 
241. For a pair of views on the divisiveness debate, see Smith, supra note 63 
and Laycock, supra note 218. 
242. Some would contend that marriage equality advocates have an incentive 
not to bargain, waiting for judicial decisions that deliver same-sex 
marriage without exemptions specific to marriage. Because no one can 
be assured of when courts will act, and what outcome they will reach, 
refusing to bargain necessarily puts off rights that could be secured 
legislatively today. For this reason, marriage equality advocates would 
be gambling to say, “No thanks, we will wait for Justice Kennedy.” 
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For opponents, the more challenging political terrain also means 
that the best opportunity to cement meaningful religious liberty 
protections is now. If opponents act now, trading recognition of same-
sex marriage for robust protections, then opponents will have muted 
the impact of same-sex marriage on like-minded believers. It is true 
that the struggle over same-sex marriage is an existential fight for 
some who may not or cannot be moved by pragmatic appeals, but for 
those who can, if they resist the “damage control” within their 
means,243 they will only have themselves to blame.244 
 
243. “There is not yet a unified sense of where we go from here, except for 
this: there is an accelerating awareness that the consequence of marriage 
equality is going to be extremely negative for traditionalist Christians.” 
See Dreher, supra note 40 (quoting Maggie Gallagher). 
244. For those for whom the struggle over same-sex marriage is an existential 
fight, pragmatic appeals may find little reception. See Smith, supra note 
63 (arguing that both sides are acting on legitimate concerns and are 
not merely being intransigent—instead, the “contending parties 
understand that there is a struggle over who will be doing the 
accommodating to whom. Proponents of same-sex marriage perceive, 
correctly, that domestic partnership is not likely to have all of the same 
legal features and advantages as marriages; and even if it does, in such 
an arrangement, heterosexual marriage is the ‘normal’ position, and it is 
the same-sex couples who are being accommodated. By the same token, 
more traditional citizens perceive that a law recognizing same-sex 
marriage, even if it comes with religious freedom ‘exceptions’ or 
‘exemptions,’ reverses these positions: now they are the ones who are the 
outliers to be accommodated.”). For anyone who may be swayed by 
pragmatic arguments, a clear-eyed view of the benefits of compromise is 
important. In the end, compromise offers the best hope for closing the 
schism over same-sex marriage. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: States Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage and the Methods by 
Which Same-Sex Marriage Is Recognized as of Jan. 14, 2014 245 
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245. Because the political landscape of same-sex marriage is in constant flux, 
it is worth noting that this Article accounts same-sex marriage laws as 
of January 14, 2014. During the editing cycle, a spate of same-sex 
marriage decisions continued to emerge from federal district courts. As 
just one example, Michigan’s ban on same-sex marriage (the Michigan 
Marriage Amendment, Mich. Const. art. I, § 25) has been held 
unconstitutional. See Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 WL 
1100794 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014). However, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has granted the state’s request to stay 
the judgment of the district court until the appeals court has ruled on 
the appeal. See Deboer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014). 
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Table A1 (continued): States Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Methods by Which Same-Sex Marriage Is Recognized as of Jan. 14, 2014  
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Table A1 (continued): States Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Methods by Which Same-Sex Marriage Is Recognized as of Jan. 14, 2014 
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Table A2: State-Wide Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination Measures 
 
 
                                                     
246. This column is only relevant for the enacting jurisdictions.  It is 
measured by the time which passed between the enactment of the 
earliest nondiscrimination measure protecting against sexual orientation 
discrimination and the enactment of same-sex marriage legislation. 
247. An Act Implementing The Guarantee Of Equal Protection Under The 
Constitution Of The State For Same Sex Couples, Pub. Acts No. 09-13, 
sec. 3, 2009 Conn. Acts 78, 79 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 46b-20 (2009)). 
248. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, 
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 3, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 119 (codified as 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (West 2009)). 
249. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, 
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 5, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 119-120; An Act 
Concerning Discriminatory Housing Practices, Pub. Acts No. 92-257, 
 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
(SSM) 
Legislation 
Employment
Discrimination
Housing 
Discrimination
Public 
Accommodations
Other 
Nondiscrimination 
Measures 
Years 
Other 
Protections 
Preceded 
SSM 
Legislation
246 
Enacting Jurisdictions 
CT 2009247 1991248 1991249 1991250 
1991251 
(Education) 
2011252 (Credit) 
18 years 
DE 2013253 2009254 2009255 2009256  4 years 
DC 2009257 1977258 1977259 1977260 1977
261 
(Education) 
32 years 
HI 2013262 1991263 2005264 2006265  22 years 
IL 2013266 2004267 2004268 2004269 2004270 (Credit) 9 years 
MD 2012271 2009272 2009273 2009274 2008
275 
(Education) 
4 years 
MN 2013276 1993277 1993278 1993279 1993280 (Credit) 20 years 
NH 2009281 1997282 1997283 1997284  12 years 
NY 2011285 2002286 2002287 2002288 
2002289 
(Education, 
Credit, and Other 
Various 
Protections) 
9 years 
RI 2013290 1995291 1995292 1995293 1995
294 
(Education) 
18 years 
VT 2009295 1992296 1992297 1992298 2000299 (Credit) 17 years 
WA 2012300 2006301 2006302 2006303 2006
304 (Education 
and Credit) 
6 years 
Nonrecognizing Jurisdictions with Antidiscrimination Measures 
CO N/A 305 306 307 308 N/A 
NV N/A 309 310 311 N/A  N/A 
OR N/A 312 313 314 315 N/A 
WI N/A 316 317 318 319 N/A 
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sec. 2, 1992 Conn. Acts 839, 840-841 (codified as CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
46a-64c (West 2009)).   
250. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, 
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 4, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 119 (codified as 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (West 2009)). 
251. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, 
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 10, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 121 (codified as 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-75 (West 2009)). 
252. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, 
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 6, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 120 (codified as 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-66 (West 2009)).  
253. An Act To Amend Title 13 of the Delaware Code Relating to Domestic 
Relations to Provide for Same-Gender Civil Marriage and to Convert 
Civil Unions to Civil Marriages, H.B. 75, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 
2013) (enacted) (codified as Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 101 (2013) 
(effective July 1, 2013).  
254. An Act To Amend Titles 6, 9, 18, 19, 25, And 29 Of The Delaware 
Code Relating To Discrimination In Employment, Public Works 
Contracting, Housing, Equal Accommodations And The Insurance 
Business, ch. 90, secs. 17-19, 77 Del. Laws 264, 265 (2009) (codified as 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 711 (West 2013)).   
255. An Act To Amend Titles 6, 9, 18, 19, 25, And 29 Of The Delaware 
Code Relating To Discrimination In Employment, Public Works 
Contracting, Housing, Equal Accommodations And The Insurance 
Business, ch. 90, sec. 7, 77 Del. Laws 264, 265 (2009) (codified as Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4603 (West 2013).  
256. An Act To Amend Titles 6, 9, 18, 19, 25, And 29 Of The Delaware 
Code Relating To Discrimination In Employment, Public Works 
Contracting, Housing, Equal Accommodations And The Insurance 
Business, ch. 90, sec. 4, 77 Del. Laws 264 (2009) (codified as Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 6, § 4604 (West 2013). 
257. Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 
2009, 57 D.C. Reg 27 (Mar. 10, 2010) (codified as D.C. Code § 46-401).  
258. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038 
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
259. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038 
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 32-408 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
260. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038 
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 2-1402.21 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
261. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038 
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
262. Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, sec. 3, Hawaii S.B. No. 1 (2013) 
(codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (West 2013)) (effective Dec. 2, 
2013). 
263. A Bill For An Act Relating To Employment, Act 2, sec. 3, 1991 Haw. 
Sess. Laws 3, 4-5 (codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 (West 1991)).  
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264. A Bill For An Act Relating To Civil Rights, Act 214, sec. 3 2005 Haw. 
Sess. Laws 688, 689-690 (codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 515-3 (West 
Supp. 2012)).   
265. A Bill For An Act Relating To Civil Rights, Act 76, sec. 3, 2006 Haw. 
Sess. Laws 214, 215 (codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 489-3 (West Supp. 
2012)).   
266. Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, S.B. 0010, 98th Gen. 
Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (enacted) (to be codified at 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/201 (2014)) (effective, June 1, 2014). 
267. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004 
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West 
2011)).    
268. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004 
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West 
2011)).    
269. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004 
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West 
2011)).    
270. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004 
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West 
2011)).    
271. Civil Marriage Protection Act, ch. 2, sec. 1 2012 Md. Laws 9, 10 
(codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§2-201 (LexisNexis 2012)) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2013).  
272. House Bill 51, ch. 120, sec. 6 2009 Md. Laws 540, 567-570 (codified as 
Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).    
273. House Bill 51, ch. 120, sec. 7, 2009 Md. Laws 540, 581-583 (codified as 
Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-705 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).    
274. House Bill 51, ch. 120, sec. 3 2009 Md. Laws 540, 554 (codified as Md. 
Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-304 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).    
275. An Act Concerning Public Schools-Bullying, Harassment, An 
Intimidation-Policy And Disciplinary Standards, ch. 489, sec. 1, 2008 
Md. Laws 4050, 4051-4054 (codified as Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-
424.1 (LexisNexis 2008)).  
276. An Act Relating to Marriage, ch. 74, sec. 2, 2013 Minn. Laws 404, 405 
(codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.01 (West 2013)) (Aug. 1, 2013). 
277. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory 
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 3, 1993 Minn. 
Laws 121, 122-124 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.08 subd. 2 
(West 2012)).    
278. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory 
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 4, 1993 Minn. 
Laws 121, 124-125 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.09 (West 
2012)).    
279. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory 
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 5, 1993 Minn. 
Laws 121, 125-126 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.11, subd. 1 
(West 2012)).    
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280. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory 
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 12, 1993 
Minn. Laws 121, 138-139 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.16 
(West 2012)).    
281. An Act Relative to Civil Marriage and Civil Unions, ch. 59, 2009 N.H. 
Laws 60, 60 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1A (2010)). 
282. An Act Amending The Law Against Discrimination To Prohibit 
Discrimination On Account Of A Person’s Sexual Orientation, ch. 108, 
1997 H.H. Laws 88, 91 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:6 (2009)). 
283. An Act Amending The Law Against Discrimination To Prohibit 
Discrimination On Account Of A Person’s Sexual Orientation, ch. 108, 
1997 H.H. Laws 88, 92 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:8 (2009)). 
284. An Act Amending The Law Against Discrimination To Prohibit 
Discrimination On Account Of A Person’s Sexual Orientation, ch. 108, 
1997 H.H. Laws 88, 92 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:10 
(2009)). 
285. Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. LAWS 749 (codified at N.Y. 
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014)). 
286. Act of Dec. 17, 2002, ch. 2, secs. 2, 5–6, §§ 291, 296(1)–(1-a), 2002 N.Y. 
LAWS 46, 46–48 (codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 
296(1)–(1-a) (McKinney 2013)). 
287. Secs. 2, 8–9, 11, §§ 291, 296(2-a), (3-b), (5), 2002 N.Y. LAWS at 46–51 
(codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296(2-a), (3-b), (5) 
(McKinney 2013)). 
288. Secs. 2, 7, §§ 291, 296(2) 2002 N.Y. LAWS at 46, 48 (codified as amended 
at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296(2) (McKinney 2013)). 
289. Secs. 2, 10, 12–17, §§ 291, 296(4), (9)(a), (13), 296-a, 40-c, 313(1)(a), 
(3), 2002 N.Y. LAWS at 46, 48, 51–53 (codified as amended at N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296, 296-a; CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c; EDUC. § 313 
(McKinney 2013)). 
290. An Act Relating to Domestic Relations-Persons Eligible to Marry, ch. 
13-4, 2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ___ (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws §15-1-1 
(2013))(effective Aug. 1, 2013).   
291. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 4, 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws 
83, 85-88 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-5-7 (2003)).  
292. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 3,  1995 R.I. Pub. Laws 
83, 87-91 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 34-37-4 (2013)). 
293. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 7, 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws 83 
(codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-24-2 (Supp. 2013)). 
294. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 7 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws 83, 
107 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-5.1-8 (Supp. 2013)). 
295. An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, no. 3, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33 
(codified as Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (2009)).  
296. An Act Relating To Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual 
Orientation, No. 135, 1992 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 26-27 (codified as  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495(a) (2009)).. 
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297. An Act Relating To Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual 
Orientation, No. 135, 1992 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 28-30 (codified as 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4503 (Supp. 2013)).  
298. An Act Relating To Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual 
Orientation, No. 135, 1992 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 30-31 (codified as 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(a) (Supp. 2013)). 
299. An Act Relating To The Modernization Of The Laws Related To Banks 
And Banking, No. 153, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 509, 593 (codified as 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 10403 (Supp. 2013)). 
300. An Act Requiring Protection For All Families In Washington By 
Creating Equality In Civil Marriage And Changing Domestic Partner 
Laws, While Protecting Religious Freedom, ch. 3, 2012 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 199 (codified as Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(1) (West 2012)). 
301. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human 
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash. 
Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (2012)).  
302. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human 
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash. 
Rev. Code § 49.60.222 (2012)). 
303. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human 
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash. 
Rev. Code § 49.60.215 (2012)). 
304. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human 
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash. 
Rev. Code § 49.60.040(2) (2012)). 
305. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Employment Nondiscrimination 
Protections, ch. 295, 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1254, 1254-1256 (codified as 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402 (2013)).  
306. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Prohibitions Against 
Discrimination, ch. 341, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1593, 1593-1595 (codified 
as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-502 (2013)). 
307. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Prohibitions Against 
Discrimination, ch. 341, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1593, 1595-1596 (codified 
as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (2013)). 
308. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Prohibitions Against 
Discrimination, ch. 341, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1593, 1596-1597 (codified 
as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-59-106(1)(s) (2013)). 
309. An Act Relating to Employment Practices, ch. 419, 1999 Nev. Stat. 
1935, 1938 (codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.330 (2012)).    
310. An Act Relating to Housing, ch. 191, 2011 Nev. State 867 (codified as 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.020 (Supp. 2013)).  
311. An Act Relating to Public Accommodations, ch. 195, 2009 Nev. Stat. 
716, 717 (codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070 (West Supp. 2013)).  
312. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 29, 
2007 Or. Laws 431, 443 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.850(2) 
(2013)).  
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313. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 4, 
2007 Or. Laws 431, 432-433 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 
(2013)). 
314. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 8, 
2007 Or. Laws 431, 434-435 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.421 
(2013)).  
315. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 5, 
2007 Or. Laws 431, 433 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403 
(2013)).  
316. 1981 Wisconsin Act 112, ch. 112, sec. 2, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901, 902 
(codified as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2013)).   
317. 1981 Wisconsin Act 112, ch. 112, sec. 4, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901, 902 
(codified as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.50 (West Supp. 2013)).  
318. 1981 Wisconsin Act 112, ch. 112, sec.3, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901, 902 
(codified as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52 (West Supp. 2013)).  
319. 1989 Wisconsin 186, ch. 186, sec. 1, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 1113 (codified 
as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 36.12 (West 2013)). 
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Table A3: Religious Liberty Protections in Same-Sex Marriage States 
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Same-Sex Marriage by Legislation 
Maryland           
Rhode Island           
New 
Hampshire           
Minnesota           
Connecticut
330            
D.C.           
New York           
Washington           
Vermont            
Hawaii           
Illinois           
Delaware           
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Table A3 (continued): Religious Liberty Protections in Same-Sex 
Marriage States 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Same-Sex Marriage by Ballot Initiative 
Maine         
Same-Sex Marriage by Judicial Decision 
California          * 
Iowa           
Massachusetts           
New Jersey           
New Mexico *         * 
Oklahoma331           
Utah332           
 
 
                                                     
320. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-22b (West 2009); Del. Code Ann. tit. 
13, § 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/c001/sc01/index. 
shtml; D.C. Code § 46-406(c) (LexisNexis 2012); S.B. No. 1 H.D.1 § 
572-D, 27th Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013); S.B. 10(a-5), 98th Gen. 
Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-
202, (LexisNexis 2012)); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09 (West Supp. 2013); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(II) (Supp. 2013); N.Y. Dom. Rel. 
Law § 11(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5144(b) 
(2012); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(b) (LexisNexis 2013); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 26.04.010(4) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013). See also Cal. Fam. Code § 400 
(West Supp. 2013) (“Although marriage is a personal relation arising 
out of a civil, and not a religious, contract, a marriage may be 
solemnized by any of the following who is 18 years of age or older: (a) A 
priest, minister, rabbi, or authorized person of any religious 
denomination. A person authorized by this subdivision shall not be 
required to solemnize a marriage that is contrary to the tenets of his or 
her faith. Any refusal to solemnize a marriage under this subdivision, 
either by an individual or by a religious denomination, shall not affect 
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the tax-exempt status of any entity.”); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d. 865, 
871 (N.M. 2013) (“Our holding will not interfere with the religious 
freedom of religious organizations or clergy because (1) no religious 
organization will have to change its policies to accommodate same-
gender couples, and (2) no religious clergy will be required to solemnize 
a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs.”). 
321. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-22b, 46b-35a (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); 
D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); S.B. No. 1 H.D.1 § 572-E 
(Haw. 2013); S.B. 10 (a-10) (Ill. 2013) (covers “facility” only; organizations 
with “principal purpose” to advance religion); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law 
§§ 2-201, 2-202  (LexisNexis 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.26(3) (West 
Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013); N.Y. 
Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 4501(1) (Supp. 2013); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(c) (2013); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(5) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013) (provides there is no duty to “host”; 
encompasses “other religious institution”). 
322. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a (Supp. 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 
§ 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/c001/sc01/ 
index.shtml; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); S.B. No. 1 
H.D.1 § 572-D (Haw. 2013); S.B. 10 (a-5) (Ill. 2013); Md. Code Ann., 
Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09 
(West Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013); 
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws 
Ann. § 15-3-6.1 (2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 5144(b) (2012); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 26.04.010(6) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013). 
323. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a (Supp. 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 
§ 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/c001/sc01/ 
index.shtml; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); S.B. No. 1 
H.D.1 § 572-D–E (Haw. 2013); S.B. 10 (a-10) (Ill. 2013); Md. H.B. 438 §§ 
2–3 (codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 
2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09 (West Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) 
(McKinney Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1 (2013); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 26.04.010(4) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 
19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013). See also Cal. Fam. Code § 400(a) (West Supp. 
2014) (“Any refusal to solemnize a marriage under this subdivision, either 
by an individual or by a religious denomination, shall not affect the tax-
exempt status of any entity.”). 
324. See D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (2011) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). See also N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013) (exempting “the promotion of 
marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or 
housing designated for married individuals”); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law 
§§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012) (this protection only applies if the 
program receives no state or federal funding); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-
6.1 (2013) (exempting the “promotion of marriage through any social or 
religious programs or service”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
26.04.010(7)(a)(ii (LexisNexis 2013)). New York may protect this. See N.Y. 
Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 2014)  (“nothing in this article 
shall limit or diminish the right, . . . of any religious or denominational 
institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or 
educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in 
connection with a religious organization . . .  from taking such action as is 
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calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which 
it is established or maintained”). 
325. See Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 19 (2009) (requiring that “such religious 
organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program 
or purpose”); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202  (LexisNexis 2012) 
(no “promotion” through “social programs . . . unless state or federal 
funds” for “specific program”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.201 (West Supp. 
2014) (conditioning protection on fact that covered entity “does not receive 
public funds for that specific program or purpose”).  Rhode Island does not 
condition this protection on not receiving public funds.  R.I. Gen. Laws 
Ann. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2) (2013). 
326. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 4501(b) (Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 457:37(IV) (Supp. 2013); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 
(LexisNexis 2012); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(e) (2013). 
327. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013). See also N.Y. Dom. 
Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 2014) (“[N]othing in this article shall 
limit or diminish the right, . . .  of any religious or denominational 
institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or 
educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in 
connection with a religious organization to limit employment or sales or 
rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to 
persons of the same religion or denomination”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
363A.26 (West 2013) (providing that religious organization are not 
prohibited from “in matters relating to sexual orientation, taking any action 
with respect to . . . housing and real property”). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 28-1-9 (West Supp. 2012) (“B. bar any religious or denominational 
institution or organization that is operated, supervised or controlled by or 
that is operated in connection with a religious or denominational 
organization from limiting admission to or giving preference to persons of 
the same religion or denomination or from making selections of buyers, 
lessees or tenants as are calculated by the organization or denomination to 
promote the religious or denominational principles for which it is established 
or maintained, unless membership in the religious or denominational 
organization is restricted on account of race, color, national origin or 
ancestry; C. bar any religious or denominational institution or organization 
that is operated, supervised or controlled by or that is operated in 
connection with a religious or denominational organization from imposing 
discriminatory employment or renting practices that are based upon sexual 
orientation or gender identity; provided, that the provisions of the Human 
Rights Act with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity shall 
apply to any other:(1) for-profit activities of a religious or denominational 
institution or religious organization subject to the provisions of Section 
511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or(2) nonprofit 
activities of a religious or denominational institution or religious 
organization subject to the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended”). 
328. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/ 
title13/c001/sc01/index.shtml (“[N]othing in this section shall be construed 
to require any person (including any clergyperson or minister of any 
religion) authorized to solemnize a marriage to solemnize any marriage, and 
no such authorized person who fails or refuses for any reason to solemnize a 
marriage shall be subject to any fine or other penalty for such failure or 
refusal.”). 
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329. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be 
deemed or construed to limit the protections and exemptions provided to 
religious organizations under RSA 354-A:18.”); SF 925, 85th Legis. Reg. 
Sess. (Minn. 2013) (“This chapter does not alter or affect the protections or 
exemptions provided in chapter 363A for a religious association, educational 
institution, business, labor union, place of public accommodation, employer, 
or other person.”); S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) 
(“Nothing in this Act . . . is it intended to abrogate, limit, or expand the 
Illinois Human Rights Act or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”); 
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1 “Nothing in the marriage laws of this 
state shall be deemed or construed to limit the protections and exemptions 
provided to religious organizations under GL paragraph 28-5-6(7)(ii) and 
subsection 34-37-4.2(a)”); 3. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b. (“Nothing in this 
section shall be deemed or construed to limit the protections and 
exemptions otherwise provided to religious organizations under section three 
of article one of the constitution of the state of New York.”). A catch-all 
provision in Delaware provides that the same-sex marriage law “does not 
affect rights, duties or obligations that matured or were owed, penalties that 
were incurred, or proceedings that were begun, before its effective date.” 
Delaware Laws Ch. 19 (H.B. 75 2013). See also In re Marriage Cases, 43 
Cal. 4th 757, 784, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (2008), vacated by Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 113 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“[a]ffording same-sex couples the opportunity 
to obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the religious 
freedom of any religious \organization, official, or any other person; no 
religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with 
regard to same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to 
solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs. (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 4.).”); Griego v. Oliver,  316 P.3d. 865  (“Our holding will 
not interfere with the religious freedom of religious organizations or clergy 
because (1) no religious organization will have to change its policies to 
accommodate same-gender couples, and (2) no religious clergy will be 
required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious 
beliefs. ) 
330. Connecticut passed legislation on the heels of a judicial decision requiring 
same-sex marriage. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 
A.2d 407(2008). 
331. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013, 
at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan 14, 2014) (permanently enjoining Oklahoma’s 
constitutional same-sex marriage ban because it “violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
by precluding same-sex couples from receiving an Oklahoma marriage 
license.”). The court stayed execution of the permanent injunction pending 
any appeals in the Tenth Circuit. Id.  
332. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *27 (D. Utah 
Dec. 20, 2013) (“Although the State did not directly present an argument 
based on religious freedom, the court notes that its decision does not 
mandate any change for religious institutions, which may continue to 
express their own moral viewpoints and define their own traditions about 
marriage. If anything, the recognition of same-sex marriage expands 
religious freedom because some churches that have congregations in Utah 
desire to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies but are currently unable to 
do so, . . . By recognizing the right to marry a partner of the same sex, the 
State allows these groups the freedom to practice their religious beliefs 
without mandating that other groups must adopt similar practices.”). 
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Table A4: State Political Climate333 
State Region House 2013 Senate 2013 Gov. Constitutional 
Ban 
  
D
em
oc
ra
t 
R
ep
ub
lic
an
 
D
em
oc
ra
t 
R
ep
ub
lic
an
 
D/R 
(Ind.) 
Alabama South 37 63 11 23 R X 
Alaska Pacific 14 26 7 13 R X 
Arizona West 24 36 13 16 R X 
Arkansas South 48 51 13 21 D X 
California West 52 25 28 12 D 
Colorado West 37 38 18 17 D X 
Connecticut Northeast 98 53 22 14 D 
Delaware South 27 14 13 8 D 
DC South - 
Florida South 44 75 14 26 R X 
Georgia South 58 118 18 37 R X 
Hawaii Pacific 44 7 24 1 D 
Idaho West 13 57 7 28 R X 
Illinois Midwest 71 47 40 19 D 
Indiana Midwest 31 68 13 37 R 
Iowa Midwest 46 53 26 23 R 
Kansas Midwest 32 91 8 32 R X 
Kentucky South 54 45 14 23 D X 
Louisiana South 43 59 13 26 R X 
Maine Northeast 89 58 19 15 R 
Maryland South 98 43 34 11 D 
Massachusetts Northeast 130 29 36 3 D 
Michigan Midwest 49 59 12 26 R X 
Minnesota Midwest 73 61 39 28 D 
Mississippi south 58 64 20 32 R X 
                                                     
333. Sources: Region: Chapter 6-Statistical Groupings of States and Counties, 
U.S. Census Bureau (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014) available at: 
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/pdfs/GARM/Ch6GARM.pdf; House, 
Senate, and Governor data drawn from ballotpedia.org; Constitutional ban 
and lock-in effect, see Part II.D; Sexual Orientation Protection: States With 
Protections for Being Gay, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/31/business/States-With-Protections-for-
Being-Gay.html?ref=your-money; Education: Educational Attainment, US 
Census Bureau (2011) available at: http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/socdemo/education/; Religiosity from State of the States, Gallop, 
(2012) available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/state-states.aspx; 
Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It 
Means New York Times (Mar. 26 2013) available at 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-
sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/?_r=0. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Marriage of Necessity 
1259 
 
Table A4 (continued): State Political Climate 
 
State 
L
oc
k 
In
 
E
ff
ec
t 
Se
xu
al
 
O
ri
en
ta
ti
on
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
  
E
du
ca
ti
on
  Religiosity 
2012  Nate Silver's Projected Support 
  
% very 
religious  
2008 2012 2016 2020 
Alabama Mild No 30 55.7 24.4 29.9 35.9 42.5 
Alaska Mild No 36 31.3 41.5 47.6 53.7 59.6 
Arizona Negligible No 35 36.6 42.4 48.4 54.6 60.7 
Arkansas Negligible No 25 52.3 31.1 36.8 42.8 49.1 
California 41 34.5 48.6 54.6 60.4 66.1 
Colorado Strong Yes 49 33.5 45.8 52 58 64 
Connecticut 51 30.5 52 58.2 64.1 69.8 
Delaware 40 35.2 49.2 55.7 62 68 
DC 77 29.7 57.1 63.1 68.7 74 
Florida Negligible No 34 37.6 40.4 46.6 52.9 59.3 
Georgia Strong No 37 47.9 30.8 36.7 42.9 49.5 
Hawaii 40 31.4 52.2 58.6 64.6 70.3 
Idaho Strong No 31 45.1 36.4 42.4 48.5 54.8 
Illinois 42 38 45.8 52.2 58.4 64.6 
Indiana 31 42.7 37.8 43.7 49.8 55.9 
Iowa 33 41.3 40.2 46.5 52.8 59.1 
Kansas Strong No 40 45.1 36.8 42.8 48.9 55.1 
Kentucky Mild No 30 45.4 35.7 41.8 48 54.4 
Louisiana Strong No 28 53.3 29.3 35.1 41.4 48.1 
Maine 37 24.4 44.8 51.1 57.2 63.2 
Maryland 52 36.7 48.6 55 61.2 67.2 
Massachusetts 55 26.5 56.4 62.9 69 74.5 
Michigan Negligible No 34 36.5 42.7 48.9 55 61.2 
Minnesota 42 38.2 46.3 52.3 58.2 64 
Mississippi Mild No 27 58.4 20.9 25.9 31.5 37.8 
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Table A4 (continued): State Political Climate 
 
State Region House 2013 Senate 2013 Gov. 
Constitutional 
Ban 
  
D
em
oc
ra
t 
R
ep
ub
lic
an
 
D
em
oc
ra
t 
R
ep
ub
lic
an
 
D/R 
(Ind.) 
Missouri Midwest 53 109 10 24 D X 
Montana West 39 61 21 29 D X 
Nebraska Midwest 0 0 0 0 R X 
Nevada West 26 15 11 10 R X 
New 
Hampshire Northeast 218 179 11 13 D  
New Jersey Northeast 47 32 24 16 R 
New Mexico West 37 32 25 17 R 
New York Northeast 105 42 33 30 D 
North 
Carolina South 42 77 17 33 R X 
North 
Dakota 
Midwest 23 71 14 33 R X 
Ohio Midwest 38 61 10 23 R X 
Oklahoma South 29 72 12 36 R Ruled Uncon. 
Oregon West 34 26 16 14 D X 
Pennsylvani
a 
Northeast 92 110 23 27 R 
 
Rhode Island Northeast 69 6 32 5 Ind. 
South 
Carolina South 45 78 18 28 R X 
South 
Dakota Midwest 17 53 7 27 R X 
Tennessee South 27 70 7 26 R X 
Texas South 54 95 12 19 R X 
Utah West 14 61 5 24 R Ruled Uncon. 
Vermont Northeast 94 45 21 7 D 
Virginia South 32 65 20 20 R X 
Washington West 55 43 26 23 D 
West 
Virginia South 53 46 24 10 D  
Wisconsin Midwest 39 57 15 18 R X 
Wyoming West 8 52 4 26 R 
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Table A4 (continued): State Political Climate 
 
State 
L
oc
k 
In
 E
ff
ec
t 
Se
xu
al
 
O
ri
en
ta
ti
on
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
  
E
du
ca
ti
on
  
Religiosity 
2012  Nate Silver's Projected Support 
    
% very 
religious  2008 2012 2016 2020 
Missouri Mild No 35 42.1 37.5 43.6 49.7 56 
Montana Mild No 36 34 41.9 47.8 53.7 59.6 
Nebraska Strong No 36 44.2 37.9 44 50.2 56.5 
Nevada Mild Yes 29 31.4 46.7 53 59.2 65.2 
New 
Hampshire   43 23.4  50.6 57.1 63.2 69.1 
New Jersey 47 34.7 50.6 57 63.1 69 
New Mexico 36 43.2 43.3 49.6 55.8 61.9 
New York 46 31.5 51.9 58.1 64 69.7 
North 
Carolina 
Strong No 35 49.5 
 
34.2 40.2 46.3 52.7 
North 
Dakota 
Negligible No 33 41.6 
 
38.5 44.8 51.2 57.7 
Ohio Mild No 33 38.2 40.4 46.6 52.8 59.1 
Oklahoma Mild No 30 47.6 32.5 38.4 44.7 51.2 
Oregon Mild Yes 40 28.8 48 54 59.7 65.4 
Pennsylvania 37 39.5 45.8 52 58 64 
Rhode Island 42 29.1 56.3 63.1 69.3 75.1 
South 
Carolina Strong No 32 51.9  31.6 37.3 43.3 49.7 
South 
Dakota Mild No 32 45.6  37.1 43.3 49.7 56.1 
Tennessee Mild No 31 50.3 34.5 40.3 46.3 52.6 
Texas Strong No 34 47 33.4 39.4 45.8 52.4 
Utah Strong No 38 56 36.3 42.1 48.1 54.2 
Vermont 46 19.1 51.6 57.8 63.8 69.4 
Virginia Mild No 48 41.1 41.1 47.2 53.3 59.5 
Washington 42 30.5 49.6 55.7 61.5 67.2 
West 
Virginia   24 41.9  37.3 43.5 49.9 56.3 
Wisconsin Mild Yes 34 36.7 45.6 51.8 58 64 
Wyoming 31 32.8 34.6 40.6 46.8 53.2 
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Table A5: Vote Margins in Enacting Jurisdictions334 
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334. Support at time of enactment: Connecticut Voters Back Same-Sex 
Marriage, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Rell Approval Holds as 
Dodd, Lieberman Scores Drop, Quinnipiac Univ. (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/ 
connecticut/release-detail?ReleaseID=1243; New Poll: 54% of Delaware 
Voters Support Marriage Equality Del. Equality (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/equalitydelaware/pages/54/ 
attachments/original/1362425933/Equality_Delaware_Press_Release_-
_New_Poll_54__Support.pdf?1362425933; D.C. Poll, Wash. Post 
(2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll 
_013110.html; Poll: Hawaii Voters Support Allowing Gay Couples to 
Marry, Civil Beat (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:18 PM HST), 
http://hawaii.politics.government.blogs.civilbeat.com/post/41745936105
/poll-hawaii-voters-support-allowing-gay-couples-to; Greg Hinz, 
Illinoisans back gay marriage 50-29: Crain’s/Ipsos poll, Crain’s 
Chicago Business (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/ 
article/20130219/BLOGS02/130219779/illinoisans-back-gay-marriage-50-
29-crains-ipsos-poll#; Question 6 Civil Marriage Protection Act, Md. 
State Board of Elections (Nov. 28, 2012), http://elections. 
state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_detail_qresults_2012_4
_0006S-.html; Minnesotans like Dayton, Split on Gay marriage, Public 
Policy Polling (June 1, 2011), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/ 
pdf/PPP_Release_MN_06011118.pdf; New Poll Shows Majority of New 
Hampshire Voters Continue to Support Marriage Equality for Lesbian 
and Gay Couples, National Center for Lesbian Rights (2009), 
http://nclrights.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/new-poll-shows-majority-of-
new-hampshire-voters-continue-to-support-marriage-equality-for-lesbian-
and-gay-couples/; 8/10: Majority Supports Legalization of Same-Sex 
Marriage…63% Want Law to Remain in Place, Marist Poll (Aug. 10, 
2011), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/810-majority-supports-legalization-
of-same-sex-marriage%E2%80%A663-want-law-to-remain-in-place/ 
#sthash.gIbZUN2p.dpuf; Ted Nesi, Poll: Raimondo is favorite for gov; 
Chafee does best as a Dem, WPRI. (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://blogs.wpri.com/2013/01/31/poll-raimondo-is-favorite-for-gov-
chafees-best-shot-as-dem/; Minnesota Amendment 1 Same-Sex Marriage 
Ballot Measure Fails, Huffington Post (Nov. 7, 2012), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/minnesota-amendment-1-results-
2012_n_2050310.html; Vote Counts: Substitute for Raised S.B. No. 
899, Session Year 2009, Conn. Gen. Assem., http://www. 
cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_nu
m=899&which_year=2009; Zach Ford, Delaware Becomes 11th State 
with Marriage Equality, Think Progress (May 7, 2013) 
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013/05/07/1975311/breaking-delaware-
to-become-11th-state-with-marriage-equality/; Governor Signs Marriage 
Equality Bill into Law, State of Delaware (May 7, 2013), 
http://news.delaware.gov/2013/05/07/governor-signs-marriage-equality-
bill-into-law/;  Ian Urbina, District of Columbia Backs Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2009, at A28; Abercrombie signs same-
sex marriage bill into law, Honolulu Star-Advertiser (Nov. 13, 
2013), http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/20131113_ 
Abercrombie_to_sign_samesex_marriage_bill_into_law.html; Reid 
Wilson, Hawaii Set to Legalize Same Sex Marriage, Washington Post, 
Nov. 13, 2013, at A2; Dave Mckinney, Gay marriage bill passes state 
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House, Senate — heads to Quinn’s desk, Chicago Sun-Times (Dec. 7, 
2013 6:25 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/23558841-761/gay-marriage-
bill-passes-in-illinois-house.html; Ill. S., S, Vote: S.B. 10 3rd Reading, 98th 
Gen. Assem. at 1 (2013); Ill. H., H. Vote: S.B. 10 3rd Reading, 98th Gen. 
Assem., at 4 (2013);  David Hill, Maryland senate approves same-sex 
marriage bill, Wash. Times (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2012/feb/23/maryland-senate-approves-same-sex-
marriage-bill/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS; Bill 
Information: H.B. 438 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012), http://mgaleg. 
maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?ys=2012rs%2fbillfile%2fhb0438.ht
m; HF 1054: Status in the House for the 88th Legislature (Minn. 2013),  
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/bill.php?view=chrono&f=HF1054&y=
2013&ssn=0&b=house#actions; Press Release, Empowering Spirits, 
Empowering Spirits Applauds Passage of NH Marriage Equality Bill, 
(Jun. 3, 2009),  http://www.empoweringspirits.org/PRDocServer/ 
Passage_of_NH_Marriage_Equality_Bill_060309.pdf; A.B 8520-2011: 
N.Y. Open Legislation, N.Y. Sen. (2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/ 
legislation/bill/A8520-2011 (last visited Aug. 12, 2013); Randal Edgar, 
R.I. Senate approves same-sex marriage 26 to 12, Providence 
Journal (Apr. 24, 2013), http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-
news/2013/04/same-sex-marriage-bills-clear-rhode-island-senate.html; 
Randal Edgar, Rhode Island House passes bill legalizing same-sex 
marriage, 56 to 15 (May 2, 2013),  http://news.providencejournal.com/ 
breaking-news/2013/05/rhode-island-house-passes-same-sex-marriage-
bill-56-to-15.html; Journal of the House of Representatives, H. Vol. 140, 
No.41, May 2, Sess., at 11 (R.I. 2013); Journal of the Senate, S. Vol. 
140, No.41, Apr. 24, Sess., at 8 (R.I. 2013);   Status Summary: S. 115, 
Vt. Leg. (2009), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/summary. 
cfm?Bill=S.0115&Session=2010; Tom Watkins, Washington state 
legislature votes to approve same-sex marriage, CNN (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/08/us/washington-same-sex-
marriage/index.html. 
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Table A6: Same-Sex Marriage Support 
(and Opposition) in Constitutional Ban States 
Strong Lock-In
 1994-96 
Support 
Support at time 
of Ban 
2008 
Support 
2012 Support 
(projected) 
2016 Support 
(projected) 
Georgia (2004) 21 23.80 34 36.7 42.9
Idaho (2006) 17 36.65 33 42.4 48.5
Kansas (2005) 24 30.00 37 42.8 48.9
Louisiana 
(2004) 
23 22.22 36 35.1 41.4
North Carolina 
(2012) 
21 38.94 36 40.2 46.3
South Carolina 
(2006) 
21 22.00 32 37.3 43.3
Texas (2005) 24 23.75 35 39.4 45.8
Mild Lock-In 
 1994-96 
Support 
Support at time 
of Ban 
2008 
Support 
2012 Support 
(projected) 
2016 Support 
(projected) 
Alabama 
(2006) 
17 19.00 26 29.9 35.9
Alaska (1998) 23 31.89 45 47.6 53.7
Kentucky 
(2004) 
18 25.00 31 41.8 48
Nevada (2002) 26 32.80 50 53 59.2
Oregon (2004) 26 43.00 52 54 59.7
Tennessee 
(2006) 
19 19.00 31 40.3 46.3
Virginia (2006) 24 42.94 42 47.2 53.3
Wisonsin 
(2006) 
26 41.00 44 51.8 58
Negligible Lock-In
 1994-96 
Support 
Support at time 
of Ban 
2008 
Support 
2012 Support 
(projected) 
2016 Support 
(projected) 
Arizona (2008) 25 43.80 48 48.4 54.6
Arkansas 
(2004) 
17 25.05 29 36.8 42.8
Colorado 
(2006) 
27 44.98 52 52 58
Florida (2008) 26 38.10 41 46.6 52.9
Michigan 
(2004) 
26 41.00 46 48.9 55
Mississippi 
(2004) 
17 14.00 27 25.9 31.5
Missouri 
(2004) 
26 29.40 37 43.6 49.7
Montana 
(2004) 
23 33.50 45 47.8 53.7
Nebraska 
(2000) 
20 29.90 35 44 50.2
North Dakota 
(2004) 
22 26.77 38 44.8 51.2
Ohio (2004) 24 38.29 45 46.6 52.8
South Dakota 
(2006) 
23 48.17 38 43.3 49.7
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Table A7: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Age, 
With and Without the Oldest Generation (65 and Older)335 
STATE/ 
SUPPORT 
65+ 45-64 30-44 18-29 Average Weighted 
Average 
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+  
Massachusetts 34 53 61 74 55.5 56.2 21.7 25.3 35.4 17.6 
Vermont 33 49 57 70 52.3 52.1 20.2 22.7 38.8 18.4 
Rhode Island 32 49 58 71 52.5 53.0 22.5 23.9 35.3 18.3 
Connecticut 32 49 57 69 51.8 51.8 19.7 25.0 36.9 18.4 
New York 32 47 56 70 51.3 51.8 22.3 25.9 34.4 17.4 
New 
Hampshire 31 47 56 69 50.8 50.6 19.1 24.3 39.3 17.3 
Maine  30 46 56 69 50.3 49.2 17.9 23.1 39.0 20.1 
California 31 46 53 67 49.3 50.7 23.9 27.7 33.2 15.2 
Washington 28 45 53 66 48.0 49.0 22.1 26.4 35.4 16.1 
Hawaii 27 46 53 66 48.0 48.6 21.5 25.1 35.0 18.4 
New Jersey 27 45 53 67 48.0 48.5 20.4 26.4 35.7 17.5 
Colorado 26 44 50 63 45.8 47.4 22.7 27.6 35.3 14.4 
Oregon 26 44 50 64 46.0 46.5 20.9 25.7 35.4 18.0 
Nevada 26 43 49 64 45.5 46.6 21.8 28.3 34.0 15.9 
New Mexico 25 43 49 63 45.0 45.7 22.2 24.5 35.7 17.6 
Arizona 25 41 48 62 44.0 44.6 22.6 26.0 32.9 18.5 
Minnesota 23 38 47 61 42.3 42.7 21.6 25.6 35.8 17.0 
Pennsylvania 24 40 48 63 43.8 43.5 20.7 23.6 35.9 19.8 
Alaska 22 36 44 57 39.8 41.9 25.0 26.9 37.6 10.5 
Wisconsin 23 38 46 61 42.0 42.2 21.2 24.7 36.2 17.9 
Illinois 23 38 46 60 41.8 42.5 22.2 26.7 34.5 16.5 
Montana 23 38 46 60 41.8 41.5 20.8 22.4 37.7 19.1 
Maryland 23 37 45 58 40.8 41.4 21.5 26.2 36.2 16.1 
Delaware 23 36 45 59 40.8 40.7 21.4 24.6 35.3 18.7 
Michigan 21 35 43 57 39.0 39.0 20.8 24.5 36.6 18.1 
Florida 23 36 44 57 40.0 39.2 19.7 24.0 34.3 22.0 
Ohio 20 34 43 56 38.3 38.2 20.7 24.6 36.3 18.5 
Iowa 20 34 43 56 38.3 38.2 21.7 23.8 35.0 19.6 
Virginia 19 33 40 54 36.5 37.3 22.3 26.6 35.3 15.9 
Wyoming 19 32 39 54 36.0 36.6 22.8 24.2 36.7 16.3 
Kansas 19 32 40 54 36.3 36.7 23.0 24.7 34.6 17.7 
South Dakota 18 31 40 54 35.8 35.8 22.5 23.3 35.2 19.0 
Indiana 17 30 38 53 34.5 34.9 22.0 25.5 35.2 17.3 
North Dakota 16 30 39 53 34.5 35.1 25.0 22.3 34.1 18.7 
Missouri 17 30 38 52 34.3 34.4 22.0 24.5 35.2 18.3 
Idaho 16 30 37 51 33.5 34.3 23.1 25.7 34.1 17.1 
Nebraska 16 29 36 51 33.0 33.4 22.9 24.6 34.5 18.0 
West Virginia 16 29 37 52 33.5 32.6 18.9 23.9 37.0 20.3 
Texas 16 28 35 48 31.8 33.2 24.3 28.5 33.0 14.2 
North 
Carolina 
15 27 34 47 30.8 31.2 21.6 26.8 34.6 17.0 
Georgia 14 26 33 45 29.5 30.6 22.9 28.5 34.2 14.4 
Louisiana 15 26 33 46 30.0 30.7 23.6 25.2 34.8 16.3 
South 
Carolina 14 24 31 44 28.3 28.4 22.0 25.0 35.1 17.9 
Kentucky 13 23 30 44 27.5 27.5 21.2 25.9 35.6 17.4 
Tennessee 12 23 29 42 26.5 26.6 21.1 26.0 35.3 17.5 
Utah  11 20 26 37 23.5 25.5 28.9 29.1 28.9 13.1 
Oklahoma 12 21 27 40 25.0 25.2 23.0 24.8 34.3 17.9 
Arkansas 12 21 27 40 25.0 24.9 21.6 25.0 34.4 19.0 
Mississippi 10 19 25 36 22.5 22.9 22.9 25.3 34.6 17.2 
Alabama 10 19 25 36 22.5 22.9 23.6 24.5 34.2 17.6 
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Table A7 (continued): Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Age, 
With and Without the Oldest Generation (65 and Older) 
STATE/ 
SUPPORT 
45-64 30-44 18-29 Average Weighted 
Average 
18-29 30-44 45-64  
Massachusetts 53 61 74 62.67 60.99 26.4 30.7 42.9 
Vermont 49 57 70 58.67 56.41 24.7 27.8 47.5 
Rhode Island 49 58 71 59.33 57.69 27.5 29.2 43.2 
Connecticut 49 57 69 58.33 56.28 24.1 30.6 45.2 
New York 47 56 70 57.67 56.03 27.0 31.4 41.7 
New Hampshire 47 56 69 57.33 54.72 23.1 29.4 47.5 
Maine 46 56 69 57.00 54.04 22.4 28.9 48.7 
California 46 53 67 55.33 54.20 28.1 32.7 39.2 
Washington 45 53 66 54.67 53.05 26.3 31.5 42.2 
Hawaii 46 53 66 55.00 53.42 26.3 30.8 42.9 
New Jersey 45 53 67 55.00 53.01 24.8 32.0 43.3 
Colorado 44 50 63 52.33 50.98 26.5 32.3 41.2 
Oregon 44 50 64 52.67 50.98 25.5 31.3 43.1 
Nevada 43 49 64 52.00 50.46 25.9 33.6 40.4 
New Mexico 43 49 63 51.67 50.17 26.9 29.7 43.3 
Arizona 41 48 62 50.33 49.05 27.7 32.0 40.4 
Minnesota 38 47 61 48.67 46.77 26.1 30.8 43.1 
Pennsylvania 40 48 63 50.33 48.28 25.8 29.4 44.8 
Alaska 36 44 57 45.67 44.27 27.9 30.0 42.0 
Wisconsin 38 46 61 48.33 46.34 25.8 30.1 44.1 
Illinois 38 46 60 48.00 46.42 26.6 32.0 41.4 
Montana 38 46 60 48.00 45.87 25.7 27.6 46.6 
Maryland 37 45 58 46.67 44.89 25.7 31.3 43.1 
Delaware 36 45 59 46.67 44.78 26.3 30.3 43.4 
Michigan 35 43 57 45.00 42.99 25.4 29.9 44.6 
Florida 36 44 57 45.67 43.76 25.2 30.8 44.0 
Ohio 34 43 56 44.33 42.30 25.4 30.2 44.5 
Iowa 34 43 56 44.33 42.58 26.9 29.5 43.6 
Virginia 33 40 54 42.33 40.77 26.5 31.6 42.0 
Wyoming 32 39 54 41.67 40.01 27.2 28.9 43.9 
Kansas 32 40 54 42.00 40.54 27.9 30.0 42.1 
South Dakota 31 40 54 41.67 39.98 27.8 28.8 43.4 
Indiana 30 38 53 40.33 38.59 26.6 30.8 42.5 
North Dakota 30 39 53 40.67 39.52 30.7 27.4 41.9 
Missouri 30 38 52 40.00 38.32 26.9 30.0 43.1 
Idaho 30 37 51 39.33 38.02 27.9 31.0 41.1 
Nebraska 29 36 51 38.67 37.24 27.9 30.0 42.1 
West Virginia 29 37 52 39.33 36.84 23.7 30.0 46.3 
Texas 28 35 48 37.00 36.00 28.4 33.2 38.5 
North Carolina 27 34 47 36.00 34.46 26.0 32.3 41.7 
Georgia 26 33 45 34.67 33.41 26.7 33.3 39.9 
Louisiana 26 33 46 35.00 33.76 28.3 30.2 41.6 
South Carolina 24 31 44 33.00 31.50 26.8 30.5 42.7 
Kentucky 23 30 44 32.33 30.58 25.6 31.3 43.0 
Tennessee 23 29 42 31.33 29.75 25.6 31.6 42.9 
Utah 20 26 37 27.67 27.66 33.3 33.4 33.3 
Oklahoma 21 27 40 29.33 28.13 28.0 30.3 41.7 
Arkansas 21 27 40 29.33 27.91 26.6 30.9 42.5 
Mississippi 19 25 36 26.67 25.54 27.7 30.6 41.7 
Alabama 19 25 36 26.67 25.66 28.7 29.8 41.6 
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Table A7 (continued): Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Age, 
With and Without the Oldest Generation (65 and Older) 
St
at
e 
With Silent Generation Weighted Avg. Without Silent 
Generation 
Weighted Avg. 
18
–2
9 
30
–4
4 
45
–6
4 
65
+
 
SU
M
 
18
–2
9 
30
–4
4 
45
–6
4 
65
+
 
18
–2
9 
30
–4
4 
45
–6
4 
SU
M
 
18
–2
9 
30
–4
4 
45
–6
4 
MA 17.0 19.8 27.7 13.8 78.3 21.7 25.3 35.4 17.6 17.0 19.8 27.7 64.5 26.4 30.7 42.9 
VT 16.0 18.0 30.8 14.6 79.4 20.2 22.7 38.8 18.4 16.0 18.0 30.8 64.8 24.7 27.8 47.5 
RI 17.7 18.8 27.8 14.4 78.7 22.5 23.9 35.3 18.3 17.7 18.8 27.8 64.3 27.5 29.2 43.2 
CT 15.2 19.3 28.5 14.2 77.2 19.7 25.0 36.9 18.4 15.2 19.3 28.5 63.0 24.1 30.6 45.2 
NY 17.3 20.1 26.7 13.5 77.6 22.3 25.9 34.4 17.4 17.3 20.1 26.7 64.1 27.0 31.4 41.7 
NH 14.9 19.0 30.7 13.5 78.1 19.1 24.3 39.3 17.3 14.9 19.0 30.7 64.6 23.1 29.4 47.5 
ME 14.2 18.3 30.9 15.9 79.3 17.9 23.1 39.0 20.1 14.2 18.3 30.9 63.4 22.4 28.9 48.7 
CA 17.9 20.8 24.9 11.4 75.0 23.9 27.7 33.2 15.2 17.9 20.8 24.9 63.6 28.1 32.7 39.2 
WA 16.9 20.2 27.1 12.3 76.5 22.1 26.4 35.4 16.1 16.9 20.2 27.1 64.2 26.3 31.5 42.2 
HI 16.7 19.5 27.2 14.3 77.7 21.5 25.1 35.0 18.4 16.7 19.5 27.2 63.4 26.3 30.8 42.9 
NJ 15.8 20.4 27.6 13.5 77.3 20.4 26.4 35.7 17.5 15.8 20.4 27.6 63.8 24.8 32.0 43.3 
CO 17.2 20.9 26.7 10.9 75.7 22.7 27.6 35.3 14.4 17.2 20.9 26.7 64.8 26.5 32.3 41.2 
OR 16.2 19.9 27.4 13.9 77.4 20.9 25.7 35.4 18.0 16.2 19.9 27.4 63.5 25.5 31.3 43.1 
NV 16.4 21.3 25.6 12.0 75.3 21.8 28.3 34.0 15.9 16.4 21.3 25.6 63.3 25.9 33.6 40.4 
NM 16.6 18.3 26.7 13.2 74.8 22.2 24.5 35.7 17.6 16.6 18.3 26.7 61.6 26.9 29.7 43.3 
AZ 16.8 19.4 24.5 13.8 74.5 22.6 26.0 32.9 18.5 16.8 19.4 24.5 60.7 27.7 32.0 40.4 
MN 16.4 19.4 27.1 12.9 75.8 21.6 25.6 35.8 17.0 16.4 19.4 27.1 62.9 26.1 30.8 43.1 
PA 16.1 18.4 28.0 15.4 77.9 20.7 23.6 35.9 19.8 16.1 18.4 28.0 62.5 25.8 29.4 44.8 
AK 18.4 19.8 27.7 7.7 73.6 25.0 26.9 37.6 10.5 18.4 19.8 27.7 65.9 27.9 30.0 42.0 
WI 16.2 18.9 27.7 13.7 76.5 21.2 24.7 36.2 17.9 16.2 18.9 27.7 62.8 25.8 30.1 44.1 
IL 16.8 20.2 26.1 12.5 75.6 22.2 26.7 34.5 16.5 16.8 20.2 26.1 63.1 26.6 32.0 41.4 
MT 16.1 17.3 29.2 14.8 77.4 20.8 22.4 37.7 19.1 16.1 17.3 29.2 62.6 25.7 27.6 46.6 
MD 16.5 20.1 27.7 12.3 76.6 21.5 26.2 36.2 16.1 16.5 20.1 27.7 64.3 25.7 31.3 43.1 
DE 16.5 19.0 27.2 14.4 77.1 21.4 24.6 35.3 18.7 16.5 19.0 27.2 62.7 26.3 30.3 43.4 
MI 15.9 18.7 27.9 13.8 76.3 20.8 24.5 36.6 18.1 15.9 18.7 27.9 62.5 25.4 29.9 44.6 
FL 15.5 18.9 27.0 17.3 78.7 19.7 24.0 34.3 22.0 15.5 18.9 27.0 61.4 25.2 30.8 44.0 
OH 15.8 18.8 27.7 14.1 76.4 20.7 24.6 36.3 18.5 15.8 18.8 27.7 62.3 25.4 30.2 44.5 
IA 16.5 18.1 26.7 14.9 76.2 21.7 23.8 35.0 19.6 16.5 18.1 26.7 61.3 26.9 29.5 43.6 
VA 17.1 20.4 27.1 12.2 76.8 22.3 26.6 35.3 15.9 17.1 20.4 27.1 64.6 26.5 31.6 42.0 
WY 17.3 18.4 27.9 12.4 76.0 22.8 24.2 36.7 16.3 17.3 18.4 27.9 63.6 27.2 28.9 43.9 
KS 17.1 18.4 25.8 13.2 74.5 23.0 24.7 34.6 17.7 17.1 18.4 25.8 61.3 27.9 30.0 42.1 
SD 16.9 17.5 26.4 14.3 75.1 22.5 23.3 35.2 19.0 16.9 17.5 26.4 60.8 27.8 28.8 43.4 
IN 16.6 19.2 26.5 13.0 75.3 22.0 25.5 35.2 17.3 16.6 19.2 26.5 62.3 26.6 30.8 42.5 
ND 19.4 17.3 26.5 14.5 77.7 25.0 22.3 34.1 18.7 19.4 17.3 26.5 63.2 30.7 27.4 41.9 
MO 16.8 18.7 26.9 14.0 76.4 22.0 24.5 35.2 18.3 16.8 18.7 26.9 62.4 26.9 30.0 43.1 
ID 16.8 18.7 24.8 12.4 72.7 23.1 25.7 34.1 17.1 16.8 18.7 24.8 60.3 27.9 31.0 41.1 
NE 17.1 18.4 25.8 13.5 74.8 22.9 24.6 34.5 18.0 17.1 18.4 25.8 61.3 27.9 30.0 42.1 
WV 14.9 18.9 29.2 16.0 79.0 18.9 23.9 37.0 20.3 14.9 18.9 29.2 63.0 23.7 30.0 46.3 
TX 17.7 20.7 24.0 10.3 72.7 24.3 28.5 33.0 14.2 17.7 20.7 24.0 62.4 28.4 33.2 38.5 
NC 16.4 20.4 26.3 12.9 76.0 21.6 26.8 34.6 17.0 16.4 20.4 26.3 63.1 26.0 32.3 41.7 
GA 17.0 21.2 25.4 10.7 74.3 22.9 28.5 34.2 14.4 17.0 21.2 25.4 63.6 26.7 33.3 39.9 
LA 17.8 19.0 26.2 12.3 75.3 23.6 25.2 34.8 16.3 17.8 19.0 26.2 63.0 28.3 30.2 41.6 
SC 16.9 19.2 26.9 13.7 76.7 22.0 25.0 35.1 17.9 16.9 19.2 26.9 63.0 26.8 30.5 42.7 
KY 16.2 19.8 27.2 13.3 76.5 21.2 25.9 35.6 17.4 16.2 19.8 27.2 63.2 25.6 31.3 43.0 
TN 16.1 19.9 27.0 13.4 76.4 21.1 26.0 35.3 17.5 16.1 19.9 27.0 63.0 25.6 31.6 42.9 
UT  19.8 19.9 19.8 9.0 68.5 28.9 29.1 28.9 13.1 19.8 19.9 19.8 59.5 33.3 33.4 33.3 
OK 17.3 18.7 25.8 13.5 75.3 23.0 24.8 34.3 17.9 17.3 18.7 25.8 61.8 28.0 30.3 41.7 
AR 16.3 18.9 26.0 14.4 75.6 21.6 25.0 34.4 19.0 16.3 18.9 26.0 61.2 26.6 30.9 42.5 
MS 17.1 18.9 25.8 12.8 74.6 22.9 25.3 34.6 17.2 17.1 18.9 25.8 61.8 27.7 30.6 41.7 
AL 18.5 19.2 26.8 13.8 78.3 23.6 24.5 34.2 17.6 18.5 19.2 26.8 64.5 28.7 29.8 41.6 
 
                                                     
335. For an explanation of where the data in this Table are taken from, and 
how the weighted averages were generated, see supra note 166. 
